TL;DR
World Liberty Financial has three parts: WLFI, the governance token; USD1, the stablecoin; and WLFI Markets, a front end onto Dolomite. BitGo Bank & Trust issues USD1 under a brand World Liberty owns. DeFiLlama holds no protocol TVL Total value locked: the dollar value of everything deposited in a protocol or pool. It shows size, not safety. for the name, so we measure size by USD1 supply. That was $3,546.8M on 2026-11-06, down 20.0% from $4,434.8M on 2026-09-29. Ethereum lost the most (down 32.7%), then BSC (down 15.4%) and Solana (down 10.1%).
The reserves passed a real test. About $888M left in five weeks, and the Ethereum minting address alone burned 560.2M USD1 in 123 redemptions. CoinGecko's hourly price never went below $0.99667. That is 33bp under the Peg and depeg A stablecoin's peg is the price it targets, usually $1. A depeg is a move away from it, most often down. The stables page checks prices every 5 minutes. and inside our 50bp alert threshold. KPMG LLP signed the September examination unmodified on 2026-10-29, the fourth monthly report in a row. At September 30, assets exceeded tokens by $412,411.
The admin powers were tested too. During the Binance hack on 2026-10-29, World Liberty's guardian key blacklisted 48.5M WLFI, and a BitGo wallet froze 27.8M USD1. Both balances sit at an address Etherscan labels "Binance Hot Wallet Exploiter 2". "Binance 14", one of Binance's own hot wallets, was also frozen on USD1 and blacklisted on WLFI, on both Ethereum and BSC. The powers worked the way an issuer would want. They also showed how fast a holder can be cut off.
We correct September on one point. The Ethereum freezer address is a two-signature BitGo wallet, not a single key. In September it had no code because BitGo had not yet deployed it there. It went on chain at 21:58 UTC on 10-29, twelve minutes before its first freeze. The BSC freezer is a plain key, and it has now been used.
Separately, on 2026-09-30 the WLFI owner Safe upgraded the token to a new V4 implementation. There was no Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree., and we found no public Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope.. The uncapped Ethereum minter is still a single EOA. Both reds sit on surfaces where you lose money, so the verdict stays avoid.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Two Cyfrin reports cover the WLFI token system. "WLF" v2.1, dated 2025-09-05, covered the V2 upgrade. "WLFI Unlock" v2.0, dated 2026-05-06, covered V3. Both are still listed in Cyfrin's public report repository.
The token on chain is no longer V3. At 15:25 UTC on 2026-09-30, the 3-of-5 owner Safe called upgradeAndCall on the WLFI ProxyAdmin. That pointed the proxy at 0x73fe...fde7, which Etherscan verifies as "WorldLibertyFinancialV4". The new code is built against a staking contract, 0x196f...1923, and adds functions to lock tokens, claim rewards, set a reward signer and fund rewards. One minute later the same Safe granted REWARD_FUNDER_ROLE on 0x196f...1923 to 0xe61d...0a7a. Cyfrin's repository, last committed 2026-11-06, has no V4 or staking report. Another firm may have audited it, but we did not find a report: not verified in this review.
We also found no public audit of the USD1 token or its controller. The USD1 implementation is unchanged at 0x694a...1f08 on Ethereum and BSC. Both tokens remain upgradeable proxies.
Admin control. This is the first red. On Ethereum, the USD1 controller and its owners are unchanged. Its default admin is the 3-of-6 Safe, whose nonce is still 66, so it has executed nothing since 09-29: no role change, no drain, no upgrade. The USD1 proxy admin Safe is also unchanged at nonce 5.
The minter EOA 0x87e0...246e still holds MINTER and BURNER; we re-checked both with hasRole. Its nonce went from 75 to 240. That is 165 transactions: 42 mints totalling 34.9M USD1 and 123 burns from its own balance totalling 560.2M, none of which failed. On chain it is still one externally owned account with no cap. Whether BitGo runs it as an MPC wallet cannot be seen from the chain: not verified in this review. We did not re-run September's one-trillion mint simulation, because the role is unchanged.
The Ethereum freezer needs a correction. In September we described 0x6802...ee66 as an EOA with no code. It now holds code: an EIP-1167 clone of BitGo's WalletSimple, the same two-signature wallet as the other Ethereum minter. Etherscan shows it was created at 21:57:59 UTC on 10-29, through BitGo factory 0xa719...1555, about half an hour after it first received gas. Every freeze it has made went through sendMultiSig, which needs a second signature. So a freeze on Ethereum needs two BitGo signatures. September's address was a reserved BitGo wallet that did not yet exist on chain, not a plain key.
BSC is different. Its freezer, 0x82ac...a44b, is still a plain key with no code. Its nonce went from 0 to 3, and the exploiter address and Binance 14 both read as frozen on BSC today. So on BSC one key can freeze, and it has done so. The BSC minters 0x2ce4...eef1 and 0x8217...1151 still hold MINTER; the second went from nonce 20 to 41. On Solana, the mint authority is still the 1-of-4 SPL Multisig A wallet that needs several keyholders to sign, such as 5 of 9. Safer than one key, but only as safe as the people who hold the keys. with the same four signers, two of them ordinary keypairs. The freeze authority is still one keypair.
WLFI is where single keys reach furthest. Both guardians still read as guardians. 0x407f...c178 sent 36 transactions between 09-29 and 11-06. Four were blacklistings: on 10-07, on 10-12, at 20:57 UTC on 10-29 (the exploiter) and at 22:22 UTC on 10-29 (Binance 14). The rest were routine work: token approvals, reward campaigns, a CCIP send, delegate settings and executions for the owner Safe. That makes one hot operational key, also one of the owner Safe's five signers, able to blacklist or pause the token alone.
The owner Safe went from nonce 506 to 517. Its executions included the V4 upgrade and, on 10-16, an ownerBatchReallocateFrom on WLFI. That call had four legs. One moved 15,766.37 WLFI, another 0.0025 WLFI, and two moved zero. Zero-amount legs may move Vester allocation records rather than balances, and the reason for the whole batch is unpublished: not verified in this review. No issuer path on either token sits behind a timelock. Red.
Oracle. Holding up. KPMG LLP, San Francisco, signed the September 2026 examination on 2026-10-29. Its opinion is that management's assertion "is fairly stated, in all material respects." At September 15 there were 4,344,280,208 tokens against $4,344,692,702 of assets. At September 30 there were 4,416,180,490 tokens against $4,416,592,901, a surplus of $412,411, about one Basis point (bp) One hundredth of a percent: 1 bp = 0.01%, so 25 bp is 0.25%. The exit costs on the funding page are in bp.. Of those assets, $3,254M (73.7%) sat in a government money market fund and $1,162M (26.3%) in bank demand deposits that "at times may exceed" the FDIC limit. The BitGo account held $0. The background and summary sections are still footnoted as outside the examination.
The September report predates the freezes, so its access-restricted rows are zero. The October report should show the frozen tokens. The live feed at 0x691b...d4c4 ("USD1 BitGo Reported Reserves") read $3,515,923,387 at 21:24 UTC on 2026-11-06, so it is current this time. It is still the issuer's own figure relayed on chain.
WLFI Markets inherits Dolomite's Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through.. Our Dolomite report of 2026-11-06 found that oracle path behind a 2-of-3 Safe with a 300 second delay. It also found that a pause helper swapped seven market oracles on 10-29. Yellow.
Liquidity & exit. Better tested, still conditional. About $888M of redemptions cleared in five weeks, and the peg held throughout. Mid-October coverage tied an early wave to burns on Ethereum and BNB Chain, about $200M of it from a single BSC address (Onchain Benchmark via financefeeds and altcoinbuzz). USD1 trades about $1.1B a day (CoinGecko).
Redemption is still open only to BitGo clients in good standing. The September report repeats that holders without an account "do not have direct redemption rights with the Company." As far as we found, HTX still lists no USD1 after its June delisting: not verified in this review.
Inside our watchlist, Dolomite's Ethereum USD1 pool reached about 88.2% Utilization The share of a lending market's deposits that is lent out. Near 100%, depositors may have to wait to withdraw and the borrow rate jumps. on 10-17, after its borrow cap went from 250M to 300M. It was 79.7% on 11-06, with 58.4M idle. All Ethereum markets have been flagged closing since 10-29, which blocks new borrowing. WLFI trades $67.7M a day against a $1.47B market cap. Yellow.
Yield: real vs emission. USD1 pays no native yield; reserve income goes to the issuer. WLFI's lock-and-vote reward, passed in September, now has contracts behind it: the V4 token, a staking contract with a REWARD_FUNDER_ROLE, and reward campaigns created from the guardian key. On 10-02 the owner Safe test-funded the staking contract with a dust amount of USD1. No fixed rate is published, and the split between fee income and treasury tokens is unknown: not verified in this review. Dolomite's Ethereum USD1 market pays 8.08%, of which 3.40% is base and 4.68% is rewards. Yellow.
Holder concentration. This is the second red. On chain on 2026-11-06, the Vester 0x74B4...9583 holds 46,110,008,630 WLFI, 47.7% of Ethereum supply. The owner Safe holds 12,620,954,712, or 13.0%. Ethereum supply reads 96,722,743,250.5, the same as on 09-29, so no insider burn went through in this window. CoinGecko puts circulating supply at 31.78B of 100B.
In April's vesting vote, the largest wallet cast nearly 13% of votes and the top four held about 40% of voting power (CoinDesk). The owner can change MAX_VOTING_POWER without a vote.
The concentration also reaches DeFi. Our 11-06 Dolomite report counts $239.9M of WLFI plus $110.3M of WLFIcx as 38% of Dolomite's Ethereum supply. WLFIcx is Concrete's custodial wrapper, not a World Liberty contract. Nansen returned an out-of-credits error for wallet-level data: not verified in this review.
Track record. No contract exploit and no reserve loss. DeFiLlama's hacks list has 1,340 entries, the newest dated 2026-11-05. The only October entry near this name is Binance itself: a $6.36B CEX loss, classed as a key leaked through infrastructure. No entry is for World Liberty, USD1 or BitGo.
The freeze record grew. On Ethereum, the BitGo freezer froze 0x5227...2f8c ("Binance Hot Wallet Exploiter 2") at 22:10 UTC on 10-29 and 0x28c6...1d60 ("Binance 14") at 22:26 UTC. It froze an unlabelled address, 0x4dcd...28e0, at 11:59 UTC on 10-30. All three are still frozen. The exploiter address still holds 27,824,040 USD1 and 48,525,612 WLFI. That matches the "$27 million" USD1 and "48 million WLFI" in press coverage; BitGo said it froze USD1 at an address World Liberty identified. Binance 14 holds no USD1 and 420,240 WLFI, which is blacklisted. World Liberty has not explained publicly why Binance's own wallet was frozen: not verified in this review.
The unflattering datapoint is WLFI itself. It set an all-time low of $0.0437 on 2026-11-05 and is down 18% since 09-29.
The Sun case changed shape. In the California federal case, World Liberty filed an amended corporate disclosure. It lists 22 entities in its ownership chain, with citizenship in Florida, Delaware, Puerto Rico and the UAE. World Liberty now argues that the federal court lacks jurisdiction. On 2026-11-03 Sun announced a motion for sanctions and said he plans to refile in California state court (CoinCentral, 2026-11-04). Nothing has been decided on the merits.
The OCC charter for World Liberty Trust is still preliminary. We found no final approval and no handover of issuance, and the September report still names BitGo as issuer.
Worst case
Three ways to lose, ranked by what we verified.
First, an issuance key is compromised. On Ethereum, one EOA with no cap sends USD1 mints and burns every day. BSC has two such keys. On Solana, two ordinary keypairs sit on a 1-of-4 multisig. 10-29 showed what a leaked hot key costs at scale: Binance lost $6.36B that way. Unbacked USD1 could cross chains over CCIP and land on every venue that treats it as a dollar.
Second, seizure. You can be cut off in minutes. On 10-29, a WLFI address was blacklisted within about an hour of the first public reports, and its USD1 was frozen within about two. That was aimed at a thief. The same tools, in the same hands, froze an exchange's own hot wallet. On BSC one plain key did it, and on WLFI one guardian key can do it alone. The EVM admin Safe can then drain or reallocate a frozen USD1 balance. There is no timelock and no appeal.
Third, the slow version: the reserves stay sound, but the issuer changes. If the OCC approval becomes final, issuance and reserves move from BitGo to World Liberty Trust, and the attestation record may restart. A quarter of reserves sits in bank deposits above the insured limit, and the surplus is about one basis point. Holders without a BitGo account can exit only on the market. A run would hit Dolomite's USD1 lenders first, in a pool that is about 80% lent out with new borrowing frozen. No leg has an insurance fund.
Bottom line
Avoid for direct exposure. The reserves came through a 20% drawdown in five weeks without breaking the peg or missing a report. That is real evidence, and it improves the record. The Ethereum freezer is safer than we said, because it needs two BitGo signatures.
Neither red moved. The Ethereum minter is still one uncapped EOA. BSC freezes with one plain key, and Solana mints with either of two plain keys. WLFI's guardian is a hot operational key that can blacklist or pause alone. The owner Safe swapped in a new token implementation with no timelock and no audit we could find. Most of the supply still sits with the Vester and the owner. Our only exposure stays indirect, through Dolomite, which our 11-06 report now rates avoid.
Re-rate upward if all three of these happen. Mint and freeze on every chain move behind a real multisig with a timelock or a mint rate limit. WLFI's guardian powers move behind the owner Safe. V4 gets a published audit. A final OCC charter that keeps a KPMG-grade monthly attestation would also count. Re-rate downward on any of these:
- a freeze or drain of a DeFi venue's USD1;
- a drain of the frozen exploiter balance without an announced process;
- another unannounced implementation change;
- a missed monthly report;
- a USD1 hourly print below $0.995.
Data appendix
- TVL: DeFiLlama has no protocol TVL for World Liberty Financial, so we quote none.
- USD1 supply and price (DeFiLlama stablecoins, id 262):
- Circulating $3,546,801,111 at $0.99782 on 2026-11-06, the sixth-largest stablecoin.
- Previous day $3,715.2M, previous week $3,884.8M, previous month $4,459.1M. Against 09-29 ($4,434.8M): down 20.0%.
- By chain today: Solana $1,250.1M, BSC $1,178.3M, Ethereum $1,078.2M, Aptos $19.3M, Abcore $18.6M, Tron $10.1M.
- On-chain reads: Ethereum 1,057,673,498, BSC 1,178,291,927, Solana 1,250,084,588.
- Ethereum supply fell 545.5M on chain since 09-29. The minter's net native burn of 525.3M explains most of that. The rest, presumably net CCIP outflow, is not verified in this review.
- Peg (CoinGecko hourly, 2026-09-29 to 2026-11-06):
- Low $0.99667 (2026-11-03 00:00 UTC), high $0.99974 (2026-10-06).
- Spot about $0.998, 24h volume about $1.09B to $1.14B.
- CoinGecko's ATL and ATH prints on 2026-07-09 ($0.988762 and $1.048) are still unexplained: not verified in this review.
- WLFI market (CoinGecko, 2026-11-06 about 22:05 UTC):
- Price $0.0463, market cap $1.47B (rank 62), FDV $4.63B.
- Circulating 31,780,184,665 of 100B. 24h volume about $67.7M, 4.6% of market cap.
- ATL $0.04370 on 2026-11-05. Hourly range since 09-29: $0.0439 to $0.0580. Price on 09-29: about $0.0566 to $0.0570.
- Ethereum USD1 admin (re-read):
- Proxy 0x8d0d000ee44948fc98c9b98a4fa4921476f08b0d. Implementation 0x694aa534bdef8ed63244eb902e7914e527891f08 (unchanged). ProxyAdmin 0xa032fe6c496732bdfc0d235066f55f171fa4aece, owned by 3-of-5 Safe 0x6a8dc6dbf909f542f2536edf8676d52630cf59e1 (nonce 5, unchanged).
- Owner: controller 0xee9b1a09aedaced9dcda74964ea447feb93861c2. Default admin: 3-of-6 Safe 0x0d190b74308669e8f4fe7dbce3466169b285289d, nonce 66 (unchanged since 09-29).
- hasRole on 2026-11-06:
- FREEZER: 0x6802744c90ffb2045de9790527b446d663f1ee66 and the Safe.
- MINTER and BURNER: 0x87e0017503560a655309c470666645472c66246e, the WalletSimple clone 0x0f33afb00334ea05f6f0e64fc919920ecd4bd16c, and the Safe.
- PAUSER: the clone and the Safe.
- 0x6802...ee66 is now an EIP-1167 clone of WalletSimple 0xe5dcdc13b628c2df813db1080367e929c1507ca0.
- It received gas from 21:28 UTC on 10-29 and was created at 21:57:59 UTC, in tx 0xf608df71...d81c from 0x833b62b180a2e74c325d5fc02ef917ddc807d67b through factory 0xa7198f48c58e91f01317e70cd24c5cce475c1555.
- Freeze calls, all sendMultiSig to the controller with freeze(address): seq 3 at 22:10:35 UTC on 10-29 targeting 0x5227f603c1ee34ce3c06efe6477003bdfccb2f8c; seq 5 at 22:26:11 UTC targeting 0x28c6c06298d514db089934071355e5743bf21d60; seq 7 at 11:59:35 UTC on 10-30 targeting 0x4dcda4d0682fbec10d5fab594accb8d8e25a28e0.
- frozen(address) returns true for all three today.
- Minter EOA 0x87e0...246e: nonce 240 (75 on 09-29).
- 165 transactions: 42 mints for 34,886,950 USD1, and 123 burnFrom calls on its own address for 560,235,824 USD1. No failures.
- Largest mint recipients: 0xb9f6...da05 13.3M, 0x67f6...4aef 10.6M, 0x83bc...c4 9.5M.
- Largest burn days: 11-06 93.6M, 11-03 68.2M, 10-08 54.4M.
- BSC (re-read):
- USD1 implementation unchanged.
- Freezer 0x82ac131813fe775384d675059ce50f345049a44b: no code, nonce 3 (0 on 09-29).
- The exploiter address and Binance 14 read as frozen on BSC. 0x4dcd...28e0 does not.
- Minters: 0x2ce40f5c4ca78337f281d85245a4977d4ab5eef1 (nonce 453, also pauser) and 0x8217fb24d076d71864eb69684de2024c3c111151 (nonce 41).
- Timestamps and targets of the BSC freezer's three transactions: not verified in this review (BSC explorer API not available on our plan).
- Solana (re-read):
- Mint USD1ttGY1N17NEEHLmELoaybftRBUSErhqYiQzvEmuB, supply 1,250,084,587.68.
- Mint authority BQh68x9D7TDqgJUXiJX1BsD1eR7kkV978owqwBEftpwK, a 1-of-4 multisig with the same signers (76pV...11t5, AU33...ywdQ, 4Lo5...AACw, 3AvS...pFV3).
- Freeze authority 84ssq8Ud2WRzxVCuEmPa9xLPBUt4odmB8wuE8svZkh71 (unchanged).
- Any Solana freezes on 10-29: not verified in this review.
- WLFI token admin (re-read):
- Proxy 0xda5e1988097297dcdc1f90d4dfe7909e847cbef6.
- Implementation now 0x73fe14ff5a25e4363a72828cccd8444f0748fde7 ("WorldLibertyFinancialV4", verified; deployed 2026-09-30 with the Vester and 0x196f...1923 as constructor arguments). Previously 0x59a3293c71769363068b4c1e8906e364763b3195.
- ProxyAdmin 0x7f533afa9e994b7e44673188034f9ce52886a0c0, owned by 3-of-5 Safe 0x5be9a4959308a0d0c7bc0870e319314d8d957dbb. The same Safe owns the token.
- Upgrade: owner Safe tx 0xf7cf1a6b9a6fb38fd5ee2b19f2c9f0ec5f4066df46f0ba02bfb44a0f6581fb0d at 15:25:47 UTC on 2026-09-30 (upgradeAndCall). The next tx, 0x1a962cac...579c at 15:26:47 UTC, granted REWARD_FUNDER_ROLE (0x61b754da...) on 0x196fee96efeaad585483a6d950e70286b6851923 to 0xe61d87b84a8226fa081b6f28fd262324348f0a7a.
- Owner Safe nonce 517 (506 on 09-29). Its execution at 15:12 UTC on 2026-10-16 (tx 0x4e615af6...d7af) called ownerBatchReallocateFrom on WLFI:
- 0x6c97...adaf to 0x0dd3...f95e: 15,766.37 WLFI.
- 0xabd1...3579 to 0x517f...21ee: 0.
- 0x6472...433a to 0xeee0...111f: 0.
- 0x192e...6535 to 0xe203...4449: 0.0025 WLFI.
- Reason: not verified in this review.
- Guardians: isGuardian is true for 0x407f66afb4f9876637accc3246099a2f9705c178 (EOA, nonce 513, 478 on 09-29) and 0xee3e775137520dfa73a29694b2943ffdf994441a (a contract).
- guardianSetBlacklistStatus calls from 0x407f since 09-29: 0xc54feb4aa3fb1c993ddbb12f2993acdd9c5396b6 (10-07 14:42 UTC), 0xcc61af21f23407c38b7dea6f9adad7f8d7f84cf4 (10-12 19:05 UTC), 0x5227...2f8c (10-29 20:57 UTC) and 0x28c6...1d60 (10-29 22:22 UTC). isBlacklisted is true for all four. The token is not paused.
- No timelock on any issuer path.
- Proxy 0xda5e1988097297dcdc1f90d4dfe7909e847cbef6.
- Address labels (Etherscan page titles, 2026-11-06): 0x5227...2f8c "Binance Hot Wallet Exploiter 2". 0x28c6...1d60 "Binance 14". 0x4dcd...28e0 unlabelled.
- Audits:
- Cyfrin repository (github.com/Cyfrin/cyfrin-audit-reports, last commit 2026-11-06): 2025-09-05-cyfrin-wlf-v2.1.pdf and 2026-05-06-cyfrin-wlfi-unlock-v2.0.pdf. Nothing for V4, staking or USD1.
- Audits by other firms of V4 or the USD1 controller: not verified in this review.
- The Cyberscope "wlfi.club" audit and Cyfrin's "One World Project" report cover different projects.
- Reserves and attestation (BitGo USD1 Reserve Report, September 2026, KPMG LLP San Francisco, signed 2026-10-29):
- Sept 15: 4,344,280,208 tokens, $4,344,692,702 assets, surplus $412,494.
- Sept 30: 4,416,180,490 tokens, $4,416,592,901 assets, surplus $412,411.
- Sept 30 assets: demand deposits $1,162,488,934; government MMF at NAV (CUSIP 31607A703) $3,254,103,967; BitGo account $0.
- Tokens at Sept 30: Ethereum 1,603,127,809, BNB 1,392,332,135, other 1,420,720,546.
- Access-restricted and time-locked rows: zero.
- Networks: Ethereum, BNB Smart Chain, Solana, Tron, Aptos and Tempo, with a Canton address footnoted. Redemption terms unchanged.
- The October report is not yet published: not verified in this review.
- PoR feed: 0x691b74146cdba162449012aa32d3cbf5df77d4c4, description "USD1 BitGo Reported Reserves". Latest bundle $3,515,923,386.97 at 21:24:07 UTC on 2026-11-06. Not reconciled to supply net of frozen tokens: not verified in this review.
- Regulatory: OCC preliminary conditional approval for World Liberty Trust Company, N.A., dated 2026-08-14 (Corporate Decision #1385). No final approval and no transfer of issuance found by 2026-11-06. Per secondary coverage, the approval lapses if the bank does not open within 18 months.
- Holder concentration:
- Vester 0x74B4f6A2E579D730aAcb9dD23cfbbAEb95029583: 46,110,008,630 WLFI (47.67%).
- Owner Safe: 12,620,954,712 (13.05%).
- Ethereum supply 96,722,743,250.50, unchanged since 09-29.
- Nansen top holders: out-of-credits error, not verified in this review.
- Cross-reference, Dolomite (apps/showcase/content/research/dolomite.md, researched 2026-11-06, verdict avoid):
- USD1 borrow cap raised from 250M to 300M on 10-16.
- Utilization peaked at about 88.2% on 10-17 and was 79.7% on 11-06 (286.9M supplied, 228.6M borrowed).
- All 23 Ethereum markets have been closing since 23:16 UTC on 10-29. A pause key swapped seven oracles on 10-29.
- USD1 APY Yearly yield with the earnings reinvested (compound interest). Most tables here show APY; funding and the exchange vaults show APR. 8.08% (3.40% base, 4.68% reward). Not re-measured here.
- Recent-news scan:
- DeFiLlama hacks: 1,340 entries, the newest 2026-11-05. None for World Liberty, WLFI, USD1 or BitGo. Binance, 2026-10-29: $6.36B, CEX, Key Leaked via Infrastructure.
- Binance hack: World Liberty and BitGo froze $27M USD1 and 48M WLFI tied to the hack (bitcoin.com, 10-30). BitGo said it froze USD1 at an address World Liberty identified and found no security issue on its own platform.
- USD1 redemptions: $385M fell between the 10-06 and 10-15 closes, per Onchain Benchmark, about $200M of it from one BSC address (financefeeds, altcoinbuzz). The peg held.
- Sun v. World Liberty: the amended disclosure lists 22 ownership entities, including in the UAE. World Liberty argues there is no federal jurisdiction. Sun announced a sanctions motion on 2026-11-03 and plans to refile in California state court (CoinCentral, 2026-11-04). World Liberty's Miami-Dade defamation suit: no update found, not verified in this review.
- No new peg break, reserve shortfall or contract exploit found for 2026-09-29 to 2026-11-06.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.