TL;DR
Spark is Sky's lending and savings Star. SparkLend is an Aave v3 fork. The Spark Liquidity How much you can sell or withdraw right now without moving the price or waiting. Thin liquidity means a slow or costly exit. Layer moves Sky reserves into other venues. Spark Savings runs the sUSDS-side products and Spark's own V2 Vault and curator A shared deposit pool run by code or by a curator. The curator chooses which markets get your money and sets the limits, for a fee.. Since 2026-09-20 the risk picture is the same in substance. The numbers moved, new parts were added, and one claim from last month needs correcting.
TVL Total value locked: the dollar value of everything deposited in a protocol or pool. It shows size, not safety. is $6,867,116,851 on the DeFiLlama parent, against $7,109,214,251 on 2026-09-20 on the same de-duplicated basis. That is down 3.4 percent while ETH fell about 15 percent: the SparkLend WETH Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through. read $2,624.61 then and $2,226.07 now. SparkLend's own line fell from $5.60B to $5.06B, which is less than its mostly wstETH collateral fell in dollars, so collateral grew in ETH terms. The Liquidity Layer rose from $2.53B to about $2.91B.
The controls that carried last month's verdict were read again on-chain this run:
- The Sky pause delay is 48 hours.
- All five Ethena and Superstate rate limits still read zero. All five carry the same 2026-09-14 14:00:59 UTC timestamp, so nobody has touched them since.
- The ALM Proxy still holds the 80.91 sUSDe it held in August.
What is new is in the Liquidity Layer on Arbitrum. The 2026-10-08 spell gave admin over the new Diamond PAU rate limits to a "PAS Configurator". Its verified source shows it can raise those limits without a spell, within narrow bounds. Details are under Admin control.
The hack-list entry needs one sentence. DeFiLlama dates a $538k "MakerDAO ETH-A Liquidation When a loan passes its LLTV or a perp position runs out of margin, it is closed by force and the collateral is sold, usually with a penalty. Keeper Bot" loss to 2026-10-06. The keeper is a dormant third-party bot that won its auctions in 2020, and it had an unprotected drain function. DeFiLlama's own write-up says MakerDAO's core contracts behaved as designed. The money was not Spark's or Sky's.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. SparkLend inherits Aave v3's Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope.. Spark's security page still lists thirteen audited components, counted again this run from its audit links. The Immunefi bounty is still listed at up to $5,000,000. The spark-alm-controller audits folder confirms the firms that last month carried over without a recheck:
- ChainSecurity and Cantina on v1.0.0 through v1.7.0 and on v1.10.0.
- Cantina and Certora on v1.8.0 and v1.9.0.
One correction. Last month's report said diamond-pau v1.14.0 appeared nowhere in the audited set, and it called the separate PAU stack a growing coverage gap. That was half right. The docs page still does not list diamond-pau. But the repository, now at sky-ecosystem/diamond-pau, keeps its own audits folder:
- the earlier controller audit files from v1.0.0 onward;
- v1.12.0 reports from Cantina, Certora, ChainSecurity, Octane and Unvariant;
- v1.14.0 reports from Cantina and ChainSecurity.
Those are file names only. The PDFs were not opened, so their scope and findings are not verified in this review. pau-administered-agent, pau-assemblers and the PAS Configurator were not checked for audits: not verified in this review. The gap is narrower than reported, not closed.
Admin control. MCD_PAUSE.delay() reads 172800 seconds (48 hours) on-chain today. Treat that as today's setting only: over two years it has been 30, 48, 24 and 48 hours.
Spark spells since the last report:
- 2026-09-24: Spark Foundation grants, a USDS allocation for SPK buybacks, and the end of the Gnosis and LBTC wind-down.
- 2026-10-08: a Diamond PAU parallel controller on the existing Arbitrum ALM Proxy, and a CCTP V2 USDC route from Arbitrum to Ethereum. Its limit is a $5M cap that refills at $50M a day. The spell also sent idle Arbitrum USDS back to Ethereum, added spUSDC to X Layer savings intents, and moved the Arbitrum beacon admin to the Sky governance relay. The 2026-11-05 forum post says it executed on Arbitrum on 2026-10-12.
- 2026-10-22: lower WETH and stablecoin rate curves, 100M sUSDS bridged to Arbitrum, grants and buybacks. It has executed. The WETH strategy now reads slope 2 of 30 percent. PYUSD reads an 80 percent kink with slopes of 0.2 and 15 percent. Both match the proposal.
- 2026-11-05: the Base copy of the PAU stack. It also adds OUSD mint and redeem through two Bridge deposit addresses that the forum post says are held for the Spark Assets Foundation, and a Uniswap v4 OUSD/USDS pool. On-chain, OUSD is the "OpenUSD" token with 112.1M supply. The spell has not executed. Its OUSD transfer rate limit still reads zero. Its Sky Core companion item, raising the ALLOCATOR-SPARK-A auto-line ttl to 24 hours, still reads 43200 seconds (12 hours).
The new item to name is the PAS Configurator at 0xd11Dc57F3eF23bb7b3142588a461F68460a7C474 on Arbitrum. It holds admin over both the Arbitrum PAU access controls and the PAU rate limits. Its verified source exposes only two actions:
setRateLimit: raises or lowers a rate limit.callControllerAction: runs controller calls that are on a governance whitelist.
Both can only be called by holders of a "cBEAM" permission recorded in a BeamState contract. Read on-chain this run:
- The Sky governance relay is a ward of BeamState.
- BeamState is not stopped.
- The hop for the Arbitrum PAU rate limits is 57,600 seconds (16 hours).
- maxChange is 1.2.
So a cBEAM holder can raise any Arbitrum PAU rate limit without a spell. Each raise goes to the larger of a governance-set default or 1.2 times the current limit, at most once every 16 hours per key. Lowering a limit has no such wait.
That is a bounded path outside the 48 hour delay. Within 48 hours, three steps compound a limit to at most about 1.73 times its value, or to its default. The defaults were not read, and who holds cBEAMs was not read: not verified in this review.
The 10-08 spell also changed who operates the Arbitrum PAU Administered Agent:
- A Spark hot wallet (an address with no contract code) was added as an actor.
- Two Soter Multisig A wallet that needs several keyholders to sign, such as 5 of 9. Safer than one key, but only as safe as the people who hold the keys. were added, one as revoker and one as grantor.
What the grantor can grant was not established: not verified in this review. The emergency freezer multisigs still act with no delay at all.
Oracle. No change. PoolAddressesProvider 0x02C3eA4e34C0cBd694D2adFa2c690EECbC1793eE still points to oracle 0x8105f69d9c41644c6a0803fda7d03aa70996cfd9. The WETH and cbBTC sources still describe themselves as "Aggregated price feed ... from Chronicle, Chainlink, and RedStone oracles", and both return live prices. Last month's caveat still applies: the feed reports its own timestamp in a way that cannot prove the price is fresh. That was not tested again this run.
Liquidity & exit. SparkLend withdrawals need idle pool liquidity. Borrowed is $2.67B against $5.06B of TVL. Borrowing ran at $2.72B on 2026-10-29, with no visible stress in the daily series.
Savings V2 pays out atomically from a buffer. Anything larger goes to an intent queue that the ALM Planner fills. Measured today:
- spUSDC: $252.7M total, $10.0M idle in the vault, so about 4.0 percent is available instantly. Down from $309.2M.
- spUSDT: $357.2M total, $64.9M idle, about 18.2 percent. Down from $397.5M. The idle amount is above the "up to $10 million" buffer the docs describe, so treat it as a point-in-time reading, not a policy.
The ALM Proxy still holds zero shares of all four V2 vaults. How fast the queue clears under stress has not been measured: not verified in this review.
Yield (real vs emission). The administered Vault Savings Rate went up. vsr() annualises to exactly:
- 3.8 percent for spUSDC and spPYUSD (3.6 percent last month);
- 4.0 percent for spUSDT (3.5 percent);
- 1.7 percent for spETH (1.35 percent).
The October forum post puts the Sky Base Rate, Spark's cost of capital, at 3.93 percent, so these rates sit close to it. The money comes from stability fees, treasuries and returns on deployed reserves. With Ethena at zero there is no basis-trade component.
On SparkLend, the largest USDS pool is $351.0M paying 5.33 percent. DeFiLlama books all of it as rewards and none as base. Next to it is a $329.0M pool paying 3.18 percent base. Do not read 5.33 percent as revenue.
Holder concentration. Circulating SPK is 3,439,429,068 of 10,000,000,000 (34.4 percent), up from 33.3 percent. At about $0.0164 that is a $56.2M market cap and a $163.5M FDV. The price is down 26.5 percent over 30 days and about 22 percent since 2026-09-20. Governance now funds monthly buybacks: 341,970 USDS in the 2026-10-22 spell, spread over 90 days. That is small next to the float. Top holders: not verified in this review, because Etherscan puts that data behind its Pro plan, for the fourth month running. For a depositor the concentration that matters more is still Sky, which controls governance and much of the deposit base.
Track record. There is no Spark record among 1,340 DeFiLlama hack entries (1,273 last month), and all three Spark protocol records have an empty hacks field. Two recent entries have similar names but are not Spark:
- "MakerDAO ETH-A Liquidation Keeper Bot", 2026-10-06, $538k. A third-party keeper had an unprotected drain function. Someone settled four auctions the keeper had won in 2020 and walked off with 200 WETH of unclaimed collateral.
- "SKYDAO", 2026-09-30, $183k on BSC: a bug in a taxed token's pool.
The same list does hold one entry for Spark's lineage. MakerDAO lost $8.32M on 2020-03-12 ("Black Thursday"). Its oracle went stale, liquidations cleared at zero bids, and about $4M of bad debt followed. That is three years before Spark launched, but Spark depends on Sky.
For the 2026-10-29 Binance hack window, SparkLend reserve flags were read at blocks dated 2026-09-23, 2026-10-26, 2026-10-29 17:49 UTC, 2026-11-01 and today. At every one, no reserve was paused, and the same five reserves were frozen: GNO, rETH, tBTC, ezETH and rsETH. Those were frozen before the window. These are samples, not every block, so a freeze set and lifted between samples cannot be fully ruled out.
An X sweep from 2026-09-20 to 2026-11-06 found no Spark freeze, exploit, bad debt or Peg and depeg A stablecoin's peg is the price it targets, usually $1. A depeg is a move away from it, most often down. The stables page checks prices every 5 minutes.. LBTC collateral fell from $222.5M to $86.7M after September set its LTV and LLTV LTV is your loan as a share of your collateral's value. LLTV is the LTV at which the position is liquidated; the gap between the two is your buffer. to zero. That is the wind-down working as intended.
Worst case
A Sky governance failure is still the worst case. A hostile executive spell can change SparkLend parameters or upgrade contracts once the 48 hour delay passes, and governance can change that delay. Spark cannot be safer than Sky.
Second is the new plumbing. Diamond PAU controllers now run beside the audited ALM controller on Arbitrum, and the Base copy is queued. The PAS Configurator lets cBEAM holders raise those controllers' rate limits without a spell. Each raise is limited to 20 percent per key per 16 hours, or a default that governance sets. Today this covers the Arbitrum PAU only, where the route back to Ethereum is capped at $5M. But it is now a channel where Liquidity Layer limits can grow faster than the 48 hour spell window. A compromised cBEAM holder could raise limits step by step until governance stops BeamState or revokes the permission.
Third is the savings exit. A large spUSDC or spUSDT redemption beyond the idle balance waits for off-chain fulfilment from a Layer that holds credit lines, LP (liquidity provider) Depositing two tokens into a trading pool to earn its swap fees. If their prices drift apart, you end up holding more of the one that fell. positions and SparkLend deposits. That delays the money but does not take away the claim to it. Still, it is the part of Spark least like the cash people treat it as.
Bottom line
Solid, and nothing measured this run would change it. No dimension is red. Every control the September verdict relied on was read again on-chain and holds: the pause delay, Ethena at zero, oracle aggregation, and no pauses or new freezes. TVL fell less than the ETH price. Three spells executed and all were routine: rate curves, bridging, grants, buybacks. The one hack-list entry that looked like it touched Spark turned out to be a third-party keeper bot whose auctions date from 2020.
Deductions carried forward:
- The Liquidity Layer's credit book cannot be inspected.
- Savings exits depend on a buffer and a queue.
- The advertised savings rate is set by governance, not earned and passed through.
- The biggest SparkLend USDS rate is booked as rewards.
New deduction: a bounded path now exists for raising Arbitrum PAU rate limits without a spell.
Any of these would flip the verdict to caution:
- a large Ethena rate limit restored;
- the Anchorage credit book growing without matching disclosure;
- the configurator's bounds widened (maxChange above 1.2, a hop under 16 hours, or large defaults), or the same setup extended to the Ethereum mainnet ALM rate limits;
- a first bad-debt event.
Data appendix
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TVL:
- Parent: $6,867,116,851 (api.llama.fi/tvl/spark), against $7,109,214,251 on 2026-09-20, same parent basis, -3.4 percent.
- Children before de-duplication: SparkLend $5,059,871,498; Spark Liquidity Layer $2,910,588,441 (an earlier read the same day gave $2,905.2M); Spark Savings $1,261,546,975.
- SparkLend borrowed $2,665.7M. The daily Ethereum series shows SparkLend at $5,130.5M and borrowed at $2,718.4M on 2026-10-29, with no sudden jump around that date.
- Not measured again: Liquidity Layer composition, the Anchorage USDT line, the Uniswap v4 position count and the PYUSD gap: not verified in this review.
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Audits:
- docs.spark.finance/dev/security/security-and-audits: thirteen component audit links, the same set as last month, no diamond-pau entry.
- Bug bounty page: "up to $5,000,000" (Immunefi).
- sparkdotfi/spark-alm-controller/audits: ChainSecurity, Cantina and Certora files through v1.10.0.
- sky-ecosystem/diamond-pau/audits: v1.12.0 (Cantina, Certora, ChainSecurity, Octane, Unvariant) and v1.14.0 (Cantina, ChainSecurity), plus the earlier controller files. File names only; PDFs not opened: not verified in this review.
- Audits of pau-administered-agent, pau-assemblers and the PAS Configurator: not verified in this review.
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Admin/governance:
MCD_PAUSE.delay()= 172800 s.- spark-spells PRs: 196 (2026-09-24 spell, merged 2026-09-21), 204 (2026-10-08, merged 2026-10-12), 208 (2026-10-22, merged 2026-10-20), 209 (2026-11-05, merged 2026-11-03).
- The 2026-10-22 spell's execution is confirmed by the WETH strategy
0xd5114e1e780f13ed82fb36440dc4d381d7743c81(slope 2 = 30 percent) and the PYUSD strategy0x5eb8926757e75d06d3014633ff1705cab8db0a17(optimal 80 percent, slope 1 0.2 percent, slope 2 15 percent, base 3.93 percent). - The 2026-11-05 spell has not executed: the USDC to OUSD Bridge-deposit transfer rate limit reads all zero, and DssAutoLine ilks(ALLOCATOR-SPARK-A) reads ttl 43200 (line 10B, gap 1.5B).
- Forum posts: forum.skyeco.com/t/28265, /28298, /28351. The 28351 post says the 2026-10-08 spell executed on Arbitrum on 2026-10-12.
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PAS Configurator (Arbitrum):
0xd11Dc57F3eF23bb7b3142588a461F68460a7C474, verified source "Configurator" (Dai Foundation). BeamState is0x11cfefea67b18de9046a6250555d438854ffeeda.- It holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on PAU AccessControls
0x8386f819860D54B1180539Ff4852E4CAECef8A1Dand PAU RateLimits0x4824C4336a1a11979068A544958dCe5D49B42752. - BeamState: stopped false, getHop = 57,600 s, getMaxChange = 1.2e18, and the Sky governance relay is a ward.
- Not read: cBEAM holders and default limits: not verified in this review.
- The Base copy,
0x458Acd38fD749F6325039e63e8Bc496dBc286D11, is pending in the 2026-11-05 spell.
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Rate limits (ALM RateLimits
0x7A5FD5cf045e010e62147F065cEAe59e5344b188): LIMIT_USDE_MINT, LIMIT_USDE_BURN, LIMIT_SUSDE_Cooldown and withdrawal queue The wait between asking to withdraw and getting your funds: a fixed cooldown (7 days for HYPE staking) or a queue that clears as cash comes back., LIMIT_SUPERSTATE_SUBSCRIBE and the sUSDe 4626 deposit key all read max 0, slope 0, lastUpdated 2026-09-14 14:00:59 UTC. ALM Proxy sUSDe balance is 80.912135195743362751, unchanged. B2C2 and Anchorage keys not resolved: not verified in this review. -
Oracle:
0x8105f69d9c41644c6a0803fda7d03aa70996cfd9.- WETH source
0x2750e4cb...("Aggregated price feed ETH/USD from Chronicle, Chainlink, and RedStone oracles"): $2,226.07468395. - cbBTC source
0x4219aa1a...("Aggregated price feed BTC/USD from Chronicle, Chainlink, and RedStone oracles"): $75,763.89001983.
- WETH source
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Savings V2 (on-chain):
Vault totalAssets Rate Idle in vault ALM shares spUSDC 252,686,738 3.8000% 10,000,920 USDC 0 spUSDT 357,152,958 4.0000% 64,881,573 USDT 0 spPYUSD 23,914.5 3.8000% 23,236 PYUSD 0 spETH 24,092.76 WETH 1.7000% 2,408 WETH 0 Fulfilment time under stress: not verified in this review.
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Yields (DeFiLlama pools):
- Spark Savings: USDS Arbitrum 3.8 percent ($476.2M), USDT 4.0 percent ($357.2M), USDC 3.8 percent ($253.6M), ETH 1.7 percent ($53.5M), USDS Base 3.8 percent ($12.1M), USDG Robinhood Chain 3.8 percent ($11.7M).
- SparkLend: USDS $351.0M at 5.32684 percent (apyBase null, all reward); USDS $329.0M at 3.17824 percent base; LBTC $86.7M (was $222.5M); wstETH $3,529.1M.
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SparkLend reserve flags: read from Pool
0xC13e21B648A5Ee794902342038FF3aDAB66BE987getConfiguration, bits 57 (frozen) and 60 (paused), at blocks 26,040,000 (2026-09-23), 26,280,000 (2026-10-26), 26,300,000 (2026-10-29 17:49 UTC), 26,320,000 (2026-11-01) and latest. At all five, none was paused and GNO, rETH, tBTC, ezETH and rsETH were frozen. -
Holder concentration: SPK (CoinGecko spark-2): 3,439,429,068 circulating of 10,000,000,000, about $0.01636, market cap about $56.3M, FDV about $163.6M, 30d -26.5 percent. Buyback funding: 341,970 USDS in the 2026-10-22 spell. Top holders: not verified in this review.
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Incident and news scan:
- DeFiLlama hacks: 1,340 records, no Spark entry.
- "MakerDAO ETH-A Liquidation Keeper Bot" (2026-10-06, $538,000, Ethereum, Improper Access Control) is a third-party keeper; its description says "MakerDAO's core contracts behaved as designed".
- "SKYDAO" (2026-09-30, $183,482.88, BSC) is unrelated.
- Lineage entry: "MakerDAO" (2020-03-12, $8,320,000, stale oracle price, Black Thursday).
- Grok X search 2026-09-20 to 2026-11-06: no Spark or Sky exploit, freeze, pause, bad debt, oracle issue, depeg or governance controversy.
- Credora rating: not verified in this review.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.