TL;DR
Rysk V12 sells covered calls and cash-secured puts on HyperEVM and Ethereum. It runs on a fork of Opyn's Gamma contracts, with an RFQ in which makers pay the premium upfront. Collateral is fully posted and the yield is real premium. This is a refresh of our 2026-10-01 report, and the short version is that nothing structural moved. We re-read the contracts on both chains on 2026-11-07. The same 3-of-5 Safe, with no Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree., still controls every contract that holds or moves collateral. The same hot EOA still posts every non-stablecoin settlement price, and every pricer we read still has a zero dispute period. That includes a new pricer for Lighter's LIT token added on 11-06. Self-service settlement is still off, and there is still no exit before expiry. The good news is operational. Six Friday fixings since 10-01 matched market prices closely, including the 10-30 fixing the day after the Binance incident, and nothing has been lost. Caution, with the same three reds.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. No change. The docs security page still lists the same six reports under the same labels: V12 mk3 plus Lean Gamma, the Lean Gamma upgrade procedure, V12 mk2, mk1 and mk0, and Rysk Premium mk0. Our 10-01 run opened all six, and all six were Trust Security reports. The page still lists no bug bounty. The Gamma core that holds collateral has been in Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope. scope only since May 2026; that audit fixed all four highs and left two mediums acknowledged. The Safe has sent no upgrade transaction on either chain since 10-01, so the deployed code is the code we described then. On HyperEVM that means the Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through. and pricers still lack the zero-price checks the audited version adds. Whether the swapped-in MarginPool and ControllerLogic match the audited mitigation commit: not verified in this review. The HyperEVM processor proxy still points at implementation 0x19f1e313...1c76, as it did on 10-01.
Admin control. Re-verified on-chain on both chains on 2026-11-07, and unchanged. Safe 0xafe32eb8...23db4 reads threshold 3 with the same five signers on Ethereum and HyperEVM, no modules and an empty guard slot. It still owns the HyperEVM AddressBook, and it is still the disputer and owner of both Oracles. There is no timelock at any level. Its nonce rose from 133 to 136 on HyperEVM and from 9 to 10 on Ethereum, and we decoded all four new transactions:
- 2026-10-30, 09:01 UTC (HyperEVM): setRedeemTimePeriod(7200) on 0x577b846a...7964.
- 2026-10-30, 09:17 UTC (HyperEVM): setRedeemTimePeriod(3600) on the same contract.
- 2026-11-02 (HyperEVM): a transfer of about 46 USDC from the Safe to 0xdd86261e...d8be. Purpose: not verified in this review.
- 2026-11-06, 15:45 UTC (Ethereum): one batch that registered a pricer for LIT (Lighter) on the Oracle, whitelisted LIT as collateral and whitelisted a LIT call product against USDT.
The 10-30 change is the third time we have seen the Safe stretch the redemption window by hand on an expiry Friday, after 07-17 and 08-28. This time it came at 09:01 UTC, an hour and a minute after the 08:00 expiry, and was undone 16 minutes later. The audit calls this an economic parameter that applies retroactively. None of this is malicious. It shows that settlement rules can still be changed on the day, by three keys, with no delay. Signer identities: not verified in this review.
Oracle. Still red. We read getPricerDisputePeriod and getPricerLockingPeriod for eight pricers: WHYPE, kHYPE, UBTC and UETH on HyperEVM, and WETH, WBTC, wstETH and the new LIT pricer on Ethereum. All eight read 0 for both. All eight name the same bot, the EOA 0x65802cc3...9e48, and read deviationMultiplier 300. That address is still operator() on both Rysk processors. So one hot key still posts prices that become final at once, checked on-chain only by a band of a third to three times the previous price. The newest pricer was set up the same way, so this is a configuration choice, not an oversight left over from older deployments. The docs page still describes a manual check "during a 5-minute smart contract enforced dispute period", and the contracts still do not show one.
The fixings themselves were good. We read the finalized 08:00 UTC prices for six Fridays, from 10-02 to 11-06:
- WETH came in 0.01% to 0.15% below Binance's ETH/USDT one-minute open in every case. On 10-30, the day after DeFiLlama's Binance CEX entry, it was $2,233.69 against $2,237.07.
- WBTC came in 0.07% to 0.29% below Binance BTC/USDT.
- WHYPE fixed at $78.41 on 10-23, $91.48 on 10-30 and $77.42 on 11-06. Hyperliquid's HYPE opens were $78.39, $91.56 and $77.42.
HYPE moved 17% between the 10-23 and 10-30 fixings and 15% back the next week, and the fixings tracked both moves. Stablecoins still have no pricer and settle at a hard-coded $1. The time between each fixing and the first redemption was not measured this run: not verified in this review.
Liquidity & exit. Still red. The FAQ still answers "Not yet" to closing a position before expiry and describes a secondary market in development. Settlement is "typically processed within about two hours after expiry". selfServiceAllowed still reads false on both processors (0x8c8bcb6d...4e35 on HyperEVM, 0x7a3ddeac...2aad on Ethereum), and operator() is the same hot EOA on both. A depositor still cannot redeem or settle without that key. The same Safe can also pause settlement outright.
Yield: real vs emission. Real. Option buyers pay the premium when the trade executes, and there are no Emissions and points Emissions are new tokens a protocol issues to pay rewards; they count in the reward yield. Points may turn into tokens later and are never counted in a rate.. Points remain a speculative extra; whether the program still runs: not verified in this review. Current quotes by strike were not re-pulled: not verified in this review.
Holder concentration. There is still no liquid token. Depositor concentration inside the MarginPools is unmeasured: not verified in this review. The collateral mix shifted toward volatile assets. On the pre-expiry snapshot of 11-06, stablecoins were about 54% of the $50.5M book, against 61% on 10-01. In the current post-expiry read ($32.8M for V12), they are about 45%. HyperEVM USDC fell from 23.4M to 17.4M units between the 10-02 and 11-06 pre-expiry snapshots, a real outflow. WHYPE rose from 69k to 127k units, and Ethereum WETH from 282 to 1,023. A USDC or USDT Peg and depeg A stablecoin's peg is the price it targets, usually $1. A depeg is a move away from it, most often down. The stables page checks prices every 5 minutes. would still hit the book at par, because the Oracles price stablecoins at a fixed $1.
Track record. No exploit found. DeFiLlama's hacks list (1,340 entries, read 2026-11-07) has no entry naming Rysk. It does list a Binance CEX incident on 2026-10-29, and Rysk's next fixing, on 10-30, matched Binance and Hyperliquid prices closely. An X search for 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-07 surfaced no Rysk incident. It was partly rate-limited and could not return the official account's posts: not verified in this review. V12 data starts 2025-07-11, so it has under 17 months of history; Ethereum has under four.
Worst case
Unchanged from October. Three of the Safe's five keys upgrade the MarginPool or the processor and take every locked position. Nothing forces a delay, and the 07-20 migration showed that a full code swap fits in under an hour.
The quieter failure is the hot key. If the EOA that posts fixings is compromised or wrong, it can post a bad price. The price is final at once, and every option on that asset settles at it that morning. The same key is the only one that can process redemptions today, so if it stops, payouts wait for the Safe.
Short of either failure, the underlying runs through your strike, and you are assigned after weeks in which you could not exit. HYPE's 17% week into the 10-30 expiry is the kind of move that does this. There is no insurance fund in the docs. Position sizing is the only mitigation.
Bottom line
Caution, unchanged. The mechanics are clean: full collateral, premium paid upfront, no emissions, accurate fixings through a volatile month, and nothing lost. The three reds from October all stand, and each was re-read on chain this run:
- No exit before expiry.
- A no-timelock 3-of-5 Safe over every contract that holds collateral. It changed settlement rules by hand again on 10-30.
- One hot key that posts final prices with a zero dispute period on every pricer read. The newest pricer, added on 11-06, was set up the same way. The same key is the only one that can process settlement.
Three changes would move it: a non-zero dispute period on every pricer, self-service switched on, and a timelock on the AddressBook. None has happened. Fits only as a small overlay.
Data appendix
- TVL: Rysk Finance parent $33.0M (DeFiLlama, read 09:30 UTC):
rysk-v12$32.73M (Hyperliquid L1 $23.44M, Ethereum $9.29M),rysk-v1$0.19M on Arbitrum,rysk-premium$0.08M. Our own read ofrysk-v12at 08:58 UTC gave $32.77M (HyperEVM $23.47M, Ethereum $9.29M).- Today's figure is a post-expiry trough. The 11-06 Friday expiry settled at 08:00 UTC and collateral went back to wallets, as it does every week. The 10-01 report's $52.0M was a pre-expiry read, so comparing the two numbers overstates the decline.
- Like for like, the pre-expiry book was $51.9M on 10-02 (00:00 snapshot) and $50.5M on 11-06, down 3%.
- Prices fell between those fixings: ETH 18.7%, WBTC 12.4% and WHYPE 13.7%. Since the dollar value barely moved, net inflows in units offset most of that price drop.
- The snapshots after each Friday expiry since 10-01 read $37.6M, $33.9M, $37.1M, $37.7M, $36.3M and $31.3M. Today's is the lowest of them.
- V12 ATH is still $70.5M (2026-03-27).
- Collateral mix (DeFiLlama tokensInUsd, 2026-11-07 08:58 UTC):
- HyperEVM: WHYPE $7.46M, USDC $6.81M, USDT0 $3.64M, kHYPE $2.65M, UBTC $1.54M, UETH $1.19M.
- Ethereum: USDT $2.23M, USDC $2.19M, WETH $1.65M, WBTC $1.54M, wstETH $1.29M, weETH $0.25M, XAUt $0.12M. DeFiLlama shows no LIT yet.
- Unit changes from 10-02 to 11-06 (pre-expiry): HyperEVM USDC 23.37M to 17.36M, WHYPE 69,375 to 127,225, kHYPE 66,700 to 36,175; Ethereum USDT 2.16M to 3.44M, WETH 282 to 1,023, WBTC 15 to 32.
- Audits: docs.rysk.finance/resources/security, re-read 2026-11-07, still lists the same six reports under the same labels, with no dates and no bug bounty. Auditor and finding counts are carried from the 10-01 read, when all six PDFs opened as Trust Security reports: the May 2026 Gamma core audit (4 high fixed; M-6, M-7, L-1 and L-4 acknowledged), the June 2026 migration audit (3 low open), three earlier V12 rounds, and Rysk Premium. PDFs not re-opened this run. Match between the deployed code and mitigation commit 4a4b3be: not verified in this review.
- Admin/governance: read 2026-11-07 via eth_call (rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm, ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com) and the Etherscan v2 API (chainid 1 and 999).
- Safe 0xafe32eb89391dfd5900f98857f009477e4423db4: threshold 3 on both chains. Owners 0xab855506...4251, 0xa0e5af7b...a835, 0x92d97f86...1276, 0x030e9cbd...76f2 and 0xd390f33c...0415 on both chains. getModulesPaginated returns none, and the guard slot is zero. Nonce 136 on HyperEVM (133 on 10-01) and 10 on Ethereum (9 on 10-01).
- HyperEVM AddressBook 0xffce2d20...93f34: owner is the Safe; getOracle 0x664ad80f...e815, getController 0x84d84e48...b212, getMarginPool 0x24a44f1d...1ab4.
- Oracle owner and getDisputer: the Safe, on both chains.
- Safe transactions since 10-01:
- HyperEVM, 2026-10-30 09:01:00 UTC: setRedeemTimePeriod(7200) on 0x577b846a95711015769452f7f29d8054cf087964.
- HyperEVM, 2026-10-30 09:17:00 UTC: setRedeemTimePeriod(3600) on the same contract, which reads 3600 today.
- HyperEVM, 2026-11-02 11:27:59 UTC: USDC transfer of 46.14 to 0xdd86261e02388ce23d0da3bb0f6ef9c94e08d8be.
- Ethereum, 2026-11-06 15:45:11 UTC: a MultiSend batch with setAssetPricer(LIT 0x232ce3bd...4ee2, pricer 0xd9edb7f0...4af7) on Oracle 0xc11a4767...09a7, then whitelistCollateral(LIT) and whitelistProduct(LIT, USDT, LIT, call) on 0x6f878af4...540d.
- No upgrade, owner change or pause since 10-01. Timelock: none. Signer identities: not verified in this review.
- Oracle:
- Pricers read (dispute 0, locking 0, bot 0x65802cc3...9e48, deviationMultiplier 300):
- HyperEVM: WHYPE 0x2f79daa7...6451, kHYPE 0x97303114...639e, UBTC 0x3b82edd0...6bca, UETH 0x921233d4...fd44.
- Ethereum: WETH 0xb82e16f6...cd86, WBTC 0x001635b6...61cd, wstETH 0x4c95101f...76a6, LIT 0xd9edb7f0...4af7.
- The other pricers from the 10-01 list were not re-read: not verified in this review.
- Finalized 08:00 UTC fixings:
- 10-02: WETH 2,737.00, WBTC 86,030, WHYPE 89.76.
- 10-09: WETH 2,502.57, WBTC 82,520, WHYPE 86.01.
- 10-16: WETH 2,452.10, WBTC 82,125, WHYPE 81.19.
- 10-23: WETH 2,398.33, WBTC 81,341, WHYPE 78.41.
- 10-30: WETH 2,233.69, WBTC 78,030, WHYPE 91.48.
- 11-06: WETH 2,225.96, WBTC 75,400, WHYPE 77.42.
- Binance one-minute opens at 08:00, ETH/USDT: 2,737.29, 2,504.49, 2,455.08, 2,401.47, 2,237.07, 2,228.86.
- Binance one-minute opens at 08:00, BTC/USDT: 86,090, 82,664, 82,290, 81,580, 78,186, 75,616.
- Hyperliquid HYPE 08:00 UTC opens (1h candles): 78.39 (10-23), 91.56 (10-30), 77.42 (11-06).
- Docs (docs.rysk.finance/resources/oracle, re-read): Stork primary, Pyth cross-check, Pendle API for Pendle assets, and a "5-minute smart contract enforced dispute period". That period is still not in the on-chain configuration.
- Stablecoins: getPricer returns the zero address and getExpiryPrice returns $1.00 for USDC on both Oracles (re-read for the 11-06 expiry).
- Pricers read (dispute 0, locking 0, bot 0x65802cc3...9e48, deviationMultiplier 300):
- Settlement and exit:
- FAQ (docs.rysk.finance/getting-started/protocol-and-product/faq), re-read: "Not yet" on closing before expiry; settlement "typically processed within about two hours after expiry, which occurs at 8:00 AM UTC"; no insurance fund mentioned.
- Processors: HyperEVM 0x8c8bcb6d...4e35 (implementation 0x19f1e313...1c76, unchanged) and Ethereum 0x7a3ddeac...2aad (implementation 0xeedb8840...63d0). operator() is 0x65802cc3...9e48 on both, and selfServiceAllowed() is false on both.
- Holder concentration: No token. Depositor concentration: not verified in this review. Stablecoin share was about 54% pre-expiry on 11-06 and about 45% in today's post-expiry read.
- Recent-news scan:
- DeFiLlama hacks list (1,340 entries, read 2026-11-07): none names Rysk. It lists a Binance CEX entry dated 2026-10-29, classified "Key Leaked via Infrastructure", and a Premia V3 entry, an unrelated options protocol, on 2026-11-01.
- X search, 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-07: no Rysk incident surfaced, but official-account posts were rate-limited: not verified in this review.
- Rysk V1 and Rysk Premium figures are from a DeFiLlama read at 09:30 UTC, not re-read here. The Premium cause noted on 10-01: not verified in this review.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.