TL;DR
Re sells KYC-gated stablecoin deposits as collateral for reinsurance written by one Cayman reinsurer, Cover Re SPC. reUSD is the senior tranche and reUSDe the mezzanine. DeFiLlama puts the book at $484.7M, up 24% from $390.7M on September 29, and this time most of the growth went off-chain: reinsurance capital attested by The Network Firm rose from $183.2M to $250.4M, while on-chain capital, almost all sUSDe, rose from $209.3M to $235.8M.
The biggest change since our September report is a fix. On October 14 the 3-of-5 governance Safe renounced EMERGENCY_UPDATER_ROLE on both legacy NAV consumers. That role let it set the price reUSD and reUSDe mint and redeem at, immediately and with no bound, and it is why we graded admin control red. The role is administered by DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, which the 48-hour Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree. holds, so getting it back takes a visible, delayed vote. Admin control moves to yellow.
Three things got worse, all on the exit side. At 21:44 UTC on October 29, about an hour and forty minutes after the Binance hack began, the Safe paused the RedemptionGateway and InstantRedemption contracts. Two minutes later Re said on X that it had no exposure to Binance and had paused redemptions "out of an abundance of caution given market volatility and uncertainty". It unpaused them at 16:41 UTC on October 30. Curve depth has nearly vanished: the reUSD/USDC pool holds $19k, against $452k in September, and reUSDe/sUSDe holds $371. And the PT (principal token) A Pendle token that redeems for one unit of the underlying on its maturity date. Bought at a discount, it locks in a fixed yield if held to that date.-reUSD loop that matures into reUSD on December 10 has grown again, to $184.6M of Morpho collateral against $148.5M of debt.
Caution holds. Liquidity How much you can sell or withdraw right now without moving the price or waiting. Thin liquidity means a slow or costly exit. and exit is red, which forces it on its own.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Unchanged from September as far as we can tell, and we did not re-read the reports. Sherlock's collaborative Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope. of the rebuilt NAV Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through. (July 2026; six files; no High, one Medium, five Low, all resolved) remains the newest review we know of. It sits on top of Certora formal verification from September 2025, which Re's audits page lists but for which we have found no public report, and three Hacken engagements from 2024 and 2025. We did not find a new audit this run (not verified in this review). The gaps remain: the redemption stack, the CCIP pool configuration and the Solana deployment have no audit we could map to them. The tokens and ICLs are UUPS proxies, and only the timelock can upgrade them. We decoded every operation the Safe scheduled or executed through the timelock from September 29 to today. None is an upgrade. The batch run on November 2 used a new, non-upgradeable SingleUseExactAmountBurner whose verified source we read.
Admin control. This is what changed most since September 29, mostly for the better. The timelock at 0x69dDEa33 still reports a 48-hour minimum delay (getMinDelay 172800), and the Safe at 0x8eec1061 is still 3-of-5 with the same five owners. We decoded every successful Safe transaction from September 29 on.
The fix: on October 14 (tx 0x0948da39) the Safe called renounceRole for EMERGENCY_UPDATER_ROLE on both NAVConsumer contracts, 0x84d4eaeb for reUSD and 0x105f7f11 for reUSDe; the transaction emits a RoleRevoked event for that role on each. On-chain today the Safe holds the role on neither contract. On the reUSD consumer the new oracle's LegacyConsumerSinkAdapter (0xe888df32) holds it. On the reUSDe consumer that adapter does not, and none of the Re addresses we tested holds it there, so we cannot say what now writes the reUSDe price through that path (not verified in this review). On both contracts the role's admin is DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, which the timelock holds and the Safe does not. The role is not enumerable, so we cannot list every holder. But since September 29 no timelock operation has granted it, and the September report traced its history from deployment. That closes the bypass we confirmed by simulation in September. On October 21 the Safe also handed admin of the DecentralizedFund factory to the timelock. On October 22 a timelocked AccessManager call removed a role from the deployer EOA 0x6c15b25e.
What remains outside the delay, and was used this month. The Safe still holds ORACLE_MANAGER_ROLE on both deposit-token registries. On October 18 it used it directly to point sUSDe at a new VaultOracle (0x3cbbc936), alongside a timelocked PriceRouter change that pointed at the same oracle. It holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE directly on a RatioVaultStableTokenPriceOracle (0xedd9bc79), where on October 12 it granted itself ADMIN_ROLE, set the max Vault and curator A shared deposit pool run by code or by a curator. The curator chooses which markets get your money and sets the limits, for a fee. ratio to 1.4 and revoked the role again, all in one transaction with no delay. Through the AccessManager it can still call emergencyWithdraw on the Daily Instant Redemption Vault immediately (canCall returns true with zero delay). The vault now holds $22.0M, and that call can send it to any address. The Safe also still pauses and unpauses the redemption contracts at zero delay, which it did on October 29 and 30. It reconfigured rate limits on six reUSD CCIP lanes and one reUSDe lane on October 22. And on October 22 it removed two KYC providers through the AccessManager.
We did not re-check the Safe's admin on the Arbitrum and Avalanche ICLs, or its force-update right on the new NAV oracle. Our canCall probe for forceNAVUpdate(uint256) came back false, which more likely means we guessed the function signature wrong than that the right is gone (not verified in this review).
Custody is unchanged in kind. About $208.3M, 90% of the on-chain reserve, sits in three plain EOAs that Re describes as Fireblocks MPC wallets, and that signing policy cannot be checked from the chain. Holders still hold an unsecured, limited-recourse note of one segregated portfolio.
Oracle. NAV is pushed once a day by Re. The reUSD CRE wrapper read 1.1117651 at its 23:45:35 UTC print on November 5, and Re's API gives reUSDe 1.4415376. Both series rose every day through the Binance window, with no markdown. The off-chain reserve feed on Avalanche read $250,352,440 at 16:07 UTC on November 6, exactly the off-chain capital Re's API reports. We did not re-read the oracle's guardrail parameters this run. In September the automated path was limited to 50 Basis point (bp) One hundredth of a percent: 1 bp = 0.01%, so 25 bp is 0.25%. The exit costs on the funding page are in bp. per update and 200 bps per 14 days, it could not lower NAV, and markdowns had to wait 24 hours after Protection Mode was entered, with no real floor beneath them. Those values are carried, not re-verified (not verified in this review). With the legacy-consumer bypass closed, those guardrails now bind the price Re actually mints and redeems reUSD at, apart from whatever force-update right the Safe still has on the new oracle. That right was +1.5% per four hours in September (not verified in this review). The latest full AUP report from The Network Firm that we know of is still October 2025 (not verified in this review for a newer one).
Liquidity & exit. Red, held for different reasons than in September.
The buffer. The Daily Instant Redemption Vault holds 17.49M sUSDe ($21.98M) and the Redemption Reserve Custodian EOA holds 111.91M sUSDe ($140.66M), together $162.64M. Ethereum reUSD supply has grown 27.6% to 320.41M tokens, worth $356.21M at NAV, so the buffer covers 45.7% of it, down from 50.1%. Re sizes the buffer at 50% of an unpublished high-water mark of deposits, so we cannot call this a breach. On current supply it is below the policy line. The paying vault is three times its September size. The contract's high-water mark is $164.5M, which makes the daily cap about $32.9M and the per-wallet cap about $16.5M. Both the InstantRedemption and RedemptionGateway contracts read unpaused today.
The pause. At 21:44 UTC on October 29 (tx 0x43a72888) the Safe paused the RedemptionGateway and InstantRedemption. At 16:41 UTC on October 30 (tx 0x2f484242) it unpaused both. The Binance hack, which DeFiLlama now lists at $6.36B, began draining Binance wallets at about 20:05 UTC on October 29 per TRM Labs as reported in the press. Re's own account on X (@re, linked from re.xyz) posted at 21:19 UTC that Re had no assets on Binance, and at 21:46 UTC, two minutes after the pause, that "while we have no exposure to Binance, out of an abundance of caution given market volatility and uncertainty we have paused redemptions temporarily." At 17:20 UTC on October 30 it posted that reUSD redemptions had resumed. Re's statements do not name Ethena. That stress on sUSDe, the entire payout asset, was part of the reason is our inference, and Re's no-exposure claim is its own (not verified in this review). For a holder the point is plain: for 19 hours there was no instant exit, at the moment one would most want it.
We were asked to check whether Jupiter Lend's guardian paused reUSD around the same days. We could not confirm a reUSD-specific pause. Press and Solscan describe a liquidity crunch that delayed Jupiter Lend withdrawals generally on October 30 (not verified in this review).
Secondary depth. On Curve, Re's reUSD/USDC pool holds $19,292 (8,916 reUSD and 9,390 USDC), down from $452k, and the reUSDe/sUSDe pool holds $371, down from $563k. reUSD/sUSDe holds $2.24M and sUSG/reUSD $1.42M. Without KYC and Re's buffer there is now almost no direct stablecoin route out, and reUSDe has essentially none outside the quarterly windows.
The December 10 wall. PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 supply is 291.1M, up from 214.8M, worth about $287.8M at $0.9886. On Morpho, PT/USDC at 91.5% LTV and LLTV LTV is your loan as a share of your collateral's value. LLTV is the LTV at which the position is liquidated; the gap between the two is your buffer. holds $165.9M of collateral against $133.0M of debt at 90.2% Utilization The share of a lending market's deposits that is lent out. Near 100%, depositors may have to wait to withdraw and the borrow rate jumps. and a 10.19% borrow rate, and PT/USDT holds $18.7M against $15.5M at 13.0%. The Pendle AMM holds $12.9M at an implied 11.67%, so the carry on the USDC loop is thin today and turns negative once the fixed rate ends. All of it becomes reUSD in 34 days, and the KYC'd route to cash goes through a buffer with a $32.9M daily cap.
Yield: real vs emission. Real. Re's API reports 6.92% on reUSD and 11.86% on reUSDe over seven days. NAV read on-chain rose 0.72% and 1.24% between the September 28 print and the November 5 print, about 6.9% and 11.9% a year. No Emissions and points Emissions are new tokens a protocol issues to pay rewards; they count in the reward yield. Points may turn into tokens later and are never counted in a rate. feed NAV. The mix has shifted back toward reinsurance: off-chain capital is $250.4M, up 37%, and on-chain capital is $235.8M, up 13%. The sUSDe sleeve is now about 47% of the capital base, down from 53%. How Re funds the 250 bps it pays over the sUSDe rate on that sleeve is still undisclosed (not verified in this review). Re's headline total of $805.1M still includes $318,925,958 of premium receivables, unchanged to the dollar since July, so we leave it out of the capital base.
Holder concentration. The float is still mostly Leverage Borrowing to hold a position larger than your capital. At 3x you hold $3 for every $1 of your own, and gains, losses and liquidation risk grow with it.. Morpho PT-reUSD collateral of $184.6M is about 48% of Re's reported reUSD product TVL of $380.9M, up from about 40% in September. The points feed counts 7,456 participants on November 5, against 4,776 on September 28. reUSDe supply rose 42% to 20.46M. Part of that came on October 14, when a timelocked change let the reUSDe ICL take USDC: about $9.0M arrived and went to the custodian wallet, and USDC was removed as a deposit token the same day. On November 2 a timelocked batch, scheduled September 29, retired 677,905.87 reUSDe (about $977k at NAV) from EOA 0x8422bb5a. The burner's verified source calls that EOA a treasury holder, and it bought reUSDe on Curve in June 2026. We did not refresh per-address rankings or $RE supply and unlocks (not verified in this review).
Track record. We found no exploit of Re's contracts. DeFiLlama's hacks list, 1,340 records with the newest dated November 5, has no Re entry. Re's own NAV series has never fallen for reUSD. For reUSDe it shows a single 1.55% step down, from 1.2034 to 1.1847, on July 1, 2025, which we had not noticed before. Its cause is not verified in this review. DeFiLlama prices reUSD at $1.1077 against a NAV of 1.1118, about 36 bps under. Through October 29 to 31 the gap was the same size, so the hack produced no visible depeg. New in this window: the 19-hour redemption pause above, which is an operational event, not a loss. The August 25 PT-reUSD liquidations ($36.4M on a third-party Morpho market, no bad debt) stay in the record as a structural warning, not as a Re incident. The two reUSDs are different tokens: Resupply's reUSD (0x57aB1E00), whose pools dominate Curve search results under the same ticker, and its $9.6M June 2025 exploit have nothing to do with Re's reUSD (0x5086bf35). The product is about 18 months old, and its underwriting record (a 92% combined ratio and no loss reaching reUSDe) is reported by Re itself.
Worst case
The likely bad outcome is still a crowded exit. On December 10, about $288M of PT-reUSD turns into reUSD, with $148.5M of Morpho debt behind it at 91.5% LLTV and carry that goes negative the same day. If those Looping Deposit, borrow against it, buy more of the collateral, repeat. It multiplies the gap between the yield and the borrow rate, and the liquidation risk with it. unwind together, the routes out are a Pendle AMM of $12.9M, Curve pools that no longer hold meaningful USDC, and a KYC-gated buffer paid entirely in sUSDe. That buffer holds $22.0M in the paying vault, refills from a custodian EOA at operator speed, and caps exits at about $32.9M a day. October 29 showed the other lever: the Safe can pause instant redemptions at will, and it did, for 19 hours, on a day when Re says it had no exposure to the event. If the buffer falls under 1% of supply, every reUSD holder drops to quarterly windows.
The tail path runs through the capital stack. First the reinsurer's own equity absorbs losses ($77M per Re's docs as of June 2026, not refreshed). Then reUSDe, now $29.5M, then reUSD. About 47% of the capital base is sUSDe, so an Ethena failure would reach reUSD directly. Our Ethena report of the same date found its backing at 99.77% of supply before its reserve fund. Under both paths sit trust assumptions we cannot test from outside: three MPC-run EOAs holding about $208M, and a 3-of-5 Safe that can still swap deposit-token price feeds, empty the instant vault to any address and reconfigure mint-capable CCIP pools with no delay.
Bottom line
Caution. Re fixed the flaw that mattered most in September: the governance Safe can no longer write the mint and redeem price directly, and admin control moves from red to yellow on that basis. The capital mix improved too, with real off-chain reinsurance capital up 37% and the Ethena share down to about 47%. Exit got worse. The buffer covers 45.7% of Ethereum supply value. Curve exit depth is close to zero for both tokens. The December 10 PT maturity is 36% bigger than in September. And Re paused instant redemptions for 19 hours during the largest exchange hack on record, explaining it only as caution in a market it had no direct exposure to. Treat plain reUSD as an off-chain credit and insurance position that a KYC'd holder can usually exit within a day, but not always. Treat PT-reUSD loops and reUSDe as the parts with no reliable exit before mid-December.
Data appendix
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TVL: $484,745,252 (DeFiLlama api.llama.fi/tvl/re, 2026-11-06, read twice), against $390,663,237 on 2026-09-29 (+24%). Re API /tvl (as of 2026-11-06 00:00 UTC): on-chain capital $235,819,526, off-chain capital $250,352,440, together $486,171,966, 0.3% above DeFiLlama. Product TVL Total value locked: the dollar value of everything deposited in a protocol or pool. It shows size, not safety.: reUSD $380,878,066 and reUSDe $29,505,570. Headline total $805,097,925 includes $318,925,958 of premium receivables, unchanged since July (not verified in this review whether it is still updated).
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Supply / NAV: reUSD (0x5086bf358635b81d8c47c66d1c8b9e567db70c72) Ethereum totalSupply 320,406,443.35, equal to Re's API /supply figure (251,002,656 on Sep 29). reUSDe (0xddc0f880ff6e4e22e4b74632fbb43ce4df6ccc5a) 20,461,478.08 (14,434,712 on Sep 29). NAV: reUSD 1.111765085 (CRE wrapper 0x86761b94, updated 2026-11-05 23:45:35 UTC), reUSDe 1.441537557 (api.re.xyz/apy). 7-day APY Yearly yield with the earnings reinvested (compound interest). Most tables here show APY; funding and the exchange vaults show APR. 6.92% and 11.86%. Re price series: no daily decline in reUSD since 2025-05-26; reUSDe one decline, 1.203409 to 1.184704 between 2025-06-30 and 2025-07-01 (cause not verified in this review). DeFiLlama reUSD price $1.1077 (stablecoins.llama.fi id 339); daily reUSD prices from coins.llama.fi 2026-10-25 to 10-31 ranged 1.1067 to 1.1099.
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On-chain reserve (the four addresses that held all of the Sep 29 figure): $230,244,666 at sUSDe convertToAssets 1.25691. Vault 0x5C454f55: 17,485,169.89 sUSDe ($21.98M). Custodian EOA 0x9eA38e09: 111,909,601.33 sUSDe ($140.66M). reUSD ICL wallet EOA 0x295F67Fd: 42,896,956.84 sUSDe ($53.92M) plus 1,016,817.73 USDC. reUSDe ICL wallet EOA 0xd4374008: 9,966,496.04 sUSDe ($12.53M) plus 145,483.71 USDe. sUSDe is $229.08M, 99.5% of the reserve. The three EOAs hold $208.27M (90.5%) and have no code. Re's API on-chain figure is 2.4% higher; the difference is unreconciled, possibly other chains. sUSDe is about 47.1% of the $486.2M capital base (53% on Sep 29).
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Redemption buffer: vault plus custodian $162.64M, 45.7% of Ethereum reUSD supply value ($356.21M); 50.1% on Sep 29. InstantRedemption 0xa31deEbb: paused() false; highWatermark $164,512,427; dailyLimitBps 2000; userLimitBps 1000; getTotalCapacity 129,394,771 (sUSDe units, equal to vault plus custodian). RedemptionGateway 0x8aEb9453: paused() false. Policy per docs.re.xyz (last updated about two months ago): 50% of the deposit high-water mark, 20%/10% caps, quarterly-only mode below 1% of supply. Non-Ethereum buffers not summed.
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Audits: Sherlock (Jul 2026, NAV oracle), Certora (Sep 2025, no public report found), Hacken x3 (2024 to 2025), all carried from 2026-09-29 and not re-read. No new audit found (not verified in this review). No upgrade calls among timelock operations since Sep 29. Grant Thornton FY2025 audit of the reinsurer, cited by Yearn, not seen (not verified in this review).
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Admin/governance: TimelockController 0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93, getMinDelay 172800. Safe 0x8eec10616802Ef639CA55c98ac856553fAdEfBaD, threshold 3, five owners (0x2a3ef2fe, 0x28d8af3c, 0x7dd97c12, 0x1f76cc0e, 0x0ae4eeaf). No transactions sent directly to the timelock since block 26,000,000; every operation came from the Safe.
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Safe actions since 2026-09-29:
- Oct 9 schedules, and Oct 14 executes, addCustodian(USDC, reUSDe ICL wallet) on the reUSDe ICL 0xe1886be2.
- Oct 12 (tx 0x14695c66) grants itself ADMIN_ROLE on RatioVaultStableTokenPriceOracle 0xedd9bc79, calls setMaxVaultRatio(1.4e18), then revokes the role. The Safe holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE there.
- Oct 14 15:13 UTC (tx 0x0948da39) renounces EMERGENCY_UPDATER_ROLE (0x9d1945ee) on NAVConsumers 0x84d4eaeb and 0x105f7f11 (RoleRevoked emitted on both). Both now show hasRole false for the Safe. Sink adapter 0xe888df32 holds the role on the reUSD consumer 0x84d4eaeb only; on the reUSDe consumer 0x105f7f11 it does not, and no tested address does (not verified in this review). On both, the role's admin is DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, held by the timelock and not the Safe.
- Oct 14 reUSDe DepositTokenRegistry 0x9f9e2178: addToken(USDC) via the timelock, withdrawToCustodian of 9,000,000 USDC via the AccessManager, then removeToken(USDC).
- Oct 16 schedules, and Oct 18 executes, PriceRouter 0xa621fa1c setting sUSDe to VaultOracle 0x3cbbc936. On Oct 18 the Safe also called updateTokenOracle(sUSDe, 0x3cbbc936) directly on reUSD DepositTokenRegistry 0x73d37a98; it still holds ORACLE_MANAGER_ROLE on both registries.
- Oct 19 schedules, and Oct 22 executes, an AccessManager revokeRole for deployer 0x6c15b25e.
- Oct 21: DEFAULT_ADMIN on DecentralizedFund 0xF04422E6 granted to the timelock and renounced by the Safe.
- Oct 22: removeKYCProvider x2 on KYCRegistry 0x82f1806a via the AccessManager, and CCIP rate limits reset on reUSD pool 0xF00B3b06 (6 lanes) and reUSDe pool 0x37cAD86F (1 lane).
- Oct 29 21:44:35 UTC (tx 0x43a72888c7787ae2567642095d88c1ae48a1c51936987501522f3415bff6f7cd): pause() on RedemptionGateway 0x8aEb9453 and InstantRedemption 0xa31deEbb (Paused events on both).
- Oct 30 16:41:23 UTC (tx 0x2f484242a13671d45bbe14883194864a0662d2c833983e821ece4823a97921c5): unpause() on both.
- Nov 2 23:47 UTC (tx 0x713fed6e), executeBatch scheduled Sep 29: the timelock grants MINTER_ROLE to SingleUseExactAmountBurner 0x0d236982, which burns 677,905.87 reUSDe pulled from EOA 0x8422bb5a, and then revokes the role.
- AccessManager canCall for the Safe: emergencyWithdraw on vault 0x5C454f55 immediate; pause() on InstantRedemption immediate.
- Not re-checked this run (not verified in this review): the force-update right on NAVOracle 0xb45AC37C (probe inconclusive), ICL admin on Arbitrum and Avalanche, Solana mint authority, signer identities.
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Oracle: Off-chain reserve feed (Avalanche reader 0xc79a363a, 8 decimals) $250,352,440.10 at 2026-11-06 16:07:12 UTC; $183,179,875 on Sep 29. Oracle guardrail parameters carried from Sep 29 and not re-read (not verified in this review). Last full AUP report known: October 2025 (not verified in this review).
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Pendle and Morpho (2026-11-06): PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 (0xecfafdc7741323a945a163ed068b5a3c43483957): totalSupply 291.1M; market 0x13285bcb has liquidity $12,916,630, Implied APY The fixed yield Pendle quotes for a PT at today's price. You get it only by holding the PT to maturity; sell earlier and you get the market price. 11.67%, underlying 7.16%, PT $0.9886 (Pendle API). Morpho (api.morpho.org), all markets with bad debt $0:
Market LLTV Collateral Borrowed Utilisation Borrow APY PT-reUSD/USDC 91.5% $165,877,640 $133,042,373 90.2% 10.19% PT-reUSD/USDT 91.5% $18,688,283 $15,489,489 91.8% 13.0% reUSD/USDC 91.5% $8,133,481 $7,281,677 87.9% 6.54% reUSD/USDT 91.5% $1,136,545 $1,015,496 94.5% 12.74% reUSDe/USDC 77% $168,263 $128,590 91.0% 15.35% -
Secondary depth (Curve API, coin addresses checked): reUSD/USDC factory-stable-ng-466 $19,292; reUSD/sUSDe ng-534 $2,238,278; sUSG/reUSD ng-909 $1,418,225; reUSD/frxUSD ng-654 $206; reUSDe/sUSDe twocrypto-169 $371. Pools ng-392, 393, 413 and 414 hold Resupply's reUSD (0x57aB1E00), not Re's.
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Holder concentration: Morpho PT-reUSD collateral $184.6M (about 48% of reUSD product TVL; $133.3M on Sep 29). Re points API /stats: 7,456 participants on 2026-11-05. Per-address rankings, $RE supply and unlocks not verified in this review.
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Counterparty and legal (docs, carried): Cover Reinsurance SPC Ltd (Cayman, CIMA) for SP1; unsecured, limited-recourse Principal-at-Risk Note; junior layer $77M as of June 2026 (not verified in this review).
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Recent-news scan (2026-09-29 to 2026-11-06):
- DeFiLlama hacks list: 1,340 entries, newest 2026-11-05. No Re entry. Binance CEX listed 2026-10-29 at $6.36B (Key Leaked via Infrastructure).
- Binance hack timing and size: TechCrunch, Yahoo Finance, Stingrai (TRM Labs: most of $6.36B left Binance wallets in about 20 minutes from 20:05 UTC on Oct 29).
- Re on X (@re, the account linked from re.xyz), text read through X's embed endpoint: Oct 29 21:19 UTC "Re has no assets on Binance"; Oct 29 21:46 UTC redemptions paused "out of an abundance of caution"; Oct 30 17:20 UTC "reUSD redemptions have resumed".
- Jupiter Lend withdrawal delays on Oct 30: Solana Compass, The News, CryptoNinjas, Solscan on X. None names reUSD.
- X search found no Re incident, Peg and depeg A stablecoin's peg is the price it targets, usually $1. A depeg is a move away from it, most often down. The stables page checks prices every 5 minutes. or exploit.
- Re docs: redemption policy unchanged.
- Ethena backing 99.77% of supply before the reserve fund: our Ethena report of 2026-11-06. Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.