TL;DR
Puffer is native liquid restaking on EigenLayer. You deposit ETH and get pufETH, an ERC4626 share worth 1.08704 ETH today. Since our 2026-10-01 report, Puffer Stake, the pufETH Vault and curator A shared deposit pool run by code or by a curator. The curator chooses which markets get your money and sets the limits, for a fee. this report covers, fell 28.7% on DeFiLlama, from $31.11M to $22.18M. Our board adds Puffer Vaults and Puffer UniFi to that and reads $23.2M, also down 28.7% from $32.64M. About $5.0M of the drop is the ETH price, which fell from roughly $2,682 to $2,247. The other $3.9M is real outflow: the vault's ETH dropped 14.9%, from 11,599 to 9,870, and about 92% of that left through the Cooldown and withdrawal queue The wait between asking to withdraw and getting your funds: a fixed cooldown (7 days for HYPE staking) or a queue that clears as cash comes back..
Two things changed in the admin picture, and they point in opposite directions. The good one: on 2026-10-23 the operations Safe lost role 20. That role let it mint pufETH through mintRewards with no cap and no delay, and the change went through the 7-day Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree.. The bad one: on 2026-10-17 the 1-of-9 pauser Safe closed both the vault and the withdrawal manager. For 4 days and 22 hours nobody could deposit, redeem or queue. On 2026-10-22 the community Safe added a seventh signer and then reopened both contracts through its zero-delay bypass. I found no public statement explaining the pause. Puffer has now paused four times since August 2025 and explained only the first of those pauses.
The core reds stay where they were. Three community keys can upgrade the vault with zero delay. One guardian at threshold 1 signs the validator count behind 97.3% of assets, and the operations Safe can replace that guardian with no delay. Caution holds.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Moved from green to yellow. The pufETH proxy still points at implementation 0x3b2fdfde..., deployed 2025-07-31, so no new vault code shipped. But on 2026-10-23 the L1RewardManager, the contract that mints pufETH rewards, was upgraded through the 7-day timelock to a new implementation, 0x65f7bb63.... The operations Safe had queued the upgrade on 2026-10-16. It called initializeV2 with a 1-day claiming delay and a 72-hour minimum gap between mints. The code is verified on Blockscout, but I could not tie it to a published Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope.. Puffer's bounty page says a 2026 Nethermind report covers its newest code, and I have not matched that report to this bytecode. I also did not re-open the audit links or re-check the Sherlock bounty this run, so those carry forward from 2026-10-01 as not verified in this review.
Admin control. Still red. I re-read it on chain on 2026-11-07. The Timelock delay is still 604,801 seconds. The AccessManager still answers canCall(Timelock, pufETH, upgradeToAndCall) with true and zero delay. The community Safe is now 3-of-7. On 2026-10-22 it added 0x2f71129b... as an owner and kept the threshold at 3, and its nonce moved from 14 to 16. The second of those two transactions shows the bypass is live. It called Timelock.executeTransaction and reopened the vault and the withdrawal manager in the same block, without going through the queue. The operations Safe had queued a two-call AccessManager batch through the 7-day path on 2026-10-19. That batch was the same reopening, and it was never executed, because the community Safe did not wait for it.
The mint power is narrower now. In the 2026-10-23 batch, queued on 2026-10-16, the operations Safe revoked its own role 20 and role 8. It granted itself role 21, which covers freezeInterval on the L1RewardManager, and it re-mapped that contract's functions. On the vault's mintRewards, which sits behind role 20, canCall now answers false for the operations Safe and true for the L1RewardManager. The L1RewardManager's own mintRewards sits behind role 28. An EOA held role 28 from 2026-10-28 to 2026-10-30. On 2026-10-30 a grant of role 28 to 0x9a135c6c... and a matching revoke were queued, with an eta of 2026-11-06 13:42 UTC. As of my read, neither had executed.
One gap remains. Through role 77 the operations Safe can still call setAllowedRewardMintAmount and setAllowedRewardMintFrequency with zero delay. The code puts no ceiling on the amount. It does enforce at least 72 hours between mints, and every mint must also pass a claiming delay during which the interval can be frozen. To mint through this path, though, someone must first get role 28 through the 7-day timelock. That is a real improvement on an instant, uncapped mint.
The operations Safe is still 3-of-6. It still holds roles 23 (exit reports) and 25 (finalizing the queue) with zero delay. The pauser is still 1-of-9.
Oracle. Still red. There is no market Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through.: the rate is totalAssets divided by supply. totalAssets is 9,870.35 ETH. Of that, 9,600 ETH (97.3%) is PufferOracleV2's count of active validators multiplied by 32, and the count is now 300, down from 350. The rest is 203.73 ETH held in the vault, 0.49 stETH and 66.14 ETH of rewards minted ahead of their deposit, up from 38.18.
The GuardianModule still returns a single guardian, EOA 0x65d2dd7a..., at threshold 1. That EOA's nonce is still 22,504, as in October. The operations Safe still holds role 77, which governs addGuardian, removeGuardian and setThreshold with zero delay. So three operations signers can still choose the key that signs exit reports and then file those reports themselves. I did not reconcile the 9,600 ETH counter against beacon-chain balances this run (not verified in this review).
Liquidity & exit. Still yellow, with a thinner buffer and a slower queue. The vault holds 203.73 ETH, 2.06% of assets, down from 3.11%. maxWithdraw caps any single holder at 201.69 ETH after the 1% exit fee. The fee is unchanged: a 100 Basis point (bp) One hundredth of a percent: 1 bp = 0.01%, so 25 bp is 0.25%. The exit costs on the funding page are in bp. treasury fee, so previewRedeem pays 0.99 of NAV.
On the main Curve wstETH pool, 0xEEda34A3, sales of 10, 100 and 200 pufETH come in 0.13%, 0.29% and 2.69% under NAV, and 250 pufETH costs 17.8%. The second Curve pool, 0xb3c8ce1e, is still drained: selling 10 pufETH there costs 5.8%. CoinGecko prices pufETH at about 1.0855 ETH, roughly 0.1% to 0.2% under NAV, on about $112 of 24h volume. I did not re-quote Uniswap v3 this run (not verified in this review).
The queue still pays in full. Fourteen batches, 1489 to 1502, were finalized since 2026-10-01, all by the operations Safe. In each one the actual ETH paid equalled the expected ETH. The pace slipped, though. The top EOA's 500 pufETH request of 2026-10-09 finalized on 2026-10-30, 21 days later. Three requests from 2026-10-11 took 19 days. Puffer's docs say "around 14 days". The 4.9-day closure fell inside those windows, and while the withdrawal manager was closed, nobody could queue or claim. Today only batch 1503 is pending, with 14.45 pufETH. For a $10,000 position the instant exit is many times larger. At size, plan on three weeks, longer if Puffer pauses again.
Yield: real vs emission. Green, and the source has not changed. pufETH earns from validator ticket sales and restaking rewards, not PUFFER Emissions and points Emissions are new tokens a protocol issues to pay rewards; they count in the reward yield. Points may turn into tokens later and are never counted in a rate.. The rate went from 1.084570 on 2026-10-01 to 1.087040 today. That is 0.228% in 37 days, about 2.25% annualized. The figure includes any small step left behind when queued holders are paid at their locked rate, and I did not separate that out. The operator bond is still described as 2 ETH, and any slashing beyond the bond lands on the vault. I did not re-check the EigenLayer operator set or slashing opt-in this run (not verified in this review).
Holder concentration. Still yellow, and the largest holder has changed. Supply fell from 10,694.71 to 9,080.02 pufETH, held by 44,218 addresses (Ethplorer), and I re-read the top balances with balanceOf.
The largest controller is now a pair of Safes, a 2-of-4 and a 2-of-5 that share the same four signers (re-read today). Safe 0xe22de1d7... holds 1,054.58 pufETH, up from 973.86, and Safe 0xa532e967... holds 318.69. Together that is 15.12%, a claim of about 1,493 ETH, or 7.3 times the liquid buffer. The former top EOA, 0xa775c23f..., queued 500 pufETH on 2026-10-09 and now holds 656.74 (7.23%). EOA 0xd0c68e22... redeemed its whole 471.98 through three requests on 2026-10-11. Puffer's bond pool holds 6.48% and Pendle's SY 3.77%. The top ten hold 59.7%.
The pattern matches the September exit. Large holders are leaving through the queue at full value, and that works, but each exit leaves the book smaller.
Track record. Still yellow, and the list of unexplained pauses got longer. There has been no contract exploit. DeFiLlama's hacks dataset now holds 1,340 records, and none names Puffer or pufETH.
The AccessManager shows one closure since the last report. At 19:01 UTC on 2026-10-17 the pauser Safe executed Timelock.pause on pufETH and the PufferWithdrawalManager with a single signature. The transaction was relayed by 0xe1AD10b9..., which is not a pauser owner. At 16:45 UTC on 2026-10-22 the community Safe reopened both. That makes 117.7 hours, nearly four times the 32-hour pause after the August 2025 domain hijack, and it is the longest closure of the vault itself on record. Other contracts have been closed for longer. In July 2026 the L1RewardManager was closed for 11 days, and two operations coordinators were still closed as of 2026-10-01.
I found no public explanation. An X search covering 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-07 found only promotional posts from Puffer's accounts, with nothing on a pause, exploit or Peg and depeg A stablecoin's peg is the price it targets, usually $1. A depeg is a move away from it, most often down. The stables page checks prices every 5 minutes.. A web search found nothing either. The order of events on chain could fit a key-hygiene response: the pause, then a new community signer, then an immediate reopen. That is my reading, not anything Puffer has said. Staking Rewards' profile of pufETH lists a BlockSec Phalcon integration for automated pauses. Whether this pause came from it, I could not confirm.
The Binance hack of 2026-10-29 ($6.36B in DeFiLlama's dataset) has no visible link to Puffer. The big October outflow was queued from 2026-10-09 to 2026-10-13, before the hack. Batches 1501 to 1503, which include every request filed from 2026-10-29 on, total about 228 pufETH. PUFFER trades at $0.0262, a market cap of about $15.1M.
Worst case
Three of the seven community signers are compromised or collude. They call executeTransaction, the Timelock forwards the call without checking its queue, and they upgrade the vault to code of their choosing. The 204 ETH buffer can go at once. Through upgrades to the contracts that hold the validators, the 9,600 ETH staked can follow as validators exit. The 2026-10-22 reopening shows this path is used for routine work. It is not kept as a dormant emergency key.
Three of the six operations signers can still move the price without the Timelock. They can add a guardian key of their own and file exits that did not happen, or real exits at the wrong amounts. Each false exit takes 32 ETH off the counter behind 97.3% of totalAssets. Every deposit, instant withdrawal and queued request in that window then settles at the wrong rate. The uncapped self-mint that was in this section a month ago is gone. Inflating supply now needs a timelocked grant of the minter role first, and that grant would be visible on chain for a week.
A separate, smaller risk is liveness. One pauser signature can freeze every exit. In October one did, for almost five days, and Puffer has not explained it.
Bottom line
Caution, which confirms the 2026-10-01 verdict. Puffer fixed the sharpest new problem the last report found. The operations Safe can no longer mint pufETH to itself without a cap or a delay, and the fix went through the timelock as it should. Every queued withdrawal in October was paid in full.
The two reds that set the verdict have not moved. Three community keys can upgrade the vault with no delay, and they used that bypass this month. One guardian key at threshold 1, which the operations Safe can replace at once, still signs the count behind almost all of the vault's assets. On top of that, the protocol froze all exits for nearly five days and has not said why. That is the fourth pause in fifteen months and the third with no explanation.
For a $10,000 position the instant exit is ample on a normal day, but a pause like October's would close it too. If a zero-delay path over your principal, or an unexplained multi-day freeze, is a line you won't cross, avoid is a reasonable call.
Data appendix
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TVL: Puffer Stake (DeFiLlama
puffer-stake) read $22.18M at 09:00 UTC on 2026-11-07, which is exactly 9,870.35 ETH of the vault's totalAssets. On 2026-10-01 it was $31.11M and 11,599.33 ETH. Change: down 28.7% in USD and down 14.9% in ETH (1,729 ETH). The implied ETH price went from about $2,682 to about $2,247 (down 16.2%). Split: about $3.9M from outflows (1,729 ETH at today's price) and about $5.0M from the ETH price. The biggest daily step is 2026-10-30 to 2026-10-31 (11,238.63 to 10,026.07 ETH), when batches 1493 to 1501 were finalized. The parent, Puffer Finance, reads $22.70M. The board's three-child sum is $23.2M ($23.26M): Stake plus Puffer Vaults ($0.565M) plus Puffer UniFi ($0.518M), against $32.64M on 2026-10-01. The UniFi figure is the 212.64 pufETH held by the unifiETH vault0x196ead47, so the sum counts that pufETH twice. ATH $1.84B on 2024-06-06, down 98.8%. 365d: $124.51M on 2025-11-07, down 82.2%. 90d not re-pulled: not verified in this review. -
Vault state: Supply 9,080.02 pufETH (10,694.71 on 2026-10-01). totalAssets 9,870.35 ETH, made up of:
- 203.73 ETH in the vault, 0.49 stETH and 0 WETH;
- 9,600 ETH locked (300 validators x 32,
PufferOracleV2.getLockedEthAmount); - 66.14 ETH of rewards minted but not deposited (4,159.84 minted, 4,093.70 deposited).
Rate 1.087040 (1.084570 on 2026-10-01). previewRedeem 1.076170 per pufETH (1% fee). Implementation
0x3b2fdfdefe919dbcce0bc5ac426097d5523b8afa, unchanged. -
Exit mechanics: PufferWithdrawalManager
0xdda0483184e75a5579ef9635ed14baccf9d50283: 15,039 requests to date, 131 of them since 2026-10-01. Finalized through batch 1502; batch size 10; maximum request 10,000 pufETH. It holds 14.45 pufETH pending and 7.39 ETH unclaimed.- Batches finalized since 2026-10-01: 1489 (10-05); 1490 to 1492 (10-13); 1493 to 1501 (10-30 13:22 UTC, 1,240.53 ETH for 1,143.11 pufETH burned); 1502 (11-03, 153.01 ETH).
- Total 1,588.85 ETH paid for 1,464.04 pufETH burned. Actual equalled expected in every batch.
- Large requests:
0xa775c23f...sent 500 pufETH to the manager on 10-09 (batch 1493, finalized after 21 days).0xd0c68e22...requested 235.99, 92.15 and 143.84 pufETH on 10-11 (batches 1494 and 1495, finalized after 19 days); its balance is now 0.
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Secondary liquidity: Curve
0xEEda34A3holds 327.27 pufETH and 180.20 wstETH (stEthPerToken 1.24859). Sales of 10, 50, 100, 200, 250 and 300 pufETH quote 0.13%, 0.18%, 0.29%, 2.69%, 17.8% and 31.2% under NAV. Curve0xb3c8ce1eholds 1,020.44 pufETH and 35.63 wstETH; a 10 pufETH sale quotes 5.8% under NAV. Curve pufETH/WETH0x39F5b252now holds 61.71 pufETH (7.63 on 2026-10-01). Its buy side and the Uniswap v3 pool were not quoted: not verified in this review. CoinGecko: pufETH about 1.0855 ETH, about $112 of 24h volume. -
Holder concentration: Ethplorer top 20, with the top balances re-read via
balanceOf; 44,218 holders.- Safe
0xe22de1d7a27afab02fc25f9b2b0cb538a26548c2(2-of-4): 1,054.58 (11.61%) - Curve
0xb3c8ce1e: 1,020.44 (11.24%) - EOA
0xa775c23f5b135e6acbc821b309e10662b1dca2de: 656.74 (7.23%) - EOA
0x8ea1f6b673bd7dcd726ca4f3ae9b1ed639f5c1f6: 643.03 (7.08%) - PufferProtocol bonds
0xf7b6b324: 588.75 (6.48%) - Pendle SY
0x253008ba: 342.64 (3.77%) - Curve
0xEEda34A3: 327.27 (3.60%) - Safe
0xa532e9670c87b1c6c31f60197b4f106ca68b3244(2-of-5): 318.69 (3.51%) - EOA
0x431b27ad...: 240.57 (2.65%) - CCIP pool
0xbc1324f4: 225.90 (2.49%)
The top 10 hold 59.7%, the top 20 hold 73.7%. The Safe pair (#1 and #8) holds 15.12%. Both Safes list the same four signers,
0x30b8a70b...,0x1e3eafd7...,0xfa490273...and0x0bbc1d7c..., and #8 adds0xf37fef00...(re-read 2026-11-07). The L1ERC20Bridge escrow0xad16edcf, which held 477.95 pufETH on 2026-10-01, now holds 0. Identities of the EOAs and the Safe pair: not verified in this review. - Safe
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Audits: Not re-opened this run. Carried from 2026-10-01: BlockSec, SlowMist, Quantstamp, Immunefi Boost, Trail of Bits, Nethermind, Creed, Cantina (VaultV5), and Nethermind NM_0985 on an audit branch; Sherlock bounty live since 2026-08-17. New since then:
- The L1RewardManager
0x157788cc028ac6405bd406f2d1e0a8a22b3cf17bwas upgraded on 2026-10-23 (block 26,255,291) to implementation0x65f7bb63cf90bc65fd4d8b1587f89cb002d58b7a. That implementation was compiled with solc 0.8.30 and verified on Blockscout on 2026-10-24. - The upgrade ran through
upgradeToAndCallwithinitializeV2(86400, 259200, 0xa4931a9f...), queued 2026-10-16. That is a 1-day claiming delay and a 72-hour minimum mint frequency, and the third argument zeroes the allowance of the deprecated LayerZero adapter. - In code,
mintRewardsrequires the amount to be at mostallowedRewardMintAmount, which has no ceiling. Frequency cannot be set below 72 hours.
Audit coverage of this implementation and of the live vault implementation: not verified in this review.
- The L1RewardManager
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Admin/governance:
- Timelock
0x3C28B7c7Ba1A1f55c9Ce66b263B33B204f2126eA: delay 604,801 s. - Community Safe
0x446d4d6b26815f9ba78b5d454e303315d586cb2a: 3-of-7, nonce 16.- Nonce 15 (2026-10-22 13:43 UTC, tx
0xd26d9c01...):addOwnerWithThreshold(0x2f71129b240080c638ac8d993bff52169e3551c3, 3). - Nonce 16 (2026-10-22 16:45 UTC, tx
0xe1da0afa...):Timelock.executeTransactionto an AccessManager multicall that ransetTargetClosed(pufETH, false)andsetTargetClosed(WithdrawalManager, false).
- Nonce 15 (2026-10-22 13:43 UTC, tx
- Operations Safe
0xc0896ab1a8cae8c2c1d27d011eb955cca955580d: 3-of-6, owners unchanged, nonce 513 to 533. Its actions since 2026-10-01:- withdrawal finalizations, plus module and EigenPod calls;
- Timelock queues on 10-16 (AccessManager role batch and L1RewardManager upgrade, both executed 10-23 12:21 UTC);
- a Timelock queue on 10-19 (a two-call AccessManager batch for the reopening, eta 10-26, never executed because the community Safe acted first);
- a 10-28 execution granting role 28 to EOA
0xac1e97e3...; - a 10-30 multisend (tx
0x1db62163...) that revoked that grant and queued a grant and a revoke of role 28 for0x9a135c6cf01b3657a6010881277ed6e44a6549bb, eta 2026-11-06 13:42 UTC, with no matching RoleGranted event at my read.
- The 10-23 batch (tx
0x9c741a62...): granted role 21 to the operations Safe, revoked role 20 from it, and revoked role 8 from0x8898b472..., the operations Safe and0x1a440760.... It also re-mapped L1RewardManager selectors:mintRewardsto role 28;freezeIntervalto role 21;revertInterval,freezeAndRevertInterval,setAllowedRewardMintAmount,setAllowedRewardMintFrequencyandsetClaimingDelayto role 77;claimRewardspublic.
- Current reads: the operations Safe has role 20 false, 21 true, 23 true, 25 true, 28 false, 77 true.
canCall(ops, pufETH, mintRewards)is false;canCall(L1RewardManager, pufETH, mintRewards)is true. - Pauser
0x1ba8e3aa853f73ae8093e26b7b8f2520c3620df4: 1-of-9, nonce 17 to 18. - AccessManager
0x8c1686069474410E6243425f4a10177a94EBEE11:canCall(Timelock, pufETH, upgradeToAndCall)true, zero delay. The full current holder set of role 28 cannot be enumerated from the AccessManager: not verified in this review.
- Timelock
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Oracle: PufferOracleV2
0x0BE2aE0edbeBb517541DF217EF0074FC9a9e994freports 9,600 ETH locked (11,200 on 2026-10-01). GuardianModule0x628b183f248a142a598aa2dcccd6f7e480a7ccf2: guardians [0x65d2dd7a66a2733a36559fe900a236280a05fbd6], threshold 1; guardian EOA nonce 22,504. Role 77 (the guardian set) is still held by the operations Safe with zero delay. Validator count not reconciled against beacon-chain balances: not verified in this review. -
Incidents and news:
- AccessManager
TargetClosedsince 2026-10-01: pufETH and the WithdrawalManager closed at 19:01:23 UTC on 2026-10-17 (block 26,214,234, pauser Safe, tx0x4e0e1b3d..., one 65-byte signature, relayed by0xe1AD10b9..., which is not a pauser owner). Both reopened at 16:45:35 UTC on 2026-10-22 (block 26,249,438, community Safe via the Timelock bypass). No other closure; both targets read open today. - The signer of the pause was not recovered: not verified in this review.
- DeFiLlama hacks dataset: 1,340 records, none naming Puffer or pufETH. It lists Binance CEX ($6.36B, 2026-10-29) and Swell (hot-wallet key compromise, 2026-10-21) with no stated link to Puffer.
- X search (Grok), 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-07: no posts on a Puffer pause, exploit, depeg or Binance exposure, only promotional posts. Web search: nothing on an October 2026 pause.
- Public explanation of the October pause: not verified in this review.
- Status of the two OperationsCoordinators still closed on 2026-10-01: not verified in this review.
- AccessManager
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Token: PUFFER $0.0262 on CoinGecko, market cap $15.08M, 24h volume $1.29M ($0.0257 and about $14.2M on 2026-10-01).
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.