TL;DR
Jupiter Lend is the Jupiter team's money market on Solana, a Rust reimplementation of Fluid's Liquidity How much you can sell or withdraw right now without moving the price or waiting. Thin liquidity means a slow or costly exit.-layer design. TVL Total value locked: the dollar value of everything deposited in a protocol or pool. It shows size, not safety. is $927.1M on DeFiLlama (2026-11-06). That is down 21.2% from $1,176.50M at our 2026-09-26 report and 24.9% below the all-time high of $1,234.64M set on 2026-10-07. SOL fell by about a quarter over the same window (CoinGecko: $120.50 to $122.08 during 09-26, about $90 on 11-06). Most of the drop is price, not departures. SOL collateral measured in SOL is flat, and USDC Earn deposits grew.
What changed is that the main exit risk from the last report actually happened. The Binance hack began at 20:05 UTC on 2026-10-29, per TRM Labs. Jupiter said at 23:32 UTC that Lend had no exposure. By 09:01 UTC the next morning it was announcing a "liquidity crunch impacting withdrawals". Solana Compass read the public API, last updated at 09:18 UTC. It showed about 7,900 USDC withdrawable against roughly 419.6M supplied, and less than 1 JupUSD against about 46M. Nothing was lost, the queue cleared as borrowers repaid, and today $46.6M of USDC is withdrawable. Still, for at least half a day a USDC lender could not get out. That is what high Utilization The share of a lending market's deposits that is lent out. Near 100%, depositors may have to wait to withdraw and the borrow rate jumps. means on a shared layer, and it is no longer hypothetical.
The admin structure held up, and control also became more concentrated. Every authority on both markets is still a Squads Multisig A wallet that needs several keyholders to sign, such as 5 of 9. Safer than one key, but only as safe as the people who hold the keys.. Four program upgrades since September all executed after the 12-hour Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree.. A three-program upgrade was approved and then cancelled before execution. But the parameter multisig dropped its threshold from 5 to 4, and the guardian paused reUSD for two days without a public explanation. Own-paper collateral fell from 53.5% to 48.6%, still close to half. Caution, unchanged.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. The Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope. page was re-read on 2026-11-06. It lists the same fifteen Lend reports as in September:
- Ten cover the core: OtterSec twice, Offside Labs three times, MixBytes, Zenith, two Certora formal verifications, and the Code4rena contest that closed in March 2026.
- Five sit under "Jupiter Lend AMM" (OtterSec twice, Neodyme twice, Zenith), with windows ending by June 2026.
Nothing has been added, while the code kept moving. On-chain upgrade history since our report:
- 2026-10-06: Liquidity at 16:20 UTC, the lending reward-rate model at 16:25 and Lending at 16:26.
- 2026-11-06: Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through. at 07:18 UTC today.
A batch upgrading Oracle, Vault and curator A shared deposit pool run by code or by a curator. The curator chooses which markets get your money and sets the limits, for a fee. and DEX reached four approvals by 00:19 UTC on 2026-10-21. Cancel votes began about eleven hours later, and the batch was cancelled on 10-26 before it executed. Its buffers were closed on 10-28, and only the Oracle part came back and shipped today. Cancelling an approved upgrade shows the review step working, but the reason is not public. All twelve programs, seven main and five in the Ethena market, remain upgradeable and none is frozen. Whether any review covered the post-June changes is not verified in this review.
Admin control. Re-read on-chain on 2026-11-06. The structure still holds. What changed is who sits where, and the parameter threshold.
Code: all seven main programs answer to 4MsgBB..., the vault of Squads multisig J3mJ.... It is 4 of 6 with a 43,200-second timelock, no config authority, and transaction index 65 (55 in September). 5tjChp was added on 10-09 and 8BR8iA removed on 10-12. That makes eleven membership changes since August. Timelocks were respected:
- The 10-06 upgrades got their fourth approval at 20:56 UTC on 10-05 and executed from 16:20 the next day, 19 hours later.
- Today's Oracle upgrade was proposed 11-03, fully approved by 11:18 UTC on 11-04, and executed 44 hours after that.
Parameters: 5Y93... lowered its threshold from 5 to 4 while removing 4Sqa9k (config transaction 760). It kept its 21,600-second timelock. It is now 4 of 7 voters plus two initiate-only members, at transaction index 798 against 748. Five addresses vote on both the code and parameter multisigs (5tjChp, AJLekD, BicFdN, DEHuZt, DNH5KV). Since each tier needs only 4, that one group is a quorum on both. In September four overlapped, against a parameter threshold of 5.
Guardian: B9fG... raised its threshold from 3 to 4 when it added 7q4qfF on 11-02. It is 4 of 6 voters with no timelock. None of its voters sits on the code or parameter tiers.
Ethena market: parameters are still 3 of 4 with a 6-hour timelock. Three of its four members (5tjChp, BicFdN, DNH5KV) come from the same five-person group, so that group is a quorum there too. Code is still the 6-of-10 multisig 5rD6... with a 12-hour timelock. It still lists 8BR8iA and 4Sqa9k, both removed from the main code and parameter multisigs since September. A proposal there to remove ABun6m has sat at 4 of 6 approvals since 10-10. Signer identities are still not established, not verified in this review.
Oracle. The design is unchanged in the docs:
- up to four hops;
- 600 seconds and 2% for user operations, 7,200 seconds and 4% for Liquidation When a loan passes its LLTV or a perp position runs out of margin, it is closed by force and the collateral is sold, usually with a penalty.;
- only Pyth checks confidence.
The live wiring moved, though. Across 83 vaults the hops are now Chainlink 70, stake-pool 18, JupLend 12, single-pool 11, Chainlink Data Streams 8, infPool 4, pstPool 4, Pyth 4 and mSOL pool 3. The INF vaults, $50.77M of collateral, moved from Pyth to an "infPool" source. The docs name seven source types: Pyth, Chainlink, Redstone, StakePool, MsolPool, SinglePool and JupLend. That leaves three undocumented source types on live collateral: infPool, pstPool and Data Streams.
Oracle changes since September:
- The parameter vault executed three UpdateOracle calls on 2026-10-07.
- The guardian initialised several new oracle configs in early October, and a Data Streams access controller at 11:27 UTC on 11-01.
- The Oracle program itself was upgraded today.
JLP, the largest collateral, still prices on a single Chainlink hop. The Ethena vaults price on two Pyth hops through that same main Oracle program, so today's upgrade reached them too. The DEX price override (force_set_price) still answers to the parameter multisig.
Liquidity & exit. In September this report said USDC lenders sat on a layer 92% lent out with about $38M idle, so "their exit is a queue before it is a loss". On 2026-10-30 that queue formed. Per Solana Compass's read of the API, last updated at 09:18 UTC:
- USDC: roughly 419.6M supplied, about 7,900 withdrawable.
- JupUSD: about 46M supplied, under 1 withdrawable.
- SOL: about 209,000 supplied, about 52,250 withdrawable. That matches SOL's 25% rolling withdrawal limit.
CryptoNinjas reported a later read at 7:14 a.m. ET (11:14 UTC): about 418.5M USDC of Earn claims against 3.35 USDC withdrawable. Jupiter's Earn account said the protocol was "functioning as expected and all funds are safe". It said liquidity would return as borrowers repaid or new deposits came in. A later report puts the USDC recovery about 13 hours on. That timing was not confirmed at source, not verified in this review. On DeFiLlama's daily points, TVL fell 10.2% from 10-29 to 10-30 while SOL fell 6.7%. That fits some deleveraging on top of price.
Today, at the API read at 20:33 UTC on 2026-11-06:
- Earn: 7 pools, $565.10M (September: $564.79M). USDC is $473.06M of that, with $46.63M withdrawable (9.9%). JupUSD is $42.07M with $6.87M withdrawable.
- USDC debt across vaults is $415.34M, 87.8% of USDC Earn supply. The exact utilization at the shared reserve level was not re-read, not verified in this review.
- Borrow side: 83 vaults, $1,076.69M of collateral against $648.51M of debt (60.2%, up from 55.3%), 64,350 positions.
- Collateral factors still reach 94% on JupSOL/WSOL ($45.95M), INF/WSOL ($43.67M) and JitoSOL/WSOL. They are 92% on dfdvSOL/WSOL ($103.09M over 44 positions, about 73% drawn) and on the new japanSOL/WSOL.
The Ethena market changed its funding asset. It is now mostly PYUSD: $251.52M supplied, $9.71M withdrawable. Against it sits a USDe/PYUSD vault holding $258.16M of collateral and $241.98M of debt across 80 positions, at a 94% collateral factor and 95% liquidation threshold. The September USDG pool is down to $2.12M.
Yield (real vs emission). Mostly real for lenders. Jupiter's API on 2026-11-06 shows:
- USDC Earn: 4.81% APR Yearly rate without compounding. Funding here is shown as an APR: the hourly rate × 8,760. plus 0.25% rewards. The USDC borrow rate is about 5.9%. Times 88% to 90% utilization, less the 10% reserve fee, that lands close to the base rate, so the base rate is borrow interest.
- JupUSD Earn: 3.71% plus 1.49% in rewards, so about 29% of its headline is incentive.
- WSOL 3.71%, USDT 3.76%, USDS 3.80%, USDG 5.66%, EURC 2.86%.
The parameter multisig still sets borrow-rate magnifiers:
- +1.10 points on JUP/USDC and JUP/USDT;
- +0.60 on the two PST vaults;
- +1.50 on the two jlJUPUSD vaults;
- -1.00 on sUSDai/USDC (-2.00 in September).
The parameter vault ran two UpdateBorrowRateMagnifier calls on 10-21. In the Ethena market, USDe collateral still earns 4.87%, entirely from a supply-rate magnifier over an organic rate of zero. The Ethena parameter vault executed an UpdateSupplyRateMagnifier at 06:45 UTC today, and the rate reads 4.87% after it. PYUSD lenders there get 3.85%. Who funds that magnifier is not verified in this review.
Holder concentration. This uses the same denominator as September, the main market's collateral base:
- JLP: $299.02M (27.8%).
- JupSOL: $217.99M (20.2%).
- JUP $5.61M and jlJUPUSD $0.79M.
Together that is $523.41M, 48.6% of $1,076.69M. It is down 4.9 points, partly because SOL-linked paper fell with SOL and partly because sUSDai grew from $10.93M to $62.48M (5.8%).
The rest of the mix: LST and LRT A liquid staking token is a staked asset you can still trade or lend, such as jitoSOL or stHYPE. An LRT is restaked on top: more yield, more risk. are 39.8% of collateral. Debt is 64.0% USDC and 27.8% WSOL. JupUSD, also Jupiter-issued, is $30.0M of debt and a $42.07M Earn pool. The sUSDai/USDC vault is a new single-issuer block: $62.48M against $53.15M borrowed across 201 positions at an 88% factor, with a rate discount from admin. Two things were not measured: wallet-level concentration on the main market, and the holder of the Ethena PYUSD supply. Both are not verified in this review.
Track record.
- Age and size: about 14.5 months since the 2025-08-19 listing. TVL made a new all-time high of $1,234.64M on 2026-10-07.
- Incidents: DeFiLlama's hacks list now has 1,340 entries, none for Jupiter. Its Solana-tagged entries in the window are other protocols: Coffer 10-18, WAX bridge 10-22, Bloom Trading Bot 10-26 and Loopscale Lending 11-05, plus the multichain custodial losses at Gamdom (10-13) and Mercado Bitcoin (11-02). The Binance hack of 2026-10-29 ($6.36B on DeFiLlama, Binance's own estimate around $6.3B) is a centralized-exchange key compromise. Jupiter and press reports say Lend had no exposure, and nothing found contradicts that.
- The stress test: the protocol's first real one since September produced a Cooldown and withdrawal queue The wait between asking to withdraw and getting your funds: a fixed cooldown (7 days for HYPE staking) or a queue that clears as cash comes back., not a loss.
- Bad debt: absorbed-position fields are where the Fluid design parks debt that liquidators did not clear. They read zero on 82 of 83 main vaults and two base units on syrupUSDC/USDC, the same as September, and zero on both Ethena vaults. That is today's state after SOL lost about a quarter of its price. Liquidation volumes during the drawdown were not measured, not verified in this review.
- Guardian pauses: at 09:30 UTC on 10-30 the guardian paused the reUSD token and the reUSD/JupUSD vault's access to the Liquidity program. The parameter multisig lifted that pause at 22:17 UTC on 11-01. From 23:06 to 23:44 UTC on 10-30 the guardian also paused five small stake-token collaterals. No public explanation of either pause was found, not verified in this review. The pauses show the guardian works. They also show a pause can land on a collateral asset with no notice.
- Attribution: Jupiter Perp (perpetual future) A futures contract with no expiry date. Funding paid between longs and shorts keeps its price close to the spot price., the JLP pool, the aggregator and Card events are not counted here unless they hit Lend vaults. None did in this window.
Worst case
The first route is no longer theoretical. A market shock sends borrowers to draw and lenders to withdraw at the same moment. The USDC and JupUSD pools run out of idle cash, and lenders wait. On 10-30 the wait was hours and the loss was nothing. A longer queue during a falling market is the realistic bad day.
The second route is the one that could turn a queue into a loss. A correlated drawdown hits Jupiter's own stack. JLP marks down as perp LP (liquidity provider) Depositing two tokens into a trading pool to earn its swap fees. If their prices drift apart, you end up holding more of the one that fell. lose, and JupSOL reprices off stake-pool accounting rather than a market bid. Then 48.6% of the collateral base moves together at factors up to 94%. Anything liquidators cannot clear becomes absorbed debt on the layer every vault shares.
The third route is admin. The parameter tier now needs 4 of 7 votes and six hours to reassign an oracle, change a collateral factor or call force_set_price. The same five people are also a quorum on the code tier, which shipped four upgrades in five weeks, one of them today. Three of them are a quorum on the Ethena market's parameters.
The Ethena market adds its own route: about $242M of PYUSD lent to 80 USDe Looping Deposit, borrow against it, buy more of the collateral, repeat. It multiplies the gap between the yield and the borrow rate, and the liquidation risk with it. at a 94% factor. Its yield is set by admin, and its pricing runs through the main Oracle program. No insurance fund or backstop was found. The mitigations are position size and watching both Earn withdrawable balances and the five Squads queues.
Bottom line
Caution, for the fourth report running, and this time for a reason that has already been tested.
In the protocol's favour:
- no loss and no bad debt through a drop of about a quarter in SOL and the biggest exchange hack on DeFiLlama's list;
- every upgrade went through a timelock that was honored, and an approved upgrade was cancelled before it shipped;
- the guardian acted;
- lender yield is mostly real borrow interest.
Against it:
- USDC and JupUSD lenders were effectively unable to withdraw for part of 10-30;
- nearly half the collateral is paper the same issuer prints;
- the parameter threshold was lowered, and five signers hold a quorum on both code and parameters;
- three oracle source types in live use are undocumented, and the Oracle program changed today;
- an asset was paused for two days with no public explanation.
Treat a USDC deposit here as interest-bearing but not instantly liquid. Size it so a day-long queue does not hurt. Treat the Ethena market as a separate product.
Data appendix
- TVL: $927.1M (DeFiLlama
jupiter-lend, 2026-11-06; child of parent#jupiter, lending only).- Since our 2026-09-26 report ($1,176.50M): -21.2%. DeFiLlama has since revised its 09-26 daily point to $1,186.82M.
- ATH $1,234.64M on 2026-10-07, now 24.9% below. Window low $907.85M on 2026-10-30.
- Daily points: 10-07 $1,234.6M, 10-20 $1,015.3M, 10-29 $1,011.0M, 10-30 $907.9M, 11-05 $1,032.0M.
- DeFiLlama borrowed field: $921.74M.
- Price versus flows:
- SOL: $120.50 to $122.08 during 09-26 (about $118 on another source the same day), $89.86 to $90.07 on 11-06. That is -24% to -26% depending on the sample.
- WSOL collateral: $265.71M (09-26) to $193.53M today, about 2.18M SOL to 2.16M SOL, so flat in units.
- JupSOL units: roughly -4% by the same method, using a JupSOL/SOL ratio of about 1.22.
- USDC Earn: $460.12M to $473.06M (+2.8%). Earn total: $564.79M to $565.10M.
- Collateral base: $1,317.61M to $1,076.69M (-18.3%). Debt: $728.89M to $648.51M (-11.0%).
- SOL 10-29 to 10-30 (00:00 UTC prints): $102.32 to $95.47, -6.7%.
- Read: mostly price, with some deleveraging around 10-30. JLP unit change not computed (no September JLP price on file), not verified in this review.
- Main market, borrow side (83 vaults: 78 standard, 5 type-1 smart vaults): collateral $1,076.69M, debt $648.51M, 64,350 positions. Highest vault id 107 (next_vault_id 104 in September).
- Collateral: JLP $299.02M (27.8%), JupSOL $217.99M (20.2%), WSOL $193.53M (18.0%), dfdvSOL $124.65M (11.6%), sUSDai $62.48M (5.8%), INF $50.77M (4.7%), PST $50.70M (4.7%), japanSOL $14.79M, cbBTC $14.57M, JitoSOL $9.26M, rkuSOL $8.70M, SPYx $6.05M, JUP $5.61M, syrupUSDC $3.69M, reUSD $2.10M, jlJUPUSD $0.79M.
- Jupiter-issued collateral: $523.41M = 48.6% (September 53.5%, August 56.6%). LSTs: $428.33M = 39.8%.
- Debt: USDC $415.34M (64.0%), WSOL $180.31M (27.8%), JupUSD $30.00M (4.6%), USDT $14.31M.
- Largest vaults:
- JLP/USDC: $271.89M collateral / $167.96M debt, CF 85%, LT 90%, 9,586 positions, one Chainlink hop.
- JupSOL/USDC: $160.12M / $68.79M, CF 75%.
- WSOL/USDC: $153.48M / $69.85M, CF 80%, 10,628 positions.
- dfdvSOL/WSOL: $103.09M / $74.89M, CF 92%, 44 positions.
- sUSDai/USDC: $62.48M / $53.15M, CF 88%, 201 positions, borrow magnifier -100bp.
- JupSOL/WSOL: $45.95M / $40.98M, CF 94%.
- INF/WSOL: $43.67M / $39.52M, CF 94%, infPool.
- CF range: 50% to 94%.
- Supply side (7 Earn pools): $565.10M.
- USDC: $473.06M at 4.81% + 0.25% rewards, $46.63M withdrawable.
- JupUSD: $42.07M at 3.71% + 1.49% rewards, $6.87M withdrawable.
- WSOL $23.49M, USDT $17.21M, EURC $4.60M, USDG $2.36M, USDS $2.30M.
- Withdrawal-limit expansion: 50% per 21,600s on USDC and JupUSD, 25% on the rest.
- 10-30 liquidity event:
- The Binance hack began at 20:05 UTC on 2026-10-29 per TRM Labs. DeFiLlama hacks lists Binance CEX at $6.36B, key leaked via infrastructure. Binance estimated "around $6.3B".
- Jupiter Earn statements: 23:32 UTC 10-29, "no exposure to Binance"; 09:01 UTC 10-30, "liquidity crunch impacting withdrawals" and "all funds are safe"; 09:14 UTC, "Both are true".
- API figures per Solana Compass (API last updated 09:18 UTC 10-30): USDC ~419.6M supplied, ~7,900 withdrawable; JupUSD ~46M, under 1 withdrawable; SOL ~209,000, ~52,250 withdrawable.
- CryptoNinjas (10-31): ~418.5M USDC in Earn claims against 3.35 USDC withdrawable at 7:14 a.m. ET (11:14 UTC).
- Recovery time: about 13 hours per a press summary, not verified in this review.
- Guardian and parameter actions in the window (on-chain logs):
- Guardian, 10-30 09:30 UTC: PauseToken plus 2 PauseUser on reUSD (mint
2uxaYT1f...) and the reUSD/JupUSD vault's user configs. - Guardian, 10-30 23:06 to 23:44 UTC: PauseToken/PauseUser on five small stake-token collaterals (
2pMCRTPx...,2k79y8CA...,98B1NMLY...,9yQLxEzu...,PhxXAYTk...). - Parameter vault, 10-31 12:35 UTC: UpdateUserSupplyConfig.
- Parameter vault, 11-01 22:17 UTC: UnpauseToken plus 2 UnpauseUser on reUSD. No unpause of the stake tokens appears in either vault's log through 11-06, but their status was not re-read at the account level, not verified in this review.
- Guardian, 11-01 11:27 UTC: Chainlink Data Streams feed access controller.
- Guardian proposals 675 to 682, created 11-05 and 11-06 with zero approvals: pre-staged PauseUser calls and oracle configs. Not executed.
- Parameter vault since 09-26: about 45 executed transactions. These include new vaults on 10-02, 10-06, 10-08, 10-14, 10-22 and 10-28; a new lending pool on 10-10; UpdateOracle x3 on 10-07; and magnifier updates on 10-06 and 10-21.
- Reasons for the pauses: not verified in this review.
- Guardian, 10-30 09:30 UTC: PauseToken plus 2 PauseUser on reUSD (mint
- Programs (all upgradeable, none frozen, last deploy):
- Main market, all under
4MsgBB5VPoTrUSp5XnfbViV386C1UnsTdifLBw33ZMSJ:- Lending (Earn)
jup3YeL8...: 2026-10-06 16:26Z. - Liquidity
jupeiUmn...: 2026-10-06 16:20Z. - Reward-rate model
jup7Tths...: 2026-10-06 16:25Z. - Oracle
jupnw4B6...: 2026-11-06 07:18Z. - Vaults
jupr81Yt...and DEXjupZ4m2G...: 2026-09-24. - Flashloan
jupgfSgf...: 2026-07-03.
- Lending (Earn)
- Ethena market: five programs under
A4CcB3kdi3w4fJgAim4sdN8DvadZnN4R4PPbECQqz6j7, all unchanged since 2026-05-12.
- Main market, all under
- Code multisig proposals since 09-26:
- 56 to 58 (upgrades): created 10-05 08:46 to 09:06Z, fourth approval 10-05 20:56Z, executed 10-06 16:20 to 16:26Z.
- 59 (add
5tjChp): created 10-07, executed 10-09 11:02Z. - 60 (remove
8BR8iA): executed 10-12 17:58Z. - 61 to 63 (Oracle, Vaults and DEX upgrades): created 10-20 20:59 to 21:16Z, fourth approval by 10-21 00:19Z, cancel votes from 10-21 11:02Z, cancelled 10-26 18:34Z.
- 64 (close three upgrade buffers): created 10-21 11:34Z, executed 10-28 14:36Z.
- 65 (Oracle upgrade): created 11-03 15:07Z, fourth approval 11-04 11:18Z, executed 11-06 07:18Z.
- Admin tier 1, code (main):
J3mJ3wz6xkVUk3T8qHnuAYNxsRH3ixHsryYNZAU2vG8P.- Threshold 4 of 6, time_lock 43200s, no config authority.
- transaction_index 65, stale 60.
- Members:
3ZR4gM,5tjChp,AJLekD,BicFdN,DEHuZt,DNH5KV.
- Admin tier 2, parameters (main):
5Y93cxqp8rGtjDhxGkehewfhFdxLkrCfPDWookCGeASF.- Threshold 4 (was 5), time_lock 21600s.
- 9 members, of whom 7 vote (
4uqVay,5tjChp,AJLekD,BicFdN,DEHuZt,DNH5KV,EhJqf1), plus7a5UoQandHYbxGkinitiate-only. - transaction_index 798, stale 777.
- Config transaction 760: removed
4Sqa9k, threshold to 4 (exact date not verified in this review).
- Admin tier 3, guardian:
B9fGPEBP1M4SvQgtG7egVrdL5N9zBxrFpdtZevTkhQ6o.- Threshold 4 (was 3), time_lock 0.
- 8 members, 6 voters (
issFzZ,7q4qfF,C89crP,FXQuS5,GpvnGq,HitHjX). - transaction_index 682.
- Config transaction 674 (11-02): added
7q4qfF, threshold to 4.
- Admin tier 4, Ethena parameters:
49BCRd3WW3zuZFLQcY97modaaKytM8e7rxjLisHqKU6g.- 3 of 4, time_lock 21600s.
- Members:
issFzZ,5tjChp,BicFdN,DNH5KV. - transaction_index 59. Eleven proposals executed since 09-26, including UpdateSupplyRateMagnifier at 06:45Z and UpdateUserBorrowConfig at 06:48Z on 11-06.
- Proposal 59: created 11-06 06:39Z, 2 of 3 approvals by 08:35Z. It carries update_supply_rate_magnifier and update_rate_data_v1.
- Admin tier 5, Ethena code:
5rD6j4PWHJLdCuiR8Nc5eyRcuRNS5ZyCBXqTmWV36xHg.- 6 of 10, time_lock 43200s, transaction_index 15.
- Members include
8BR8iAand4Sqa9k, both since removed from the main tiers. - Proposal 15 (remove
ABun6m): created 10-07 06:46Z, fourth approval 10-10 10:37Z, still short of 6.
- Signer overlap (voting members, 2026-11-06):
- code/parameters: 5 (each tier's threshold is 4);
- Ethena parameters: 3 of the same five (threshold 3);
- code/guardian 0, parameters/guardian 0.
- Identities: not verified in this review.
- Oracle: hop counts across 83 main vaults: chainlink 70, stakePool 18, jupLend 12, singlePool 11, chainlinkDataStreams 8, infPool 4, pstPool 4, pyth 4, msolPool 3. In September: pyth 7, no infPool. JLP: one Chainlink hop. The docs list Pyth, Chainlink, Redstone, StakePool, MsolPool, SinglePool and JupLend, and name neither infPool, pstPool nor Data Streams.
- Ethena market (Fluid API, 2026-11-06):
- jlePYUSD pool: $251.52M at 3.85%, $9.71M withdrawable.
- jleUSDG: $2.12M (September $253.41M).
- USDe/PYUSD vault: $258.16M collateral, $241.98M debt, 80 positions. CF 94%, LT 95%, liquidation max 97%, penalty 1%. Borrow rate 4.45%. Collateral yield 4.87%, all from the supply magnifier. Two Pyth hops.
- USDe/USDG vault: $2.63M / $2.41M, 1,405 positions, no collateral yield.
- Absorbed fields: zero.
- Holder of the PYUSD supply: not verified in this review.
- Audits (developers.jup.ag/docs/resources/audits, read 2026-11-06): unchanged from September.
- Jupiter Lend: Certora FV 2, Code4rena, Certora FV, OtterSec x2, Offside Labs x3, MixBytes, Zenith.
- Jupiter Lend AMM: OtterSec x2, Neodyme x2, Zenith.
- Nothing covers the 10-06 or 11-06 upgrades or the Ethena instance, not verified in this review.
- Absorbed positions: zero on 82 of 83 main vaults, 2 raw units each on syrupUSDC/USDC, zero on both Ethena vaults. Backstop or insurance fund: none found, not verified in this review.
- Holder concentration: collateral-mix figures above. Wallet-level depositor and borrower concentration: not verified in this review.
- Incident scan:
- DeFiLlama hacks: 1,340 entries (2026-11-06), zero for Jupiter.
- Solana-tagged entries in the window: Gamdom (10-13, multichain), Coffer (10-18), WAX Multi-Chain Bridge (10-22), Bloom Trading Bot (10-26), Mercado Bitcoin (11-02, multichain) and Loopscale Lending (11-05). None is Jupiter Lend.
- Web: Solana Compass (10-30), CryptoNinjas (10-31) and TheNews.pk on the withdrawal queue, all reporting no losses.
- X search was rate-limited this run, not verified in this review.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.