TL;DR
Global Dollar (USDG) is Paxos's regulated dollar stablecoin. Paxos Digital Singapore issues it under a MAS Major Payment Institution licence, and Paxos Issuance Europe issues it under a FIN-FSA e-money licence. KPMG's September report, signed 23 Oct, shows $3.168B of cash, government money funds and short T-bills against 3.165B tokens on 30 Sep. The Peg and depeg A stablecoin's peg is the price it targets, usually $1. A depeg is a move away from it, most often down. The stables page checks prices every 5 minutes. barely moved through the Binance breach on 29 Oct, although net supply fell about 11.5% in a week, to $2.72B on DeFiLlama's 6 Nov daily point ($2.74B in the live read). The verdict stays caution for the same reason it dropped in September: every admin power is still held by single keys, and the ops key has since used them. On 2 Oct it added a new Ethereum mint and burn controller with unverified code, effective at once, at 100M USDG a day. On 6 Nov it tripled the controller's limit to 300M a day, again with no delay. The Solana mint authority was rotated, and one keypair can still mint there alone.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Paxos publishes third-party reviews in its own GitHub repos. Zellic covers the stablecoin base, the USDG rewards module (24 Feb 2026, two high findings marked fixed), the LayerZero OFTWrapper and the Solana minter-controller. Trail of Bits covers the cross-chain integration, and Halborn the token contracts. The Ethereum token still runs the implementation deployed on 28 Feb 2026, verified on Etherscan, and the ops key has scheduled nothing on the USDG Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree. since 29 Sep. One new piece of code sits outside that Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope. record. The supply controller added on 2 Oct is an ERC1967 proxy whose implementation has no verified source on Etherscan or Blockscout, and no Paxos repo pushed since July carries an audit that names it. Key custody was outside Zellic's scope, and key custody is where the risk sits. Admin control. Re-read on chain on 6 and 7 Nov on Ethereum, X Layer, Robinhood Chain, Ink, Arbitrum and Mantle. Nothing changed for the better. Each token's admin is an OpenZeppelin TimelockController with a 24-hour minimum delay and no pending admin transfer. On every chain, one address with no contract code (0x3af3...024b) is the timelock's proposer and executor. It also holds PAUSE_ROLE and ASSET_PROTECTION_ROLE (freeze, then wipe), and on Ethereum it holds the minter-manager role. That last power has now been used twice. On 2 Oct the key called addSupplyController on USDG's Ethereum SupplyControl and added 0x40d1...add4. The call needs no timelock and took effect at once. The controller started with 100M USDG of capacity, refilling about 100M a day, and may mint to and burn from any address. On 6 Nov at 19:51 UTC the same key raised it to 300M of capacity, refilling about 300M a day, again with no delay. The ops key added the same controller to two other Paxos SupplyControl contracts in the same block on 2 Oct, and it has handled PAXG and PYUSD as well as USDG, so it appears to serve several Paxos tokens. Its own settings change through a separate 24-hour timelock (0xdd05...7683), where the ops key has scheduled 48 changes since 2 Oct. Two externally owned addresses call it: the 500M issuance key 0xf845...abb7 and 0x6320...43bd. Some of its mint calls carry what look like two signatures, which could mean a co-signing check, but the code is unverified and we could not confirm it (not verified in this review). The two single-address issuance keys from the September report are unchanged on all six chains: 0x2fb0...41a4 can mint 1B an hour to itself, and 0xf845...abb7 can mint 500M an hour to one whitelisted wallet. The first is the address behind the October 2025 PYUSD over-mint. On Solana the mint authority is no longer the 1-of-4 Multisig A wallet that needs several keyholders to sign, such as 5 of 9. Safer than one key, but only as safe as the people who hold the keys. read on 29 Sep. It is now 2e99...1AB4, a 1-of-5 SPL multisig created on 25 Sep and first seen minting on 8 Oct. Its signers are the same ordinary keypair 2apB...YJjk, two accounts of the minter-controller program, the LayerZero OFT program's account and a fifth address with no account on chain (not verified in this review). With one signature required, that keypair can still mint with no cap. It also remains the freeze authority, the permanent delegate, the transfer-fee authority and the confidential-transfer authority. Paxos may protect these keys with MPC or HSM controls off chain, but nothing verifiable shows it. Oracle. None in the token. The peg rests on 1:1 redemption through Paxos, not on a price feed. Liquidity & exit. Verified Paxos accounts redeem 1:1, and the exit was tested in practice. On DeFiLlama's daily series, supply fell from $3.072B on 30 Oct to $2.718B on 6 Nov. Over the same window, 4-hour price samples stayed between $0.9998 and $1.0004, so the redemption path held under outflow. Since 30 Sep the full range is $0.9997 (28 Oct) to $1.0004 (1 Nov). Retail holders without a Paxos account exit through exchanges and DEX pools such as the Curve StableSwap pool, which holds about 8.5M USDG on Ethereum. Yield (real vs emission). The reserve income is real. The 30 Sep attestation shows $1.678B in government money market funds, $1.412B in US Treasuries and $78M in cash, with no Emissions and points Emissions are new tokens a protocol issues to pay rewards; they count in the reward yield. Points may turn into tokens later and are never counted in a rate.. The yield goes to Global Dollar Network partners, who can receive up to 100% of the reserve return on balances held on their platforms. A plain wallet earns nothing directly. A Maple pool holds about 6.3M USDG on Ethereum. Third-party rate claims for Kraken and Maple were not checked this run (not verified in this review). The on-chain reward multiplier and claim totals were last read on 29 Sep (not verified in this review). Holder concentration. Concentrated by chain and by holder. On DeFiLlama's 6 Nov split, X Layer (OKX's chain) holds about 43% of supply, Robinhood Chain about 24%, Solana about 18% and Ethereum about 10%. Most of the drop since 29 Sep came from X Layer (down about $290M) and Solana (down about $190M). On Ethereum about 10,060 holders share about 317M on chain. The largest address, 0xcC28...5ec7, is unlabeled and holds about 43%. It was not in September's top two. The top ten hold about 83%, including the Paxos mint wallet 0x264b...97B5. Track record. About two years live since the Ethereum deploy on 7 Oct 2024. We found no USDG exploit, depeg or reserve shortfall, and the DeFiLlama hacks list has no Paxos or USDG entry. DeFiLlama lists Binance's 29 Oct breach at $6.36B, classed as "Key Leaked via Infrastructure", and it reached Paxos only through freezes. At 22:30 UTC on 29 Oct, in one block, the ops key froze 0x5227...2f8c on USDG, PYUSD, USDP, PAXG and BUSD. That is the wallet holding the 1,906.67 PAXG that Paxos said had been moved there from Binance. The key froze one more Ethereum USDG address on 30 Oct and five on 2 Nov. Two of those five hold PAXG, but whether they are linked to the breach is not confirmed (not verified in this review). All seven hold no USDG today, and the ops key sent no wipe or pause call to the token in this period. News coverage quotes Paxos as saying its systems were unaffected and USDG reserves were intact. The January 2026 'USDG' exploit hit TMX Tribe's Perp (perpetual future) A futures contract with no expiry date. Funding paid between longs and shorts keeps its price close to the spot price.-DEX token on Arbitrum, listed by DeFiLlama as "USDGambit and TLP". It was not Paxos's Global Dollar. Issuer watch items carry over. On 15 Oct 2025 Paxos minted 300 trillion PYUSD by mistake and burned it 22 minutes later; the mint came from the key that mints USDG today. In Aug 2025 NYDFS fined Paxos $26.5M over its Binance partnership.
Worst case
The loss path still runs through a key, not a contract bug. On every EVM chain, the issuance key can mint 1B USDG an hour. On Ethereum there is now also a controller that mints to any address at 300M a day. Its code is not published on Etherscan or Blockscout, and its limit was tripled in one transaction with no delay. The ops key can add minters or lift their caps instantly, and on Solana one keypair can mint without a cap. A stolen or misused credential could therefore print unbacked USDG and sell it into DEX pools and lending markets before anyone pauses, and the pause sits with that same ops key. The Binance breach that Paxos just helped contain came from leaked keys. StablR's May 2026 depeg showed the same failure in a stablecoin minting path. The targeted case is narrower. Under a legal order, Paxos freezes an address, as it did seven times on Ethereum in the past week, then wipes the balance on EVM chains or moves it through the Solana permanent delegate. KPMG attests the reserves monthly. That protects against a reserve failure, not a key failure.
Bottom line
Caution, unchanged from 29 Sep. The money side looks as good as before. September's KPMG report shows full backing in cash, government money funds and T-bills. The peg held through a week in which about 11% of supply was burned, and Paxos moved fast on the wallet that received PAXG from Binance. The admin side is unchanged in structure and wider in practice. The single ops key added an any-address minter with unverified code and no delay, then tripled its daily limit to 300M, again with no delay. Solana minting moved to a new multisig where the same keypair still signs alone. Hold USDG as a Paxos credit and key-custody exposure, and size it that way. Published, verifiable multisig or MPC controls over minting and asset protection would reopen the case for solid.
Data appendix
- Supply (no protocol TVL): $2,742.4M on DeFiLlama stablecoin 286 'global-dollar' at $0.9999 (2026-11-06). The 2026-09-29 report had $3.159B, so supply is down about 13%. DeFiLlama daily series: $3.169B on 29 Sep, about $3.06B to $3.10B through late October, $3.072B on 30 Oct, $2.941B on 31 Oct, $2.718B on 6 Nov. Chain split on 6 Nov, with 29 Sep in brackets: X Layer 1,174.1M (1,464.6M), Robinhood Chain 645.4M (685.7M), Solana 499.0M (692.1M), Ethereum 278.4M (262.4M), Ink 65.0M (62.6M), Arbitrum 54.2M (not listed), Hyperliquid 0.9M (1.7M), Mantle 0.5M. On-chain totalSupply: X Layer 1,130.5M, Robinhood Chain 661.3M, Solana 494.1M, Ethereum about 317M, Ink 65.0M, Arbitrum about 55.5M, Mantle 0.5M, about $2.72B in all. The cause of the drop after 30 Oct is not established (not verified in this review).
- Reserves and attestation: paxos.com/usdg-transparency links monthly reports for January to September 2026, by KPMG LLP for those posted from 27 Feb 2026. The September report is by KPMG LLP Singapore: reasonable assurance under Singapore Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000, signed 23 Oct 2026. On 30 Sep: 3,164,996,248 tokens outstanding against $3,168,423,407 of redemption assets (0.11% excess). Composition: cash $78,124,993, government money market funds $1,678,019,554, US Treasuries $1,412,278,860, no repo. On 17 Sep: 3,284,764,991 tokens against $3,289,110,368 (0.13% excess). Assets held in the EU: $16.1M. Cash sits in segregated accounts in Singapore (MAS) and Luxembourg (CSSF). October report: not yet published (not verified in this review).
- Audits: confirmed in the audits folders of paxosglobal/paxos-token-contracts (Zellic Paxos Stablecoin, Zellic USDG Rewards, Zellic Enhance Signature Validation, Zellic PAXG V2, Trail of Bits Cross Chain Integration, Halborn Paxos Token Contracts, Halborn Domain Separator), cross-chain-contracts (Zellic Cross Chain Contracts, Zellic OFTWrapperUpgradeable, LayerZero Integration report) and solana-programs (Zellic Mint Controller and its patch). New Ethereum controller 0x40d1...add4 (implementation 0xB9DE...362F): source not verified on Etherscan, no audit found (not verified in this review).
- Admin / governance, Ethereum: proxy 0xe343...491D, implementation 0xfacd...a65f (unchanged). defaultAdmin is TimelockController 0x9036...7654: getMinDelay 86,400s, no pending admin, and no ops-key transaction to it since 29 Sep. Ops key 0x3af3...024b has no contract code. It holds PROPOSER, EXECUTOR and CANCELLER on the timelock, PAUSE_ROLE and ASSET_PROTECTION_ROLE on the token, and SUPPLY_CONTROLLER_MANAGER_ROLE on SupplyControl 0x9a71...3bbf. paused() is false. Minters on 7 Nov: 0x2fb0...41a4 (1B capacity, refills in an hour, mints only to itself), 0xf845...abb7 (500M an hour to 0x264b...97B5), 0x835e...1691 (a 10-USDG test minter), LayerZero wrapper 0x147b...f9c4 (225M a day, any address), and 0x40d1...add4, new since 29 Sep. The ops key added it on 2026-10-02 at 14:37 UTC (tx 0xd367...2fd6) with 100M capacity, about 1,157 USDG a second of refill (about 100M a day), and any mint or burn address. The ops key raised its limit on 2026-11-06 at 19:51 UTC (tx 0xabf7...968d; the LimitConfigUpdated event shows the old 100M / 1,157.4 per second) to 300M capacity and about 3,472 a second (about 300M a day). The controller's own admin is 0xdd05...7683, a contract with a 86,400s delay. Since 2 Oct the ops key has sent it 48 schedule and 48 execute calls, all aimed at 0x40d1...add4. Callers of 0x40d1...add4: 0xf845...abb7 and 0x6320...43bd, both externally owned. One ops-key call to the token on 2026-10-30 is still unidentified: selector 0x5a14b3b9 with arguments 0 and 400,000,000 (not verified in this review).
- Admin / governance, other EVM chains (7 Nov): X Layer (0x4ae4...2dc8), Robinhood Chain (0x5fc5...d168), Ink (0xe343...491D), Arbitrum (0x004b...9bbc) and Mantle (0x063c...c086). Each has its own TimelockController with a 86,400s delay and no pending admin. On each, the ops key holds PROPOSER, EXECUTOR, PAUSE_ROLE and ASSET_PROTECTION_ROLE and has no code. The 1B and 500M issuance keys sit at the same caps on every chain, next to a per-chain bridge controller: Robinhood 200M, X Layer 50M, Mantle 50M, Ink 25M, Arbitrum 25M. The new controller appears only on Ethereum.
- Solana: Token-2022 mint 2u1t...GWH, supply 494.1M. The mint authority is 2e99...1AB4, an SPL multisig requiring 1 of 5, created 2026-09-25 and first seen minting on 2026-10-08. Signers: keypair 2apB...YJjk, two accounts owned by minter-controller program G1SR...ThQdo, one owned by OFT program paxosVkY...r1nR, and E6ZS...FKbv (no on-chain account; type not verified in this review). It replaced the 1-of-4 multisig 3YJL...bhxR read on 29 Sep; the exact switch date is not verified in this review. 2apB...YJjk is still freeze authority, permanent delegate, transfer-fee and withdraw-withheld authority, transfer-hook authority, confidential-transfer authority, close authority and metadata authority. The transfer fee is 0 Basis point (bp) One hundredth of a percent: 1 bp = 0.01%, so 25 bp is 0.25%. The exit costs on the funding page are in bp..
- Oracle: none; par redemption anchors the peg.
- Peg: DeFiLlama coins (CoinGecko-sourced), 4-hour samples from 30 Sep to 6 Nov: low $0.99968 (28 Oct), high $1.00039 (1 Nov), no sample more than 4bp from $1. From 29 Oct: $0.9998 to $1.0004.
- Holder concentration: Ethereum has 10,064 holders (Blockscout counters, 7 Nov). Largest 0xcC28...5ec7 136.8M (about 43%), unlabeled; second 0xeAEa...036b 61.5M (about 19%); top ten 262.2M (about 83%). The top ten include Paxos mint wallet 0x264b...97B5 (12.0M), a Curve StableSwapNG pool (8.5M) and a Maple pool (6.3M). Blockscout holder balances can lag. X Layer, Robinhood Chain and Solana splits: not verified in this review.
- Freeze record, Ethereum, since 29 Sep: the ops key sent seven freeze() calls to the token. The first was 0x5227...2f8c on 2026-10-29 at 22:30 UTC, in the same block as freezes of that address on PYUSD, USDP, PAXG and BUSD; it holds 1,906.67 PAXG. Then 0xa97b...8d10 on 2026-10-30, and 0x3c6d...e051, 0xe485...2478, 0xe4c9...d1a3, 0x761e...3510 and 0x12ea...4e8d on 2026-11-02 (0x3c6d holds 369 PAXG and 0xe485 0.84 PAXG). All seven read isFrozen true with no USDG balance on 7 Nov. The ops key sent no wipe or pause transaction to the token in this window. Other chains: not verified in this review.
- Rewards: on-chain multiplier and claim figures were last read on 2026-09-29: six multipliers at 1.70% to 3.52% APR Yearly rate without compounding. Funding here is shown as an APR: the hourly rate × 8,760., and about 4.81M USDG claimed on Ethereum. Not re-read (not verified in this review).
- Regulatory: the September attestation restates PDS's MAS Major Payment Institution licence (1 Jul 2024) and PIE's FIN-FSA e-money licence (23 Nov 2022), and describes USDG as compliant with MiCA's e-money token requirements. One web search found no new licence or enforcement action between 29 Sep and 6 Nov (not verified in this review).
- Recent-news scan (2026-09-29 to 2026-11-06): Binance breach on 29 Oct (DeFiLlama hacks list: $6.36B, key leaked via infrastructure). Paxos froze 1,906.67 PAXG in 0x5227...2f8c and, according to coverage of its 30 Oct statement, said its systems were unaffected and that PAXG, PYUSD and USDG reserves were intact (rootdata, coingabbar). An X search over the window found no USDG depeg, exploit, redemption problem or attestation issue. Ticker trap: the Jan 2026 'USDG' exploit (DeFiLlama "USDGambit and TLP", deployer key compromised, $1.5M) hit TMX Tribe's Arbitrum token, not Paxos.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.