TL;DR
Fluid is Instadapp's money market. Lending (fTokens) and borrowing Vault and curator A shared deposit pool run by code or by a curator. The curator chooses which markets get your money and sets the limits, for a fee. sit on one shared Liquidity How much you can sell or withdraw right now without moving the price or waiting. Thin liquidity means a slow or costly exit. Layer, so a USDC lender is exposed to every market that borrows USDC. In September we traced its Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through. and found the weak spot. sUSDai, reUSD and PST are priced from their issuers' own rates, the dollar Peg and depeg A stablecoin's peg is the price it targets, usually $1. A depeg is a move away from it, most often down. The stables page checks prices every 5 minutes. is assumed, and nothing checks a market price. That design produced March's ~$21M of bad debt on wstUSR, and it is still the design today. The exposure is smaller: $217.3M of debt in plain and smart-collateral vaults, down from $320.2M, because borrowing across Fluid fell by about a fifth. It is still more than half of all stablecoin borrowing. Fluid has started shipping a better oracle that checks a market price, but so far it runs only on ten small Polygon vaults. The Binance hack of 2026-10-29 tested the emergency controls. Over three transactions the team Multisig A wallet that needs several keyholders to sign, such as 5 of 9. Safer than one key, but only as safe as the people who hold the keys. froze sUSDe, USDe and USDtb markets, swaps on ten DEXes and, about ten hours after Re halted reUSD redemptions, all six reUSD vaults. Most of it was lifted on 2026-10-31, after about 41 hours for the first markets and about 32 for reUSD. The brake works, but someone has to pull it by hand. The reUSD oracle itself noticed nothing, and reUSD now has almost no on-chain market a liquidator could sell into. Admin settings did not change, and nothing broke.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. For the EVM contracts, Fluid's Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope. page lists the same seven reports from four firms as in September:
- PeckShield: pre-launch.
- StateMind: one audit plus Liquidity Layer updates.
- MixBytes: vault, DEX and Liquidity Layer.
- Cantina: DEX.
None is dated and none is dedicated to the oracle contracts. The page now has a Sui section that was not in our September report. It lists four OtterSec audits (Liquidity Layer, vaults, lending and rewards, oracle) and five Certora audits (the same four areas plus Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree.). DeFiLlama shows nothing deposited on Sui, so these audits do not cover the money this report is about. Immunefi's Instadapp program still pays 10% of the funds directly affected, up to a $500,000 maximum, with a $10,000 minimum. On-chain, the Liquidity Layer still sends operate() to module 0x4bdc...3ab7 and its pause and guardian functions to 0xea78...698e. The dummy implementation is the same 0xcc33...66a2.
Admin control. Read on Ethereum on 2026-11-07:
- Timelock. The Liquidity Layer's admin slot still holds the timelock 0x2386...1F4c. delay() still returns 86,400 seconds, and the timelock's admin is still the Governor (quorum 4,000,000 FLUID).
- Multisigs. The team multisig 0x4F6F...D49e is still 6-of-12, and so is the second limits-and-rates multisig 0x1e2e...4219.
- Guardians and auths. Blockscout's logs show none of these events on the Liquidity Layer since block 26,089,900 (2026-09-30): LogUpdateGuardians, LogUpdateAuths, LogUpdateUserClasses, LogPauseToken, LogRemoveImplementation. So the guardian set and the six config auths are as described in September. The guardians are the team multisig and the pause contract that one pause-only key sits behind.
- Modules. We could not complete the query for LogSetImplementation, because Blockscout rate-limited us. The function routing reads are unchanged, so no module was swapped for the functions we checked.
- Position transfers. The vault-factory wrapper still allowlists exactly vaults 110, 111, 112, 133, 134, 135 and 143 for the multisig's no-delay transferPosition. The multisig still holds 188 position NFTs.
The pause power was used in this window, in three transactions from the team multisig:
- 2026-10-29, 23:01 UTC, about three hours after the Binance hack began. It called pauseUser on 20 Liquidity Layer users: sUSDe and USDe vaults 7, 8, 17, 18, 50, 56, 92, 93, 137, 138, 140 and 141, the DEXes behind vaults 125, 126, 127, 140 and 141, and three more addresses not in Fluid's vault list.
- 2026-10-29, 23:29 UTC. It paused 11 more users. Most were vaults that borrow USDe against ETH, wstETH, WBTC and cbBTC, plus a sUSDe market and a USDtb market. Through the FluidPauseAuth contract it also paused swaps and arbitrage on nine DEXes and paused three smart-lending positions.
- 2026-10-30, 08:07 UTC, about ten hours into Re's redemption halt. It paused the six reUSD vaults (160, 161, 162, 163, 164 and 181) and the reUSD-USDT DEX.
The fTokens were not paused, so USDC and USDT lenders could still withdraw. One transaction at 15:59 UTC on 2026-10-31 unpaused 37 of the 38 Liquidity Layer users and lifted the swap pause on ten DEXes. The 38th, a USDe-USDC DEX at 0xba9e...c6c7, was not in that transaction, and we did not check whether it is still paused (not verified in this review). The sUSDe and USDe markets were frozen for about 41 hours and the reUSD vaults for about 32. By our count the sUSDe and USDe markets carry only about $0.4M of debt today, but the reUSD vaults carry about $48.6M. The episode shows the power working as a brake. It also shows the multisig can freeze chosen markets for days without a vote, borrowers' exits included. We did not check whether Liquidation When a loan passes its LLTV or a perp position runs out of margin, it is closed by force and the collateral is sold, usually with a penalty. could run in the paused vaults (not verified in this review). The multisig's avoNonce went from 245 to 246 over a window in which it executed at least four casts, so that counter does not measure its activity.
Governance went from 140 proposals to 142:
- IGP-141 was executed, with a timelock eta of 2026-10-26.
- IGP-142 is queued, with an eta of 2026-11-03, and had not been executed at our read.
Both came from the same proposer as 139 and 140. They passed with 4.39M and 4.09M votes for and none against, and still clear quorum with almost no Margin Collateral that keeps a perp position open. When losses eat it down to the venue's minimum, the position is liquidated.. We did not decode what either proposal changes (not verified in this review). The governance forum has no new topic since 2026-08-02.
Oracle. This still sets the verdict. Fluid's API publishes an oracle description for each of its 262 listed vaults. Here is how each of the three tokens is described:
- sUSDai: "SUSDAI to USDAI contract exchange rate with safe caps, while assuming ~1:1 peg of USDAI" to the debt token.
- reUSD: "REUSD to USD contract pricing with safe caps".
- PST: "Chainlink PST contract exchange rate with safe caps".
None of the three has a market check. On-chain, reUSD's rate source 0xd1d1...05b8 returns getSharePrice() 1.11198, and Fluid's capped rate on top of it returns the same value. The vault oracles for 162 (reUSD/GHO), 165 (PST/USDC) and 171 (sUSDai/USDC) are at the same addresses as in September. At pull, the oracles sat close to market:
| Token | Fluid oracle | Market |
|---|---|---|
| sUSDai | 1.1243 | about 1.1197 (DeFiLlama) |
| reUSD | 1.1120 | 1.1112 |
| PST | 1.1448 | 1.1436 (Fluid API) |
That gap stays small only while the issuers' numbers hold.
The exposure is smaller but still large. Debt in plain and smart-collateral vaults whose collateral is or includes sUSDai, USDai, reUSD or PST is $217.3M. Measured the same way on 2026-09-30, it was $320.2M. By token:
- sUSDai: $136.9M (Ethereum $59.9M, Arbitrum $59.2M, Plasma $16.9M, Base $0.9M)
- reUSD: $48.6M
- PST: $30.7M
- USDai: $1.1M
Smart-debt vaults add about $41.5M by our estimate from DEX debt shares, for about $259M in total. All stablecoin borrowing across the five Liquidity Layers is $398.0M. These collaterals back roughly 55% of it, or about 65% with smart-debt vaults. In September the shares were about 62% and 70%. Plain vaults on these tokens run at 81.7% aggregate LTV and LLTV LTV is your loan as a share of your collateral's value. LLTV is the LTV at which the position is liquidated; the gap between the two is your buffer. ($155.0M of debt on $189.8M of collateral), about the same as September's 81%. Borrow room has reopened. Vault 171 sUSDai/USDC had $33k left before its cap in September and now has $5.8M. Vault 162 reUSD/GHO has $0.59M. PST vaults 165 and 166 are still at their caps.
There is one real step forward. Ten Polygon vaults now carry a different kind of description:
- Nine of them price collateral at "the lower of its peg price ... and its market price".
- Debt is priced at "the higher of" the two. Vault 12 applies only this rule, to its WBTC debt.
- If the reference price cannot be read, borrowing and withdrawals pause. Liquidations keep running on the main price.
Fluid's autogenerated docs now include OracleV2 pause interfaces. That is the shape of the deviation check promised in the 2026-05-11 post-mortem. It covers Polygon only, about $3.5M of TVL Total value locked: the dollar value of everything deposited in a protocol or pool. It shows size, not safety., and no sUSDai, reUSD or PST vault anywhere uses it.
reUSD shows why the gap matters:
- Re's pause. Re paused instant redemptions at 21:44 UTC on 2026-10-29 and unpaused them at 16:41 UTC on 2026-10-30 (our Re Protocol report of 2026-11-06).
- Fluid's oracle. It kept reading the share price throughout. By design it cannot react to a redemption halt.
- Fluid's manual pause. The team stepped in by hand. At 08:07 UTC on 2026-10-30, about ten hours after Re's pause, the multisig paused all six reUSD vaults. It lifted the pause at 15:59 UTC on 2026-10-31, about 23 hours after Re had resumed.
The peg held, so no damage was done. The brake worked, but it was manual and late, and it froze reUSD borrowers along with everyone else. Our Re report also measured reUSD's Curve exit at about $19k. A liquidator who seizes reUSD today has nowhere on-chain to sell it, which makes liquidating a large reUSD position slow or uneconomic. Absorbed-debt fields in Fluid's reUSD vaults read zero. Whether any reUSD positions were liquidated around the pause is not verified in this review. Resupply's reUSD is a different token and is not involved here.
Liquidity & exit. DeFiLlama's fluid-lending reads $618.6M net of borrowings, with $635.6M borrowed. That is down 16.1% from $737.4M on 2026-09-30. The fall is part price and part flows. ETH dropped about 16% over the window ($2,677 to $2,245), and Ethereum ETH-family net balances fell from $197.8M to $161.9M. Stablecoins also left:
- Ethereum: USDT net down $11.4M.
- Arbitrum: sUSDai down $11.8M and USDC down $9.5M.
- Plasma: sUSDai down $11.1M and USDT0 down $8.5M. Plasma's TVL nearly halved, from $46.3M to $26.4M.
The sharpest step came around the Binance hack, from $672.0M on 2026-10-29 to $607.8M on 2026-10-31.
At pull, Liquidity Layer Utilization The share of a lending market's deposits that is lent out. Near 100%, depositors may have to wait to withdraw and the borrow rate jumps. was 85.2% for USDC and 83.9% for USDT on Ethereum, and 89.2% and 84.5% on Arbitrum. On Ethereum, about $21.5M of fUSDC's $129.5M and $25.0M of fUSDT's $128.5M could be withdrawn at once. That is enough for a small position and thin for a crowd. GHO is the tight spot. Ethereum GHO is 97.9% utilized and only $0.63M of fGHO's $21.9M can leave now. Of the $27.1M of GHO borrowed on Ethereum, $22.8M sits in vault 162 against reUSD. In practice, an Ethereum fGHO lender is lending to reUSD holders with little way out. Plasma GHO is at 94.4%. Withdrawal limits still apply: fUSDC allows half of supply at once, with the limit expanding over six hours. A pause by the multisig or the pause-only key stops withdrawals until the multisig lifts it. TVL is 66.7% below a year ago and 73.9% below the $2.37B peak of 2025-10-09.
Yield (real vs emission). Real. On Ethereum at pull, fUSDC paid about 4.6%, fUSDT about 4.5% and fGHO 11.83%, all of it borrow interest. Arbitrum fUSDC paid 5.70%. The rewards rate is zero on every fToken on all five chains. fGHO's double-digit rate is the price of near-full utilization, not a bonus. The borrowers paying most of the stablecoin interest are still the ones posting issuer-priced collateral.
Holder concentration. Supply is still 100,000,000 FLUID. Ethplorer gives the top ten addresses 56.0% and the top 25 76.3%, against 56.2% and 76.8% in September.
- The largest holder is still the 16.3% Instadapp DeFi Smart Account.
- The second, third, sixth and seventh holders are still the four multisigs run by one 3-of-6 signer set, with about 19.7% combined.
- The sixth and seventh hold 4.11% and 4.04%. That is the same size as the two delegations that each cleared the 4,000,000-vote quorum alone in September. We did not re-read delegations this run.
- The CCIP lock pool slipped from 3.52% to 3.36%.
Who the non-team holders are is not visible on-chain (not verified in this review). We found no update on Kinetic Group's announced purchase of up to 10% (not verified in this review).
Track record. Fluid's lending, vault and Liquidity Layer code has still never been exploited. DeFiLlama's hacks list, read 2026-11-07, still has one Fluid entry: the ~$215,000 rewards-key leak of 2026-05-31. The rest of the 2026 record stands as before:
- About $21M of Resolv bad debt. Of the remaining ~$19.3M, Resolv covered ~$9.7M, the treasury ~$8.2M and the team ~$1.5M, per the 2026-05-11 post-mortem.
- ETH Lite Vault withdrawals blocked for a period during the KelpDAO liquidity crunch.
- The rsETH freeze.
Two new items appeared since 2026-09-30:
- Post-hack freezes. These are the freezes after the Binance hack described above. They were precautionary, and we found no loss tied to them.
- Plasma vault 30. This vault lends GHO against GHO/syrupUSDT smart collateral. Fluid's API shows about $100.7k of absorbed debt there, essentially its whole borrow. Beside it sit about 46,939 absorbed collateral shares, worth about $93.4k at the vault's oracle rate of about 1.990 GHO per share. That leaves a shortfall near $7k. In September every absorbed field was zero or dust. We did not find the cause (not verified in this review).
Every other vault reads zero or dust. An X search and a web search for Fluid incidents since 2026-09-30 found nothing else. A null search is weaker than a confirmation.
Worst case
The likely one is the same as last month. A collateral priced on its peg breaks: USDai loses its dollar, or reUSD or PST turns out to be worth less than its issuer reports. The oracle keeps reading the issuer's rate, so nothing is liquidated while the collateral loses value. The loss lands as bad debt in USDC, USDT and GHO, the tokens fToken holders supplied. The Liquidity Layer is shared, so every lender of those tokens carries it. At 81.7% aggregate loan-to-value, collateral stops covering debt after a fall of about 18%, sooner in the most Leverage Borrowing to hold a position larger than your capital. At 3x you hold $3 for every $1 of your own, and gains, losses and liquidation risk grow with it. vaults. reUSD is the sharpest case now. Its Curve exit is about $19k against $48.6M of Fluid debt. Re showed on 2026-10-29 that it will pause redemptions when markets turn, and Fluid's own reaction came about ten hours later and by hand. Ethereum GHO lenders are the most exposed, since most of their GHO is lent to one reUSD vault and only $0.63M can leave. In March, Resolv, the treasury and the team absorbed the loss. There is no insurance fund and no duty to do it again.
The slow path is governance. A proposal replaces a Liquidity Layer module, and one quorum-sized delegate can pass it alone if nobody votes against. It executes about four days after it is proposed.
The fast path is the pause. The team multisig or the single pause-only key can pause USDC or USDT at the Liquidity Layer and block withdrawals until the multisig lifts it. October showed the team will use that power on individual markets, carefully so far, for up to about 41 hours at a stretch.
Bottom line
Caution, for the same reason as September. Fluid's lending is well built and honestly paid. The team used its emergency brake on 2026-10-29 and 30 and lifted it within two days. But most of its stablecoin lending still rests on three yield-bearing dollar tokens priced by their issuers' own numbers, which is the design that failed in March. The fix has started to ship, but only on Polygon.
What improved:
- About $100M less debt on those tokens.
- A working market-check oracle design.
- Evidence that the team will freeze a stressed market.
What got worse:
- Borrow room has reopened.
- reUSD lost its on-chain exit.
- Ethereum GHO is nearly fully lent to reUSD.
It stops short of avoid because the ETH and BTC markets use market prices, nothing is broken, and the team has covered a loss before. Moving the market-check oracle onto the sUSDai, reUSD and PST vaults would be the clearest reason to revisit the grade. A second unbacked loss, or a reUSD price break while Curve depth stays near zero, would push it toward avoid. Size stablecoin deposits so a double-digit haircut is survivable, and prefer fUSDC or fUSDT over fGHO. Watch USDai, reUSD and PST market prices, not Fluid's.
Data appendix
- TVL: $618,603,168 (DeFiLlama
fluid-lending, net of borrowings, read 2026-11-07 09:25 UTC and again at our pull). Borrowed $635.63M. Chains: Ethereum $445.87M, Arbitrum $125.85M, Plasma $26.44M, Base $16.92M, Polygon $3.53M, Sui $0. Daily points: 2026-09-30 $737.39M, 2026-10-29 $671.95M, 2026-10-30 $625.72M, 2026-10-31 $607.84M. Change since 2026-09-30 -16.1%. 365d -66.7% (from $1,860.12M). ATH $2,366.82M on 2025-10-09, now 73.9% below. ETH $2,677 (2026-09-30, coins.llama.fi) to $2,245 at pull. Ethereum ETH-family net balances $197.8M to $161.9M. Token flows (DeFiLlama net, USD): Ethereum wstETH -$13.1M, USDT -$11.4M, WETH -$8.1M, WBTC -$6.8M, sUSDai +$5.5M; Arbitrum sUSDai -$11.8M, USDC -$9.5M, reUSD +$2.6M; Plasma sUSDai -$11.1M, USDT0 -$8.5M. Liquidity Layer (Fluid API): gross supply $1,245.7M, borrow $635.7M, stablecoin borrow $398.0M (September: $1,523.2M, $794.3M, $518.5M). Utilization: Ethereum USDC 85.20%, USDT 83.86%, GHO 97.88%, ETH 84.51%, wstETH 35.13%; Arbitrum USDC 89.23%, USDT 84.45%; Base USDC 89.92%; Plasma USDT0 70.85%, GHO 94.43%. fTokens (assets, withdrawable now, supply rate): Ethereum fUSDC $129.50M, $21.52M, 4.61%; fUSDT $128.48M, $25.00M, 4.45%; fGHO $21.87M, $0.63M, 11.83%; Arbitrum fUSDC $53.37M, $6.52M, 5.70%; fUSDT $38.95M, $6.54M, 4.53%; Base fUSDC $6.23M, $0.65M, 5.52%; Plasma fUSDT0 $14.05M, $4.83M, 3.50%; fGHO $7.73M, $0.45M, 11.75%. A later re-check read Ethereum fUSDC $129.38M, $21.54M, 4.63% and fUSDT $24.83M withdrawable. rewardsRate 0 on every fToken. fUSDC withdrawal limit 50%, expanding over 21,600s. - Audits: EVM: PeckShield (pre-launch), StateMind (audit; Liquidity Layer updates), MixBytes (vault; DEX; Liquidity Layer), Cantina (DEX). Seven reports, four firms, undated, unchanged. Sui: OtterSec (Liquidity Layer, vaults, lending and rewards, oracle) and Certora (Liquidity Layer, vaults, lending and rewards, oracles, timelock), new to our report. Source: docs.fluid.instadapp.io/audits-and-security.html, read 2026-11-07. Immunefi Instadapp page, read 2026-11-07: critical smart-contract reward 10% of funds directly affected, up to $500,000, minimum $10,000; it links Fluid's audits page with a date of 8 September 2026.
- Admin / governance (on-chain, 2026-11-07): Liquidity Layer 0x52Aa899454998Be5b000Ad077a46Bbe360F4e497. Admin slot = timelock 0x2386DC45AdDed673317eF068992F19421B481F4c. Implementation slot and getDummyImplementation() = 0xcc331daf69752bece3dc98dbc63eacd5092266a2. getSigsImplementation: operate() to 0x4bdc8816f2f56914b66ebf3786d78872d3a73ab7; pauseUser and updateGuardians to 0xea78fabc13d603895fe9efe8bb4a4f2c56e5698e. All unchanged. Timelock delay() 86,400s, admin() = Governor 0x0204Cd037B2ec03605CFdFe482D8e257C765fa1b. Governor proposalCount 142, quorumVotes 4,000,000. IGP-141: Executed (state 7), eta 2026-10-26 01:44 UTC, 4.39M for, 0 against. IGP-142: Queued (state 5), eta 2026-11-03 23:20 UTC, 4.09M for, 0 against. Both from proposer 0x059a94a72951c0ae1cc1ce3bf0db52421bbe8210, the same as 139 and 140. Contents not verified in this review. Team multisig 0x4F6F977aCDD1177DCD81aB83074855EcB9C2D49e: requiredSigners 6, signersCount 12, avoNonce 246 (245 in September; the four pause and unpause casts below did not each advance it). Second multisig 0x1e2e1aeD876f67Fe4Fd54090FD7B8F57Ce234219: 6 of 12. VaultFactory 0x324c5Dc1fC42c7a4D43d92df1eBA58a54d13Bf2d: owner = wrapper 0xb031913cb7ad81b8a4ba412b471c2da69bea410b, totalVaults 182. Wrapper vaultIdAllowlisted true for 110, 111, 112, 133, 134, 135 and 143 only (IDs 1 to 189 checked). Team multisig holds 188 position NFTs. Blockscout logs since block 26,089,900: none for LogUpdateGuardians, LogUpdateAuths, LogUpdateUserClasses, LogUpdateUserWithdrawalLimit, LogPauseToken, LogUnpauseToken, LogChangeStatus or LogRemoveImplementation. LogSetImplementation, LogSetDummyImplementation and LogSetAdmin queries were rate-limited (not verified in this review), but routing and slot reads show no change.
- Pause episode (team multisig casts via Avocado forwarder 0x4697...5a54):
- Tx 1. 0x0cc31536db9604f3b25599ab7b5e877e127ea216b1f8c4ed09883a32ac1d6988, block 26,301,553, 2026-10-29 23:01:23 UTC. 20 LogPauseUser events, sUSDe 0x9d39...3497 and USDe 0x4c9e...68b3 markets with their USDC, USDT and GHO legs.
- Tx 2. 0x11397225538b141bd1cf9f8d53ee11e312b0a3b50e4b0b39e0e1f1182502ce16, block 26,301,693, 2026-10-29 23:29:35 UTC. 11 LogPauseUser events: USDe-borrow vaults on ETH, wstETH, WBTC and cbBTC collateral, a sUSDe market and a USDtb market. Through FluidPauseAuth 0x9a25...aa26 it also paused swap-and-arbitrage on nine DEXes and paused three smart-lending positions.
- Tx 3. 0xf76aa189ff3fa68c616cbd31137eb82c086898f6a35b90730e26f253ff576dca, block 26,304,271, 2026-10-30 08:06:59 UTC. 7 LogPauseUser events: reUSD 0x5086...0c72 vaults 160, 161, 162, 163, 164 and 181 and the reUSD-USDT DEX, plus a swap pause on that DEX.
- Unpause. 0x45c19739e625680cb23363d8359932cbdf38520f798800bc20307167ab523be0, block 26,313,795, 2026-10-31 15:59:23 UTC. 37 LogUnpauseUser events and swap-and-arbitrage unpaused on ten DEXes.
- Still open. Paused but absent from the unpause transaction: DEX 0xba9ed8ae94c70ef9aa2cd1045ed473aaa405c6c7 (USDe-USDC). Its current status is not verified in this review.
- Unmapped. Three of tx 1's paused addresses are not in Fluid's vault list (0xb98eea71..., 0x8fb5c089..., 0x75580d4b...).
- Governance forum. gov.fluid.io: newest topic 2026-08-02.
- Oracle: Fluid API descriptions for 262 vaults (Ethereum 120, Arbitrum 60, Base 31, Plasma 31, Polygon 20). Market-check style, with borrowing and withdrawals pausing if the reference price fails: Polygon vaults 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18 and 24 only. Nine price collateral at the lower of peg and market; vault 12 applies the higher-of rule to WBTC debt only. No vault on the other four chains uses it. Oracle vs API price at pull: sUSDai 1.124338 (Ethereum vaults 171, 172) against 1.119708; reUSD 1.111977 (vaults 160 to 162, Arbitrum 89, 90) against 1.111140; PST 1.144845 (165, 166) against 1.143601. reUSD rate source 0xd1d104a7515989ac82f1afda15a23650411b05b8 getSharePrice() 1.111977. Capped rate 0x0964957869b2fdd70f0a120e8d8d7a5a187abb6c returns the same. Current PRICE_SETTER_ROLE holder not verified in this review. Debt on vaults whose collateral is or includes sUSDai, USDai, reUSD or PST (plain plus smart-collateral, at API prices): $217.3M (September $320.2M); by chain Ethereum $134.3M, Arbitrum $65.2M, Plasma $16.9M, Base $0.9M. By token: sUSDai $136.9M, reUSD $48.6M, PST $30.7M, USDai $1.1M. Largest: Arbitrum 66 sUSDai/USDT $24.59M; Ethereum 162 reUSD/GHO $22.82M; Ethereum 172 sUSDai/USDT $21.64M; Arbitrum 65 sUSDai/USDC $21.41M; Ethereum 164 reUSD-USDT/USDT $18.11M; Ethereum 165 PST/USDC $15.38M; Ethereum 166 PST/USDT $15.35M; Ethereum 177 and 178 sUSDai-stable smart collateral $13.34M and $13.21M; Ethereum 171 sUSDai/USDC $11.67M; Plasma 36 sUSDai/USDT0 $11.40M. Smart-debt vaults 163, 168, 169, 170, 173 and Arbitrum 68 add about $41.5M, estimated from vault share of DEX debt. Plain-vault aggregate LTV 81.7% ($155.0M on $189.8M). Liquidity Layer collateral supply: sUSDai $184.7M across four chains (September $208.0M), PST $48.7M (September $51.4M), reUSD $42.8M (September $41.8M). Borrowable now: vault 171 $5.84M (September ~$33k), 162 $0.59M (September ~$53k), 165 and 166 zero. Re's redemption pause 21:44 UTC 2026-10-29 to 16:41 UTC 2026-10-30 (Re announced the resumption on X at 17:20 UTC), and Curve reUSD/USDC depth ~$19k: from our Re Protocol report researched 2026-11-06, not re-measured here.
- Holder concentration: FLUID 0x6f40d4A6237C257fff2dB00FA0510DeEECd303eb, 100,000,000 supply (totalSupply read on-chain). Ethplorer top holders (2026-11-07): 0x2884...4d09 16.30%; 0x8675...dffa 5.81%; 0xeeda...1505 5.78%; 0xb671...422f 5.00%; 0xcabe...3fd7 5.00%; 0xd21f...ccf6 4.11%; 0xa597...ac80 4.04%; 0x2c1c...80c7 3.41%; 0x639f...a50c (CCIP lock pool) 3.36%; 0xa338...b5b8 3.19%; Liquidity Layer 2.63%; 0x1716...f152 2.50%. Top 10 56.0%, top 25 76.3%. Delegations, identities and the Kinetic purchase: not verified in this review.
- Recent-news scan: 2026-09-30 to 2026-11-07. DeFiLlama hacks list (api.llama.fi/hacks, read 2026-11-07): only Fluid entry still "Fluid Lending" 2026-05-31 $215,000. Binance CEX listed 2026-10-29 at $6.36B, "Key Leaked via Infrastructure". X search via Grok and web search: no Fluid incident or statement found for the window, and no public explanation of the October pauses (not verified in this review). Fluid API absorbed fields: Plasma vault 30 (vault 0xE6b5D1CdC4935295c84772C4700932b4BFC93274, GHO/syrupUSDT smart collateral to GHO, oracle 0xbaF85d83AAE0a4dbde5463e6DF6ebE30b7bD4d7a) absorbedBorrow
100,758 GHO ($100.6k), absorbedSupply46,939 shares ($93.4k at the oracle's ~1.990 GHO per share), cause not verified in this review. All other vaults zero or dust once smart-debt share units are read correctly; reUSD vaults 160 to 164 and 181 absorbedBorrow 0. reUSD here is Re Protocol's token (re.xyz, 0x5086...0c72), not Resupply's reUSD. Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.