TL;DR
Scope first: this report rates the Liquid Vault and curator A shared deposit pool run by code or by a curator. The curator chooses which markets get your money and sets the limits, for a fee. product, DeFiLlama's ether.fi-liquid, at $371.9M on 2026-11-06. It does not rate the multi-billion ether.fi staking parent. Our 2026-09-29 report put TVL Total value locked: the dollar value of everything deposited in a protocol or pool. It shows size, not safety. at about $443.0M. DeFiLlama's daily point for that day is $437.33M. The ETH price explains nearly all of the fall: DeFiLlama's eETH units rose 0.6% over the window, on-chain liquidETH shares rose 0.13%, and ETH fell about 15%. Depositors did not leave.
The biggest change since our last report is good news. On 2026-10-02 at 18:17 UTC, the 4-of-6 Safe that controlled every Liquid vault handed the Liquid ETH, USD and BTC RolesAuthority contracts to a TimelockController with a 24-hour delay. In the same transaction it gave role 8 to the Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree.. Role 8 covers fees, the rate band, merkle allowlist roots, transfer hooks and token rescue. The timelock is in use: three batches since then, including new merkle roots for the Liquid ETH and USD managers, were scheduled and executed a day or more later. The delay has gaps. The Safe can still pause the exit queue, the accountant and the manager with no delay. A 1-of-6 Safe can pause the accountant, a 2-of-5 Safe still sets the fee, and one plain EOA is both a strategist and a rate updater.
This run also found what Liquid ETH actually holds, and our September report missed most of it. The largest position is a Leverage Borrowing to hold a position larger than your capital. At 3x you hold $3 for every $1 of your own, and gains, losses and liquidation risk grow with it. weETH/WETH loop on Aave v3 Core: 401,799 weETH supplied against 410,912 WETH borrowed, about $1.0B of collateral at a health factor of 1.029. The loop was already there on 2026-08-12. A second, smaller loop on Spark holds 27,770 wstETH against 31,101 WETH of debt at a health factor of 1.037. About $96M, roughly 31% of Liquid ETH's NAV, sits in dollar vaults. That includes $66.1M of PYUSD in a Sentora-curated vault, $14.2M of RLUSD in another, and $15.6M of Cap's stcUSD, a protocol we rate avoid. Two wallets hold 47% of all liquidETH. The legacy Cooldown and withdrawal queue The wait between asking to withdraw and getting your funds: a fixed cooldown (7 days for HYPE staking) or a queue that clears as cash comes back. drained in September is still live and took 542 new requests in this window. Caution, unchanged.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Nothing new on the Liquid side. Veda's boring-vault repository still has the same three Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope. files: two from 0xMacro and one from Spearbit. ether.fi's registry now lists 31 files. The extra file is a Certora review of non-EigenPod validator creation and EigenLayer deprecation, dated 2026-08-25 and committed 2026-09-02. That review covers core code, and our count of 30 on 2026-09-29 missed it. The new timelock at 0xd829f278...2c89 was deployed on 2026-09-24 from factory 0x14037128...b018. Etherscan shows its source verified as OpenZeppelin's TimelockController, compiled with solc 0.8.21. Whether anyone reviewed this deployment and its role setup is not verified in this review. The legacy AtomicQueue at 0xd45884b5...ea07 is unchanged: 5,944 bytes of code, no owner, no pause, and the same flawed solve() that was exploited in September.
Admin control. This is the dimension that moved, and we verified it on-chain this run. The Liquid ETH vault, accountant and queue still return an owner() of zero and point to RolesAuthority 0x485Bde66...8122. liquidUSD and liquidBTC point to 0xaBA6bA1E...FF2e and 0x49f954c6...8c8d. All three authorities are now owned by 0xd829f278...2c89, whose getMinDelay() reads 86,400 seconds. It was created with a delay of zero, and the 4-of-6 Safe 0xcEA80390...ec96 is its only proposer, executor and canceller. The timelock administers itself, so any change to its own roles or delay also waits a day.
In one transaction on 2026-10-02, the Safe did six things:
- set the delay to 24 hours
- transferred five authorities to the timelock: the three Liquid ones and two we did not identify
- took role 8 away from itself
- gave role 8 to the timelock
- gave roles 14, 16 and 20 to a new Safe,
0x427989bb...2ee3, which has six owners and a threshold of 1 (one of the owners also signs for the 4-of-6)
The 4-of-6 Safe is still v1.3.0, with no modules and no guard, and its nonce now reads 390. Its roles on all three authorities dropped from 5, 8, 9, 15 and 17 to 5, 9, 15 and 17.
Several powers still act with no delay:
- Role 5 (the Safe): pauses and unpauses the accountant, the current queue and the manager.
- Role 9 (also the Safe): pauses and unpauses the accountant, changes the queue's withdrawal terms, and can stop withdrawals in an asset.
- Role 14: can pause the accountant. It is held by the 1-of-6 Safe, the 2-of-5 Safe and an EOA.
- Role 55: held only by the 2-of-5 Safe
0x607d0c7e...7306. It can still set the management fee, up to the 20% cap in the code. - Role 11 (rate updates): still held by two 2-of-4 Safes and the EOA
0x18deea88...8e99. That EOA also holds role 7 (strategist), role 10 (cancel user withdrawals) and roles 14, 16 and 20.
Three addresses hold role 7 on Liquid ETH, and each has a merkle root on its manager 0xf9f7969c...bcca: the 2-of-5 Safe and two EOAs, 0x18deea88...8e99 and 0xc8111d00...23a2. The second EOA has been running manager calls since November 2025. A strategist can only call what its root allows, and root changes now go through the timelock. New Liquid ETH roots were scheduled on 2026-10-20 at 16:23 UTC and executed on 2026-10-21 at 21:10 UTC. What roles 15 and 17 can reach is still not verified in this review.
Oracle. Liquid ETH's accountant reads the same bounds as in September: upper 10050, lower 9950, a minimum of 21,600 seconds between updates, not paused. An update outside the band is still stored and pauses the contract instead of reverting. The rate is now 1.11042098, last updated at 03:22 UTC on 2026-11-06. Inside the band, an updater can still move the rate 0.50% every six hours, and one updater is an EOA. What changed is that the band, the delay and the payout address are now role 8 settings, so any change to them waits 24 hours.
A second Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through. now matters for this vault: Aave's price for weETH. On Aave v3 Core it comes from 0x87625393...6d4c, described as "Capped weETH / eETH(ETH) / USD", and its ratio provider is the weETH contract itself. A market discount on weETH therefore does not move the loop's health factor, but a fall in weETH's exchange rate would. How Spark prices the wstETH in the second loop is not verified in this review.
Liquidity & exit. The current queue works. It is not paused, and its request counter went from 2,889 to 3,178 since 2026-09-29, so 289 new requests. Its terms are the same: weETH out only, a 1-hour maturity, a deadline of at least 3 days, and a discount of up to 10 Basis point (bp) One hundredth of a percent: 1 bp = 0.01%, so 25 bp is 0.25%. The exit costs on the funding page are in bp.. eETH now has terms set, but its withdraw flag is off, and WETH is still off. How many of those requests were filled is not verified in this review, because our event scan was rate-limited.
The bigger exit question is structural. The vault holds 4,135 weETH idle, while its largest holder's shares are worth about 35,400 ETH. Paying out a large holder means unwinding positions. The largest is the Aave loop: its 410,912 WETH of debt is about 20% of Aave Core's WETH supply. That market is about 86% utilized, with 292,771 WETH of cash. The weETH and WETH reserves are both active, not frozen and not paused.
The legacy queue is still a dead end that keeps taking money in. Since 2026-09-29 it recorded 542 successful updateAtomicRequest calls from 272 addresses, the latest at 17:37 UTC on 2026-11-06. By offer token:
- sETHFI: 185
- weETHs: 107
- eEIGEN: 73
- eBTC: 67
- liquidETH: 56
- WETH: 14
- liquidUSD: 7
The only direct solve() calls were five, all reverted, all from 0x6fb072d7...a4a0 on 2026-10-03. Whether any request was filled through another contract is not verified in this review.
Yield: real vs emission. Real. Liquid ETH's share price went from 1.10653703 on 2026-09-29 to 1.11042098 on 2026-11-06. That is up 0.35% in about 37.9 days, or about 3.4% a year. Plain weETH went from 1.10471802 to 1.10753159 over the same window, about 2.4% a year. The management fee is now 30 bps (35 in September), and owed fees fell from 37.70 to 2.68 WETH, so fees were claimed. Who changed the fee, and when, is not verified in this review.
The extra yield comes from leverage and credit. Liquid ETH's NAV is about 139,630 ETH, around $313M. It breaks down like this:
- Aave loop: about 445,000 ETH of weETH collateral against 410,912 WETH of debt. That is roughly 13x leverage on this sleeve, and the collateral is about 3.2 times the vault's NAV.
- Spark loop: 27,770 wstETH ($77.6M) against 31,101 WETH ($69.6M), roughly 10x.
- Dollar vaults, about $96M in total:
- Sentora PRIME Main: $66.1M of PYUSD, about 35% of that vault
- Sentora RLUSD Main: $14.2M of RLUSD
- stcUSD: 14.35M shares, Cap's staked dollar, worth $15.6M at 1.0891 cUSD per share. That is 24.2% of all stcUSD. Our Cap report of 2026-10-02 rates Cap avoid, with its cUSD vault 93% lent out.
- Smaller lines: 2,500 WETH in Katana's pre-deposit vault, 5.10M ETHFI (about $3.0M), and 4,859 shares of the liquidMonadETH sub-vault.
How an ETH-denominated vault hedges its dollar holdings against the ETH price is not verified in this review. About $113M of NAV is not decoded in this run, and the liquidMonadETH shares are part of that figure (not verified in this review).
Holder concentration. Measured for the first time. Blockscout counts 7,675 liquidETH holders and 125,747.6 shares. The largest holders:
0xC51828dd...FB4b: 31,910.3 shares (25.38%)0xf23c9B89...A2Ca: 27,487.6 shares (21.86%)0x49C59d74...F1f2, a contract: 10,000.4 shares (7.95%)0x267ed5f7...f91e: 4,141.5 shares (3.29%)
Blockscout marks neither of the top two as a contract. The top ten hold 69.33%. Who these wallets are, and whether they brought in the August inflow, is not verified in this review.
Track record. DeFiLlama's hacks list still has one ether.fi entry: ether.fi Liquid, 2026-09-11, $43,260, access control. It shows nothing new for ether.fi through its latest entries on 2026-11-05. An X search for 2026-09-29 to 2026-11-07 found no new exploit, delay or post-mortem. We found no published post-mortem for the September incident, and we did not re-check whether the 43 wallets left unpaid in September were paid later (not verified in this review). DeFiLlama's TVL history: an all-time high of $2,038.19M on 2025-02-01, a 90-day high of $459.59M on 2026-09-22, and a 90-day low of $277.32M on 2026-08-11. No loss inside the vaults has surfaced.
Worst case
The largest risk is the Aave loop. Its health factor is 1.029 and its Liquidation When a loan passes its LLTV or a perp position runs out of margin, it is closed by force and the collateral is sold, usually with a penalty. threshold is 95%, so a fall of about 2.8% in weETH's exchange rate against ETH would make the position liquidatable. The rate drop alone would cost the loop about 12,460 ETH, around 9% of Liquid ETH's NAV, before any liquidation bonus. That needs a rare event: a slashing or accounting failure in the ether.fi core. The 3-of-3 rebase committee and the core's 10-day upgrade timelock make that unlikely, but not impossible. The Spark loop sits at 1.037, so a fall of about 3.5% in the value Spark assigns to wstETH would put it at risk.
There is also a slower path that needs no event at all. If borrowing WETH costs more than the staked collateral earns for long enough, both health factors drift down. With Aave's WETH market about 86% utilized, borrow rates can jump.
The second risk is a run. Two wallets own 47% of the shares. If either leaves, the strategist has to unwind the Looping Deposit, borrow against it, buy more of the collateral, repeat. It multiplies the gap between the yield and the borrow rate, and the liquidation risk with it., which needs Aave and Spark Liquidity How much you can sell or withdraw right now without moving the price or waiting. Thin liquidity means a slow or costly exit. or weETH redemptions through ether.fi's own queue. It may also have to exit the dollar vaults, and the stcUSD part depends on Cap's thin buffer. Meanwhile the queue only pays when a solver fills, and a request nobody fills simply expires.
Admin risk is smaller than in September but not gone. A compromised 4-of-6 Safe can now change roles, roots or bands only after 24 hours, and the pending change is public while it waits. But the same Safe can pause the exit queue at once, so depositors may not be able to act on that warning. Smaller powers sit below it with no delay. A 1-of-6 Safe can pause the accountant, two signatures can raise the fee to its 20% cap, and one EOA can move the rate inside its band. The legacy queue still threatens any smart-account wallet with an open approval to 0xd45884b5...ea07, and nobody can pause it. There is no insurance fund for smart-contract or strategy losses.
Bottom line
Caution. The timelock is the change we asked for in September. It is live and in use, and it closes the one route to rewriting roles and allowlists without delay. That moves admin control from red to yellow. The verdict stays at caution because of what the vault holds:
- two leveraged ETH loops at health factors of 1.029 and 1.037
- about $96M of dollar vaults inside an ETH product, $15.6M of it in a protocol we rate avoid
- nearly half the shares in two wallets
None of this is hidden, and the Aave loop has run since at least August without trouble. But liquidETH is a leveraged ETH and credit product, not weETH with a small bonus, and position sizes should reflect that. Any of these would push the rating toward avoid: a health factor below 1.02, a further stcUSD build-up, or an admin action against depositors. If you hold Liquid, exit only through the current queue and revoke any approval to 0xd45884b5...ea07.
Data appendix
- TVL: $371.9M (DeFiLlama
ether.fi-liquid, child ofparent#ether-fi, 371,862,851 on 2026-11-06, read twice). Our 2026-09-29 report: about $443.0M.- DeFiLlama daily points: 2026-09-29 $437.33M, 10-08 $419.46M, 10-15 $397.75M, 10-22 $407.03M, 10-29 $395.62M, 11-01 $378.41M, 11-05 $401.37M.
- 90-day high $459.59M (2026-09-22), 90-day low $277.32M (2026-08-11), all-time high $2,038.19M (2025-02-01).
- Token units, 2026-09-29 to 2026-11-06: eETH 140,566 to 141,344 (+0.6%), WETH 8,192 to 8,118, USDC $26.8M to $29.8M, WBTC 141.8 to 118.4.
- liquidETH shares: 125,579.31 to 125,747.64.
- ETH price: about $2,624 to about $2,231 (DeFiLlama coins).
- The fall in TVL is price, not outflows.
- Audits:
- ether.fi registry (github.com/etherfi-protocol/smart-contracts/tree/master/audits): 31 files. The newest is "2026.08.25 - Certora - Non-EigenPod Validator Creation, EL Deprecation.pdf" (committed 2026-09-02, core code). The only Liquid-titled file is still "2026.01.20 - Certora - Liquid-Refer,KING,Cross Pod Approval.pdf".
- Veda boring-vault
audit/: 0xmacro-boring-vault-arctic-0.pdf, 0xmacro-boring-vault-arctic-1.pdf, spearbit-boring-vault-arctic-0.pdf. Unchanged. - Timelock: source verified on Etherscan (TimelockController, v0.8.21). Audit of this deployment: not verified in this review.
- Legacy AtomicQueue audit coverage: not verified in this review. Immunefi scope: not verified in this review.
- Admin/governance (on-chain this run):
- Authority owners:
owner()of0x485Bde66Bb668a51f2372E34e45B1c6226798122(Liquid ETH),0xaBA6bA1E95E0926a6A6b917FE4E2f19ceaE4FF2e(USD) and0x49f954c67ff235034b69b8a59fbe309a40256c8d(BTC) is0xd829f278016b90fec735f9a12bf8b75e06102c89for all three. - Timelock creation: block 26048446 (2026-09-24 16:16 UTC), created by
0xe8fbb28619281002212442ab9f2ac0416c27dba3through factory0x140371288ac4f4a8a75aec18be315f343fe3b018. Constructor: minDelay 0, proposer and executor0xcEA8039076E35a825854c5C2f85659430b06ec96, no external admin. - Timelock now:
getMinDelay()= 86400. PROPOSER, EXECUTOR and CANCELLER roles held by the Safe. DEFAULT_ADMIN held by the timelock only. - Activation: tx
0x10a68cad9fce4a6c5e2a6183083a50d9dc368c647a88559c082c136cae40a713(block 26106376, 2026-10-02 18:17:23 UTC). It also moved authorities0x3994741a...59dcand0x402dff43...5039. - Timelock batches since activation:
- scheduled 2026-10-17 06:01, executed 2026-10-20 15:20 (tx
0xc821ab32...500f) - scheduled 2026-10-20 16:23, executed 2026-10-21 21:10 (tx
0x1965c39e...647b; new Liquid ETH and USD manager roots) - scheduled 2026-10-27 15:15, executed 2026-10-29 00:50 (tx
0x001a5e25...95af; Liquid USD roots including EOA0xc8111d00351765c64d301cdfc1848bf5ff2e23a2)
- scheduled 2026-10-17 06:01, executed 2026-10-20 15:20 (tx
- 4-of-6 Safe: v1.3.0, threshold 4, six owners (
0x95a21150...4bef,0x4a4e996d...3eeb,0x3de2da61...329f,0x83954fbd...ea1c,0xe63794cf...05c9,0x9eac7114...843f), nonce 390, no modules, no guard. - Second Safe:
0x427989bb12f4a390d11e7647d467dea02b9d2ee3, threshold 1, six owners including0xe63794cf...05c9. - Roles on all three authorities:
getUserRoles(Safe)= 0x28220 (roles 5, 9, 15, 17).getUserRoles(timelock)= 0x100 (role 8). - Liquid ETH capabilities:
- Vault:
managerole 1 (held by the manager),enter2,exit3,setBeforeTransferHook/transferOwnership/setAuthority8. - Accountant:
updateManagementFee8 and 55;updateUpper/updateLower/updateDelay/updatePayoutAddress8;updateExchangeRate11;pause5, 9, 14;unpause5, 9. - Queue:
updateWithdrawAsset9;solveOnChainWithdraws31, 33;pause/unpause5;rescueTokens8;cancelUserWithdraws10;stopWithdrawsInAsset9, 10. - Manager
0xf9f7969c357ce6dfd7973098ea0d57173592bcca:setManageRoot8;manageVaultWithMerkleVerification4, 7;pause/unpause5; not paused.
- Vault:
- Role holders:
0x607d0c7e...7306(2-of-5 Safe): roles 7, 10, 14, 16, 20, 55.0x18deea88...8e99(EOA): roles 7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 20.0xc8111d00...23a2(EOA): role 7; first manager call at block 23835532 (November 2025).0x427989bb...2ee3(1-of-6 Safe): roles 14, 16, 20.- Roles 15 and 17: not verified in this review.
- Core admin (10-day upgrade timelock, 3-of-3 oracle): not re-read this run, last verified 2026-09-29.
- Authority owners:
- Oracle:
- Liquid ETH
accountantState(): upper 10050, lower 9950,minimumUpdateDelayInSeconds= 21600,isPaused= false, management fee 30,feesOwedInBase2.68 WETH, rate 1.11042098 at timestamp 1793935355 (2026-11-06 03:22 UTC). - weETH
getRate(): 1.10753159. - Aave v3 Core weETH source:
0x87625393534d5c102cadb66d37201df24cc26d4c"Capped weETH / eETH(ETH) / USD",RATIO_PROVIDER()= weETH,isCapped()false at read. - Spark wstETH price source: not verified in this review.
- Liquid ETH
- Strategy exposure (on-chain this run):
- Aave v3 Core
getUserAccountData(liquidETH vault): collateral $999.6M, debt $923.0M, liquidation threshold 95%, LTV and LLTV LTV is your loan as a share of your collateral's value. LLTV is the LTV at which the position is liquidated; the gap between the two is your buffer. 93%, health factor 1.0288, E-mode Aave's efficiency mode: a higher LTV when collateral and loan move together, such as ETH and wstETH or two stablecoins. It allows more leverage in a loop. 1. aEthweETH 401,798.59, WETH variable debt 410,912.53. - Same Aave account, history: at block 26085633 (2026-09-29), $1,193.5M against $1,103.9M, HF 1.0271. At block 25738411 (2026-08-12), $657.8M against $596.0M, HF 1.0484.
- Aave Core reserves: weETH active, not frozen, not paused; WETH active, borrowable, not frozen. aWETH supply 2,099,522, variable debt 1,753,796, cash 292,771, Utilization The share of a lending market's deposits that is lent out. Near 100%, depositors may have to wait to withdraw and the borrow rate jumps. about 85.7% (debt over debt plus cash). Liquid's weETH is 29.6% of aEthweETH supply (1,357,827).
- Spark (Pool
0xC13e21B648A5Ee794902342038FF3aDAB66BE987): spwstETH 27,770.15, Spark WETH variable debt 31,101.52, collateral $77.61M, debt $69.61M, liquidation threshold 93%, health factor 1.0368. - Dollar vaults:
- Sentora PRIME Main (
0xC21b08C1...8BbD, asset PYUSD): 32,501,860 shares = 66,059,910 PYUSD, 34.6% of that vault's 191.0M. - Sentora RLUSD Main (
0x6dC58a0F...0E6bf): 13,982,265 shares = 14,209,955 RLUSD. - stcUSD (
0x88887bE419578051FF9F4eb6C858A951921D8888, "Staked cap USD", asset cUSD): 14,349,451 shares = 15,627,707 cUSD, 24.2% of the 59,242,898 supply.
- Sentora PRIME Main (
- Other balances: Katana Pre-Deposit WETH 2,500; 5,100,467 ETHFI; 4,135.2 weETH; 4,859.4 liquidMonadETH (the full supply of that sub-vault; value not verified in this review); 199.8 stETH; dust PYUSD, USDT, USDe and sUSDe. Spam tokens (for example a "SPARK" token) were ignored.
- Not covered: about $113M of NAV, and any exposure during the 2026-10-29 Binance incident window: not verified in this review.
- Liquid USD vault (Blockscout): 16.33M steakUSDT, 13.96M Hastra PRIME, 10.65M Sentora PRIME Main shares, 8.57M savUSD, 3.71M Sentora RLUSD Main shares, 3.30M steakUSDC.
- Aave v3 Core
- Exit (on-chain this run): BoringOnChainQueue
0x0D2dF071...2cE0:isPaused()= false,nonce()= 3,178 (2,889 on 2026-09-29).- weETH: allowed, 3600 s maturity, 259200 s minimum deadline, 0 to 10 bps discount.
- eETH: terms set, withdrawals off.
- WETH: off.
- Fills since 2026-09-29: not verified in this review.
- Legacy queue (Etherscan, this run):
0xd45884b592e316eb816199615a95c182f75dea07, 5,944 bytes of code.- From 2026-09-29 23:28 to 2026-11-06 17:37 UTC: 542 successful
updateAtomicRequestcalls from 272 addresses. The latest is tx0x988ef6f6...00a8, a liquidETH offer. - 5 reverted
solve()calls from0x6fb072d7249721f73c56822762a5514f9262a4a0on 2026-10-03 (first tx0x3702e4fc...1c6f). - Fills through other contracts: not verified in this review.
- From 2026-09-29 23:28 to 2026-11-06 17:37 UTC: 542 successful
- Holder concentration: Blockscout
eth.blockscout.com/api/v2/tokens/0xf0bb.../holders, 7,675 holders.- Top ten: 25.38%, 21.86%, 7.95% (contract), 3.29%, 3.14% (
0xeA1A6307...a221, labelled "Ether.fi-Liquid1"), 2.43%, 2.00% (SafeProxy), 1.61%, 0.87%, 0.80%. Together: 69.33%. - Etherscan and Nansen holder endpoints returned Pro-only errors.
- Top ten: 25.38%, 21.86%, 7.95% (contract), 3.29%, 3.14% (
- Recent-news scan (2026-09-29 to 2026-11-07):
- DeFiLlama hacks list: no new ether.fi entry. Its window includes the Binance CEX incident on 2026-10-29 ($6.36B). Liquid's exposure to it: not verified in this review.
- X search via Grok: no posts on a Liquid exploit, delay, timelock or post-mortem.
- Web search: no post-mortem for 2026-09-11 and no announcement of the timelock.
- Repayment of the 43 unpaid September wallets: not verified in this review.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.