TL;DR
USDe is Ethena's synthetic dollar, and sUSDe is the staked version that collects the protocol's revenue. Since our 29 September report the picture has moved in both directions.
Better: the carry. sUSDe pays about 5.3% while borrowing USDC on Aave costs 3.9%, so holders earn roughly 139bp over the funding cost, up from about 47bp. Weekly proof of reserves kept coming every week, confirmed by the same three firms.
Worse:
- USDe shrank through October, then came back in one burst. DeFiLlama's circulating supply went from $4,904M on 29 September to a low of $4,500M on 1 November, after a peak of $4,979M on 7 October ($4,619M live, $4,563M on the daily series). Then 21 mints created $287.0M of USDe on Ethereum between 23:02 UTC on 5 November and our read, with nothing burned, which puts on-chain supply back within 1% of 29 September.
- Backing is now slightly short of supply before the reserve fund. Ethena's own API on 6 November shows $4,576.6M of backing against $4,587.0M of supply, a 99.77% ratio. Adding the $62.0M reserve fund brings it to 101.13%.
- One holder drove that burst. 94.7% of the $287.0M went to a single Safe (
0xa711a3a64f2b2d7e05dc3f564d3862d7499c6d69), and the transfers we sampled moved it into sUSDe and Aave's aEthUSDe. The published counts (Ethena $4,587.0M, DeFiLlama $4,619.3M) predate the burst, so on-chain totalSupply ($4,861M to $4,873M in two reads ten minutes apart) reads higher until they update. That is new minting, not missing USDe. - The Dev Safe used its no-delay fast lane to set a live bridge peer for the first time on record. On 21 October it set non-zero peers on all three bridge adapters for one LayerZero route, one day after closing that route through the same lane. It closed the route again on 26 October.
The 29 October Binance hot-wallet exploit did not touch Ethena's contracts, as far as this run found. Binance's USDe book printed $0.98 the next day, and Aave froze lending markets across 16 networks for about a day. Caution, unchanged.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Unchanged from 29 September, which listed Zellic, Spearbit, Quantstamp, Cantina, Pashov, Code4rena, Chaos Labs (economic) and Cyfrin on USDtb, with no critical or high findings where a severity summary exists. The $3M Immunefi bounty was live then. This run did not re-read the Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope. page or the Immunefi scope, so both are carried rather than re-verified. The gap noted last time remains, and it has grown: no published audit covers the 24-hour Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree., the bridge adapters or the PSMs, and October added a second timelock and a new PSM whose asset is USDe. Green for the core mint, redeem and staking code; the newer surfaces are graded under admin.
Admin control. Re-read on-chain at blocks 26,358,004 to 26,358,053:
- The Dev Safe is still 5 of 10.
- The original timelock still has an 86,400-second (24-hour) delay and still owns USDe, sUSDe and the USDe bridge adapter.
- The Dev Safe still holds the proposer, executor and canceller roles there, and is the fast-lane (whitelisted executor) user.
What changed since 29 September is how the fast lane was used. The timelock's WhitelistedFunctionExecuted log shows 37 instant calls in 17 transactions between 30 September and 5 November:
- 20 added mint benefactors and 1 removed one.
- 16 were setPeer calls on the USDe, sUSDe and ENA adapters, which hold 2,081M USDe (42.8% of supply) and 238M sUSDe.
Thirteen of those setPeer calls set a peer to zero, which switches a route off. Three did not. On 20 October the Safe zeroed LayerZero route 30243 on all three adapters. On 21 October it set that route back to non-zero peers, with no delay, then zeroed it again on 26 October. The new peer on the USDe adapter equals the adapter's own mainnet address, which is the same pattern its live routes use today (for example endpoint 30184), so it looks like Ethena's standard address scheme for its tokens on other chains. The contracts at those addresses on the remote chain were not checked.
This was most likely a route being repaired, not an attack. But last report's main mitigating fact, that the fast lane had only ever switched routes off, no longer holds. A 5-of-10 signer set can point the lockbox behind 43% of supply at a new peer in one transaction, and has now done it.
Other changes:
- A second timelock. 0x9d0d...6ceb is the same EthenaTimelockController code. Its event log starts on 29 October, and its delay is now 259,200 seconds (3 days). The Dev Safe holds the proposer, executor, canceller and fast-lane roles on it; the same EOA and 3-of-6 Safe as on the first timelock hold the plain executor role. Its log has no FunctionWhitelisted event, so its fast lane has nothing on it yet. It owns a new PSM (0x3fea...458f) whose asset() is USDe, plus two contracts this run did not identify.
- The BUIDL-I PSM. It moved from the 3-of-6 Safe to the 24-hour timelock; role grants were scheduled on 28 October, and owner() now returns the timelock. Its 21 fast-lane entries, which did nothing on 29 September, can therefore now be used.
- Collateral moves. The Dev Safe called transferToCustody on the minting contract directly, outside any timelock, twice: 20M USDtb on 12 October and 50M PYUSD on 4 November, both to 0x2d4d...7bb4. The minting contract's verified source only lets this function send to addresses on its custodian list, so the Safe cannot use it to send collateral to an arbitrary wallet. Who is on that list was not re-read. On 5 November the Safe queued two changes: adding transferToCustody to the fast lane, and giving the timelock the collateral-manager role.
Red. The design is not new, but the use is. Instant Multisig A wallet that needs several keyholders to sign, such as 5 of 9. Safer than one key, but only as safe as the people who hold the keys. control over the bridge backing 43% of supply is a fund-loss surface, and it is now exercised in both directions.
Oracle. Downgraded to yellow. Ethena's transparency figures still answer and are still confirmed weekly.
On 6 November at 12:00 UTC the collateralization endpoint showed:
- $4,576.6M of backing
- a $62.0M reserve fund
- $4,587.0M of supply
That is 101.13% with the reserve and 99.77% without it. On 29 September the figures were 101.36% and 100.09%. In other words, backing alone no longer covers supply, and the reserve is closing a gap of about $10.4M. The weekly PoR still marks every report over-collateralized, which only holds once the reserve is counted.
The PoR feed lists 85 weekly reports. Every one since 24 September landed on schedule (1, 8, 16, 23 and 30 October, and 6 November), each confirmed by Harris and Trotter, Chainlink and LlamaRisk, and each marked Delta-neutral Holding an asset and shorting the same amount, so price moves cancel out. What is left is the funding the short collects plus the asset's own yield. and over-collateralized.
The published supply figures lag the chain today. USDe's on-chain totalSupply read $4,861M to $4,873M, while Ethena counts $4,587.0M and DeFiLlama $4,619.3M. The difference is new minting: from 23:02 UTC on 5 November to our read, 21 mints created $287.0M of USDe on Ethereum with no burns, 94.7% of it to one Safe (0xa711a3a64f2b2d7e05dc3f564d3862d7499c6d69). Both published counts predate that burst. The backing ratio above compares Ethena's backing and supply from the same snapshot, so the lag does not distort it; whether backing kept pace with the new mints will show in the next weekly attestation.
The rest is as before:
- Reserve-fund visibility: 42.02M USDtb sits at the published Safe against a reported $62.0M.
- Aave prices USDe as capped USDT.
- The Morpho Looping Deposit, borrow against it, buy more of the collateral, repeat. It multiplies the gap between the yield and the borrow rate, and the liquidation risk with it. use a fixed $1 with a 16-hour challenge window (not re-measured this run).
Liquidity & exit. The sUSDe Cooldown and withdrawal queue The wait between asking to withdraw and getting your funds: a fixed cooldown (7 days for HYPE staking) or a queue that clears as cash comes back. still reads 86,400 seconds (1 day) on-chain, although DeFiLlama's pool label still says 7 days.
The book moved toward loans. Backing composition on 6 November:
- DeFi lending: $1,569.2M (34.4%)
- liquid stables: $1,141.6M (25.0%, down from 28.7%)
- crypto basis: $828.8M (18.2%)
- BTC-collateralized institutional lending: $652.5M (14.3%, up from 12.6%)
- RWA (JAAA, STAC): $309.9M (6.8%)
- a new equity and RWA basis sleeve: $64.1M (1.4%), holding CRCL, GOOGL, INTC, MSTR, MU, SNDK, SPCX and GOLD
Loans are now 48.7% of backing, and liquid stables cover a quarter of it.
Aave's USDC market is less stretched than in September: 81.6% utilized, against 92.6% then. Retail holders still exit on secondary markets. Binance's book printed $0.9800 on 30 October, the day after the exploit, and closed at $0.9996. Yellow.
Yield: real vs emission. Real.
- DeFiLlama's sUSDe pool shows 5.30% APY Yearly yield with the earnings reinvested (compound interest). Most tables here show APY; funding and the exchange vaults show APR. with a null reward component and a 30-day average A rate's mean over the last 30 days: DeFiLlama's where it publishes one, otherwise ours from daily readings, or each venue's history for funding. of 5.01%.
- Ethena's API, to 4 November, shows a 30-day sUSDe yield of 5.00%, a 90-day yield of 4.76% and a 30-day protocol yield of 4.95%.
- On-chain, the share price moved from 1.2506 to 1.2569 USDe in 38 days, about 4.8% annualized.
- Aave v3 Ethereum Core USDC borrow is 3.91%, so the carry is about +139bp, up from +47bp.
The Merkl looping rewards (about $280k a day on 29 September) and whether ENA incentives really ended on 30 September were not re-measured: not verified in this review. Green.
Holder concentration. On-chain, three contracts hold about 77% of USDe:
- the bridge adapter: 42.8% (2,081M)
- the sUSDe contract: 23.6% (1,145M, down 11% from 1,294M)
- Aave's aEthUSDe: about 11% (520M to 533M across two reads)
The adapter holds 26.2% of sUSDe shares. Wallet-level holders are paywalled (Nansen and Etherscan's holder endpoint both refused). The Morpho 91.5% LLTV loops on Base and Robinhood Chain, where on 29 September five wallets sat at health factors of 1.007 to 1.04, were not re-measured: not verified in this review. Yellow.
Track record. DeFiLlama's hacks list, 1,340 entries through 5 November, has no Ethena entry. It does hold incidents that touch Ethena's surroundings:
- third-party exploits that used USDe or sUSDe pricing, such as UwU Lend in June 2024 and Peapods in July 2025, with no Ethena loss;
- bridge exploits through LayerZero routes, the largest being Kelp's $293M on 18 April 2026, where forged cross-chain messages passed a 1-of-1 verifier setup.
Ethena's adapters run on the same messaging layer. The Safe made 112 delayed setConfig calls on the LayerZero endpoint in the window, but how many independent verifiers each USDe route now requires was not read: not verified in this review.
The 29 October Binance hot-wallet exploit is the main event in the window. The attacker's one Aave position was USDT supplied against a WETH borrow, and the Aave risk bulletin reports no USDe involvement. Ethena's own statement on Binance exposure (custody, the hedges, the new equity sleeve on Binance perps) was not found: not verified in this review. The PoR on 30 October at 04:03 UTC, about eight hours after the exploit, still confirmed delta-neutral and over-collateralized.
Peg since 30 September:
- Binance daily low: $0.9800 on 30 October.
- Bybit daily low: $0.9989.
- DeFiLlama 4-hour aggregate: low $0.9972 and high $0.9999, so USDe traded slightly under a dollar the whole window.
Green, with the standing note that Binance's USDe book breaks first.
Worst case
The bridge. Five of ten Dev Safe keys can, with no delay, set the peer on adapters that lock 2,081M USDe and 238M sUSDe for holders on other chains. On 29 September the adapters did not rate-limit releases back to Ethereum; the Safe has since changed the USDe adapter's rate limits through the delayed path, and whether inbound releases are now capped is not verified in this review. A compromised or mistaken Safe transaction could release that lockbox to a bad peer before anyone outside could react. A forged message on a weakly verified route, the Kelp pattern, is a second path to the same lockbox. The Safe has now used the fast lane to add peers, though so far only to what looks like Ethena's own address.
A credit or custody loss in a run. Backing is 99.77% of Ethena's supply figure before the reserve. Almost half of it is loans, a quarter is liquid stables, and 1.4% is a new equity basis trade on Binance. A loss above about $52M (the reserve minus the current shortfall) would leave USDe under-backed even on Ethena's count.
Concentrated new supply. About 6% of USDe was minted in one day, almost all by one Safe that stakes it and supplies it to Aave. A holder that size can leave as fast as it arrived, and an exit would hit sUSDe redemptions and the Aave USDe market at the same time.
Exit pressure. Counted supply fell about 8% from 29 September to 1 November, before the 5-6 November mints. The looped USDe on Aave and Morpho, levered close to Liquidation When a loan passes its LLTV or a perp position runs out of margin, it is closed by force and the collateral is sold, usually with a penalty. on 29 September, is the marginal seller. During the 29 to 30 October freeze, Aave users could repay and withdraw but could not add collateral, so a levered loop could not top up. A repeat freeze during a real Peg and depeg A stablecoin's peg is the price it targets, usually $1. A depeg is a move away from it, most often down. The stables page checks prices every 5 minutes. would leave those loops able only to repay debt.
There is no insurance beyond the $62M reserve fund. Position size is the mitigation.
Bottom line
Caution, unchanged, with admin now graded red.
The yield is real and better than in September, and the weekly reserve confirmations kept coming through a week when Binance itself was drained. But three things got worse at once. Backing alone no longer covers supply. On-chain supply runs about $275M ahead of Ethena's count, with no explanation found. And the fast lane we flagged as untested was used to re-open a bridge route instantly.
Hold sUSDe as a yield position with credit, admin and venue risk, size it accordingly, and treat any loop on it as exposed to an Aave freeze. Re-check that the next attestation covers the 5-6 November mints, the bridge verifier setup and the Morpho loops before adding.
Data appendix
What changed since 2026-09-29:
- USDe counted supply: down about 6% (TVL Total value locked: the dollar value of everything deposited in a protocol or pool. It shows size, not safety. entry down 4% to 6%).
- Backing: under supply before the reserve (99.77%, from 100.09%).
- New minting: $287.0M of USDe minted on Ethereum from 23:02 UTC on 5 November, 94.7% to one Safe; on-chain supply reads above Ethena's and DeFiLlama's counts until they update.
- Fast lane: set non-zero bridge peers for the first time (21 Oct).
- New contracts: a second timelock with a 3-day delay and an empty fast lane, and a new USDe PSM.
- BUIDL-I PSM: moved under the 24-hour timelock.
- Backing mix: an equity basis sleeve (1.4%); liquid stables down to 25.0%.
- Carry: +47bp to +139bp.
- New peg low on Binance: $0.98 on 30 Oct.
- Aave USDC Utilization The share of a lending market's deposits that is lent out. Near 100%, depositors may have to wait to withdraw and the borrow rate jumps.: 92.6% to 81.6%.
TVL. About $5.07B for DeFiLlama parent ethena on 2026-11-06 (read twice):
- ethena-usde: $4.59B to $4.69B (two reads minutes apart)
- Ethena USDtb: $416.6M (from $492.4M)
- tsUSDe: $2.4M
That compares with $5.40B on 2026-09-29.
USDe supply.
- DeFiLlama circulating: $4,619.3M live, $4,563.5M on the daily series (6 Nov), against $4,904.4M on 29 Sep. Window peak $4,979.0M (7 Oct), low $4,500.4M (1 Nov). Largest daily drops: -$95.7M (8 Oct), -$61.8M (9 Oct), -$60.7M (28 Oct).
- By chain, live: Ethereum $2,547M, Plasma $546M, Base $406M, Robinhood Chain $348M, Solana $298M (from $454M), Monad $129M, TON $86M, BSC $78M, Avalanche $71M, Mantle $66M.
- On-chain totalSupply: 4,861.1M (block 26,358,004) and 4,872.8M (block 26,358,053), against 4,904.8M on 29 Sep.
- Ethena API supply value: $4,587.0M.
- The difference to the published counts is the $287.0M minted from 23:02 UTC on 5 November (21 Transfer-from-zero events, no burns, read from mint logs on 2026-11-06; 94.7% to Safe
0xa711a3a64f2b2d7e05dc3f564d3862d7499c6d69).
Collateralization and PoR.
- /api/collateralization/status, 2026-11-06 12:00 UTC: backing $4,576,623,537; reserve $62,028,673; supply $4,586,978,647. That is 101.13% with the reserve and 99.77% without.
- /api/por: 85 reports. Latest 2026-11-06 00:03 UTC, confirmed by LlamaRisk, Chainlink and HarrisAndTrotter, and marked deltaNeutral and overCollateralized. Weekly cadence unbroken since 24 Sep. ChaosLabs is still inactive.
- Confirmation on the attestors' own pages: not verified in this review.
Backing composition (/api/collateral-breakdown, 6 Nov):
- DeFi lending: $1,569.2M (34.4%)
- liquid stables: $1,141.6M (25.0%)
- crypto basis: $828.8M (18.2%)
- institutional lending: $652.5M (14.3%)
- RWA: $309.9M (6.8%)
- equity and RWA basis: $64.1M (1.4%)
Reserve fund. $62.03M per the API. The published Safe 0x2b5a...d4d5 holds 42.02M USDtb, unchanged. Where the remaining ~$20M sits is not verified in this review.
sUSDe.
- DeFiLlama pool 66985a81: 5.296% APY with a null reward, 30-day mean 5.006%, TVL $1,143.9M; the label still says "7 days unstaking".
- On-chain: totalAssets 1,145.23M USDe against 911.15M shares (1.2569 per share). Cooldown 86,400 s.
- Ethena yields API, to 4 Nov: 30-day sUSDe 5.00%, 90-day 4.76%, since inception 10.23%, 30-day protocol yield 4.95%.
Carry. Aave v3 Ethereum Core USDC (DeFiLlama lendBorrow): borrow 3.905%, $2,423M borrowed of $2,970M supplied (81.6%). sUSDe minus USDC borrow is +139bp.
Admin/governance (on-chain).
- Dev Safe 0x3B0A...1862: threshold 5 of 10 owners.
- Timelock 0xe8dc...7c94: getMinDelay 86,400 s. owner() of USDe, sUSDe and the USDe adapter (0x5d3a...ef34) is this timelock. The Dev Safe holds its PROPOSER, EXECUTOR and CANCELLER roles and is the fast-lane caller.
- Second EthenaTimelockController 0x9d0d...6ceb: first event 29 Oct; getMinDelay 259,200 s. The Dev Safe holds proposer, executor, canceller and one further role; executor is also held by 0x3520...0e8f and 0xa075...c344. 45 events: 18 scheduled calls, 18 executed, 7 role grants, 2 delay changes, and no FunctionWhitelisted event. It owns the USDe PSM 0x3fea...458f (asset() = USDe), 0x0610...3cfc and 0x6a93...699f.
- BUIDL-I PSM 0x5d05...ec7c (asset BUIDL-I): owner() is now the 24-hour timelock; role grants and revokes were scheduled 28 Oct.
- Mint V2 0xe349...62D3 (EthenaMinting, verified source): transferToCustody reverts unless the destination is on the contract's custodian list.
- Docs (7/10 confirmations, 7-day timelocks): not re-read, not verified in this review.
Fast-lane use since 29 Sep. 37 calls in 17 transactions (30 Sep to 5 Nov):
- 20 addWhitelistedBenefactor and 1 removeWhitelistedBenefactor on Mint V2
- 16 setPeer (6 on the USDe adapter, 5 each on the sUSDe and ENA adapters), by LayerZero endpoint ID, as logged by the USDe adapter's PeerSet events:
- 30183 zeroed (30 Sep)
- 30243 and 30303 zeroed (20 Oct)
- 30243 set to 0x5d3a...ef34, the adapter's own address (21 Oct)
- 30243 zeroed again (26 Oct)
- 30391 zeroed (4 Nov)
- Current peers: 30243, 30303, 30183 and 30391 read zero; 30184 reads the adapter's own address.
Running total since July: 160 calls (123 counted at the last report).
Delayed path since 29 Sep.
- 112 LayerZero endpoint setConfig calls
- setEnforcedOptions on the USDe and sUSDe adapters
- setRateLimits on the USDe adapter
- the PSM role handovers
- queued 5 Nov: add transferToCustody on Mint V2 to the fast lane, and grant COLLATERAL_MANAGER_ROLE to the timelock
Direct Safe calls. transferToCustody on Mint V2: 20,000,000 USDtb (12 Oct) and 50,000,000 PYUSD (4 Nov), both to 0x2d4d...7bb4.
Holder concentration (on-chain).
- USDe: adapter 2,081.35M (42.8%), sUSDe 1,145.28M (23.6%), aEthUSDe 520.10M to 533.10M (10.7% to 10.9%).
- sUSDe: 238.29M shares in the adapter (26.2%).
- Top wallets: not verified in this review (Nansen and Etherscan Pro only).
- Morpho loop health factors and Merkl rewards: not verified in this review.
Peg (30 Sep to 6 Nov).
- Binance USDE/USDT daily: low $0.9800 on 30 Oct (13.0M USDe volume, close $0.9996); every other day $0.9988 or higher.
- Bybit daily: low $0.9989 (30 Oct).
- DeFiLlama 4-hour aggregate: low $0.99717 (30 Oct 00:00 UTC), high $0.99988.
- DeFiLlama stablecoins price now: $0.99906.
Recent-news and incident scan.
- DeFiLlama hacks list: 1,340 entries, latest 5 Nov, no Ethena entry. Entries that mention USDe are third-party Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through. exploits (UwU Lend, Jun 2024; Peapods, Jul 2025). Entries on LayerZero routes include Kelp ($293M, 18 Apr 2026, 1-of-1 verifier), GriffinAI (Sep 2025), The Sandbox (Aug 2026) and Stake DAO Yield (Mar and May 2026).
- 29 Oct Binance hot-wallet exploit (20:24 UTC; loss estimates in press range from about $3.3B to $6.3B). Aave's Guardian froze 175 V3 reserves on 16 networks and 117 V4 markets between 21:42 and 23:04 UTC; repay, withdraw and liquidations stayed open (LlamaRisk and Aave Labs bulletin, via TechFlow). Markets reopened in waves from about 30 to 31 Oct, with nine assets including USDT and USDC kept at zero LTV and LLTV LTV is your loan as a share of your collateral's value. LLTV is the LTV at which the position is liquidated; the gap between the two is your buffer. (secondary reports).
- Whether USDe and sUSDe were frozen or set to zero LTV is not verified in this review. DeFiLlama lendBorrow lists LTV 0 for USDC, USDe and sUSDe on Aave v3 Ethereum Core. For the USDe-family that may be the non-E-mode Aave's efficiency mode: a higher LTV when collateral and loan move together, such as ETH and wstETH or two stablecoins. It allows more leverage in a loop. setting, so it is not conclusive.
- Secondary items not verified: Ethena Pay "Earn+" on Aave V4 (2 Nov); a large ENA unlock (5 Oct).
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.