TL;DR
This report covers the parent protocol, not only the slug our board tracks. DeFiLlama's parent "drift" holds about $251.9M. Of that, $251.25M is "drift-staked-sol", which is dSOL, Drift's LST and LRT A liquid staking token is a staked asset you can still trade or lend, such as jitoSOL or stHYPE. An LRT is restaked on top: more yield, more risk.. The Perp (perpetual future) A futures contract with no expiry date. Funding paid between longs and shorts keeps its price close to the spot price. venue "Drift Trade" holds $0.64M, and the new "Velocity" child has no TVL Total value locked: the dollar value of everything deposited in a protocol or pool. It shows size, not safety. tracked. Almost all of the money behind this row sits in a stake pool, not on the exchange that was drained.
Nothing in the month since our October 2 report helps the verdict, and two things hurt it. On October 20, wallets tied to the April attacker moved about $61.6M of ETH through Tornado Cash, which makes it less likely that stolen funds flow back to victims. Separately, a closer reading of the Vault and curator A shared deposit pool run by code or by a curator. The curator chooses which markets get your money and sets the limits, for a fee. Multisig A wallet that needs several keyholders to sign, such as 5 of 9. Safer than one key, but only as safe as the people who hold the keys. shows that one unidentified key, its config authority, can rewrite that multisig without a vote. The vaults multisig has no Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree. either. The main program is still a 4-of-7 with a one-hour timelock, and it was redeployed on November 3. DeFiLlama puts Velocity's open interest at about $118K. No confirmed new figure for the recovery pool has been published since it opened on October 1 at roughly one cent per dollar lost.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. The Velocity docs list one post-fork Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope.. OtterSec did the fieldwork from June 19 to July 20, 2026 and issued the final report on September 3. It found 154 issues: 0 critical, 41 high, 109 medium, 1 low and 3 informational. The audits page states: "Every High finding is fixed in the deployed code." That claim comes from the protocol, and outsiders cannot check it yet. The docs' admin-keys page says "The Velocity program is not open source yet" and promises to publish it once the post-fork report is final, but the report has been final since September 3. I did not open the 382-page PDF.
On chain, the Velocity program was last deployed on 2026-11-03 at 03:40 UTC. That is at least the second deploy since the audit fieldwork closed in July, after one on September 29. The docs do not say whether either deploy changed audited logic or was reviewed. Trail of Bits (2022, re-review 2023) and Neodyme (2024) covered only the pre-fork Drift code.
Admin control. Red this month, up from yellow. Most of the on-chain facts are unchanged; what changed is how we read the vaults multisig. I re-read everything below from chain this run.
The Velocity program vELoC1audYbSYVRXn1vPaV8Axoa9oU6BYmNGZZBDZ1P can be upgraded. Its upgrade authority, 8jj7zJgdr5bDndc7evM74FMGwzLPmd4u4QxNzFi1BMai, is vault 0 of Squads V4 multisig 7qipzLR9j1JcvdxE1XJEFgvoyFmgBpgw5hMdHBMPcJtM, and it also controls the old Drift program. That multisig is unchanged: 4 of 7, a 3600-second timelock and no config authority. Its transaction counter has moved from 141 to 150 since October 2.
The vaults program is the weakest part of the setup. Its upgrade authority is vault 0 of a 3-of-5 Squads V4 multisig with zero timelock. That multisig also has a config authority, A1eC8n2tQBHPodn8sZHsc5XWciunZy9B1VgmcHgK1xhP. In Squads V4, a config authority can add or remove members and change the threshold and timelock directly, without a vote of the members. The address is a plain system-owned account with no data, last active on 2026-04-18. If it is a single key, then one unidentified signer could take control of the vaults program with no notice. The multisig's transaction counter is still 9. The program was last deployed on 2026-03-31, the day before the hack.
Velocity's own docs, read this run, add a second concern. Parameters sit in three tiers. Warm-tier changes go through a timelock, but "changes at the cold tier are not" timelocked, and replacing a market's Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through. is a cold-tier action. The docs say they do not publish who holds the keys.
dSOL runs on Sanctum's shared stake-pool program, SP12tWFxD9oJsVWNavTTBZvMbA6gkAmxtVgxdqvyvhY. It can be upgraded through authority 47SND7bGKvNXrqfP1bjsLCbwTgZhFBzAgmZ42QSkRScz, and it was last deployed on 2025-10-07. In October, that authority traced to a 6-of-11 Squads V3 multisig that looks like Sanctum's. I did not re-trace it this run.
Oracle. Pyth by default, with price-validity states and TWAP bands, per the August read; not re-read this run. Those checks are not what failed in April. The attacker used stolen admin rights to whitelist a token priced by an oracle they controlled. The docs now confirm that oracle sources can still be changed by admin, and that a cold-tier oracle swap takes effect immediately. dSOL is priced by its stake-pool exchange rate.
Liquidity & exit. Exit works mechanically. dSOL redeems through its stake pool. Press summaries of the claim terms say any DFX holder can redeem at any time for a pro-rata share of the recovery pool. The venue itself is very small. DeFiLlama's open-interest series for Velocity has stayed between about $104K and $118K since late October. DeFiLlama's protocol page reportedly showed about $1.53M of perp volume over 30 days; the volume API is paywalled, so that figure is not confirmed. With a book that size, a sizeable position cannot exit quickly without moving the price.
Yield: real vs emission. Both sources are real yield. dSOL passes through SOL staking rewards, and Velocity earns trading, Liquidation When a loan passes its LLTV or a perp position runs out of margin, it is closed by force and the collateral is sold, usually with a penalty. and borrow fees. DeFiLlama has no fee data for Velocity (its fees endpoint returns "not found"). At current volume, venue revenue is too small to quote as a yield, or to grow the recovery pool by much.
Holder concentration. Not measured. The largest-accounts call for dSOL and DRIFT returned HTTP 429 again this run, and Nansen returned 403 in the earlier pass. Re-read on chain this run: DRIFT has no mint or freeze authority, and its supply is about 999.998M. dSOL has no freeze authority, its mint authority is the stake pool's account, and its supply is 2,283,446. not verified in this review
Track record. Red, and it stays red while the April victims are unpaid. DeFiLlama's hacks list has two entries for this protocol, both filed under Drift Trade. On 2026-04-01, $295M was drained; DeFiLlama classifies it as Access Control, "Proxy Upgrade Hijack", with no returned funds recorded. On 2022-05-11, $14.5M was lost and fully repaid. The list's newest entry is dated 2026-11-05, and nothing for Drift or Velocity has been added since April.
The stolen funds are moving away from recovery. Decrypt reported on October 20, citing Arkham, that wallets tied to the attacker sent 25,700 ETH (about $61.6M) into Tornado Cash in two hours, after a first round of about 23,095 ETH in July. The same report says the attacker's tracked wallets still hold about 81,454 ETH, roughly $198M. In June, Drift said Mandiant attributed the attack to a North Korean group. DFX claims opened on October 1 at about 0.0104 USDT per DFX. No published update to the pool size has been confirmed. One Telegram post on October 19 said the pool had received only about $219 of venue revenue on top of the initial 3M USDT; that is a single unverified source. This run found no record that Tether's "up to 127.5M USDT" has reached the pool.
Worst case
For a dSOL holder, the exchange is not the main risk. The stake-pool program is: it can be upgraded with no timelock by what appears to be Sanctum's multisig, and it backs about $250M of dSOL as well as other Sanctum LSTs. A malicious or compromised upgrade could redirect that backing.
For a Velocity depositor, the worst case is a repeat of April. That attack worked by social-engineering the people who sign. The main program's timelock gives one hour of notice, which is not enough time to get out of a thin book. The vaults program gives no notice at all, and its multisig can be reconfigured by one unidentified key. Cold-tier admin can swap an oracle immediately.
For April victims, the worst case is a slow recovery. On about $1.5M of monthly volume, venue revenue alone will not move the pool much, and the stolen ETH is being mixed. Without the Tether money, DFX stays a claim worth about a cent until the window closes on January 1, 2028.
Bottom line
Avoid, unchanged from October. Of the five conditions the August report set for a re-rating, the count is the same as a month ago. Two are met: the post-fork audit is published and a bug bounty is live. Recovery is half met: claims are open, but they pay about 1%. Two are unmet: the vaults multisig still has zero timelock and a config authority that can override its signers, and the program timelock is still one hour. Since October, the relaunched venue has shown little traction, the main program was upgraded again after its audit, and the attacker has laundered more of the stolen ETH. A move to caution needs four things: a recovery pool that grows in a way we can verify, a timelock on the vaults multisig with its config authority removed, published source code, and outside confirmation that the OtterSec highs are fixed in the code now deployed.
Data appendix
- TVL: About $251.9M for parent#drift, verified on DeFiLlama around 12:50 UTC on 2026-11-07. Drift Staked SOL holds $251.25M, Drift Trade $0.64M, Drift AMM none, and Velocity has no TVL tracked. On October 2 the parent showed $345.11M and dSOL $344.47M. dSOL supply fell only from 2,318,083 to 2,283,446 (-1.5%), so most of the drop reflects SOL's price, not withdrawals. Velocity open interest (DeFiLlama): $117,960 on 2026-11-07, with daily values between $103,944 and $117,960 from 2026-10-27 on. Velocity volume: about $1.53M over 30 days, per DeFiLlama's protocol page as quoted in search results; the volume API is paywalled, so not verified in this review.
- Audits: The Velocity docs audits page lists OtterSec for the post-fork code: fieldwork June 19 to July 20, 2026, final report September 3, 2026 (382 pages), with 154 findings (0 critical, 41 high, 109 medium, 1 low, 3 informational). The page states "Every High finding is fixed in the deployed code." That is the protocol's claim. The admin-keys page states the program "is not open source yet". Trail of Bits (2022, re-review January 2023) and Neodyme (May 2024, updated June 2024) cover only the pre-fork code. Whether the deploys of 2026-09-29 and 2026-11-03 were reviewed: not verified in this review. Audit coverage of Sanctum's stake-pool program: not verified in this review.
- Admin/governance (Solana mainnet, this run): Velocity program vELoC1audYbSYVRXn1vPaV8Axoa9oU6BYmNGZZBDZ1P. ProgramData HkRf36jvUB32dnHjHqpMnPcKJhUP2TUKJTH7RDTifJm7, last deploy slot 464750765 = 2026-11-03 03:40 UTC. Upgrade authority 8jj7zJgdr5bDndc7evM74FMGwzLPmd4u4QxNzFi1BMai, derived and confirmed as vault 0 of the multisig below. Old Drift program dRiftyHA39MWEi3m9aunc5MzRF1JYuBsbn6VPcn33UH: same authority, last deploy slot 429731225 = 2026-06-29. Multisig 7qipzLR9j1JcvdxE1XJEFgvoyFmgBpgw5hMdHBMPcJtM (Squads V4): threshold 4 of 7 members (one member has Initiate permission only), time_lock 3600, config authority none, transaction index 150 (141 on October 2). Vaults program vAuLTsyrvSfZRuRB3XgvkPwNGgYSs9YRYymVebLKoxR: authority Ad21qwCb3C98M6UNqjGsZgR48549Spp7W1UWETV29cZ9 (vault 0 of the multisig below), last deploy slot 410041556 = 2026-03-31. Its multisig BBC5gSPh71YB2eUXdCqvkmL6kj6YDkUQJpX997qXUt2Q (Squads V4): threshold 3 of 5, time_lock 0, config authority A1eC8n2tQBHPodn8sZHsc5XWciunZy9B1VgmcHgK1xhP (system-owned, no data, last signature 2026-04-18), transaction index 9. Stake-pool program SP12tWFxD9oJsVWNavTTBZvMbA6gkAmxtVgxdqvyvhY: authority 47SND7bGKvNXrqfP1bjsLCbwTgZhFBzAgmZ42QSkRScz, last deploy slot 371704212 = 2025-10-07. Its Squads V3 controller was traced on October 2 and not re-traced this run. Velocity admin tiers (docs, this run): cold (root, no timelock, includes oracle replacement), warm (timelocked), hot (single-purpose), plus a pause-only key; key custody is not published.
- Oracle: Pyth by default, with safeguards, per the August read of source and docs; not verified in this review. Oracle sources are admin-settable, and cold-tier changes are not timelocked (docs, this run).
- Holder concentration: dSOL mint Dso1bDeDjCQxTrWHqUUi63oBvV7Mdm6WaobLbQ7gnPQ: supply 2,283,445.89, freeze authority none, mint authority 6727ZvQ2YEz8jky1Z9fqDFG5mYuAvC9G34o2MxwzmrUK. DRIFT mint DriFtupJYLTosbwoN8koMbEYSx54aFAVLddWsbksjwg7: supply 999,997,911, mint and freeze authority none. Top holders for both: not verified in this review (RPC 429). DFX distribution: not verified in this review.
- Recovery (DFX): Claims opened 2026-10-01. Press put the opening rate at about 0.0104 USDT per DFX, from a 3.11M USDT pool against 299.5M DFX. Funding comes from a daily 60% to 90% share of Velocity's net revenue (Decrypt), Tether's "up to 127.5M USDT", up to 20M USDT from partners, and any recovered funds. The redemption rate equals the pool balance divided by the DFX outstanding. Claims close at 00:00 UTC on 2028-01-01, after which unclaimed DFX is burned. dfx.drift.trade shows neither the pool balance nor the current rate. Pool size since October 1: not verified in this review. A Telegram post on 2026-10-19 said venue revenue added about $219 to the pool; single source, not verified. A Telegram post on 2026-10-04 put DFX's market price near $0.05; not verified, and a market price is not the redemption rate.
- Incidents (DeFiLlama hacks list, 1,340 entries, newest dated 2026-11-05): 2026-04-01, Drift Trade, $295,000,000, Access Control / Proxy Upgrade Hijack, no returned funds recorded. 2022-05-11, Drift Trade, $14,500,000, Market Manipulation / Risk Parameter Abuse, $14,500,000 returned. No entry for Drift or Velocity since. Stolen-fund movement: Decrypt (2026-10-20, citing Arkham) reports 25,700 ETH (about $61.56M) sent to Tornado Cash that day, after about 23,095 ETH in July, with about 81,454 ETH (about $198M) still in 71 tracked attacker addresses.
- Recent-news scan: Our Sources corpus turned up early-October coverage of the DFX launch, Project 0 opening DFX claims for its affected users on 2026-10-14, and the October 20 Tornado Cash laundering. I found no report of a new exploit, outage, vaults-timelock change or new recovery funding after October 2. The 2026-11-03 program redeploy was not announced anywhere I found. Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.