TL;DR
Curvance is an isolated-market lending protocol that runs only on Monad. On 2026-09-30 we moved it from caution to avoid because its Emergency Council ran the protocol through no-delay powers instead of the 5-day Timelock A built-in delay between an admin approving a change and the change taking effect, so users can withdraw first if they disagree.. Five weeks later, nothing on that front has changed. The council kept doing it.
Since that report the council Safe's nonce has gone from 62 to 77. I decoded the 14 transactions Etherscan lists against it. Eight of them call functions the registry reserves for "a 5-day delay or the Emergency Council". Those include three new market listings:
- PT (principal token) A Pendle token that redeems for one unit of the underlying on its maturity date. Bought at a discount, it locks in a fixed yield if held to that date.-AUSD-17DEC2026/AUSD on 2026-10-07
- strUSD/AUSD on 2026-10-08, against a new strUSD price adaptor
- PT-USDat-14JAN2027/AUSD on 2026-11-05
The DAO, which is the timelock's only proposer, has sent no transaction since September. The timelock's single queued operation from January is still sitting there, never executed.
The rest of the picture is also unchanged. Every asset I checked still has one pricing adaptor. Lending is about 90% utilized. The May eBTC market is still paused, its WBTC lenders still cannot redeem, and the attacker's loan is still on the books at full value. TVL Total value locked: the dollar value of everything deposited in a protocol or pool. It shows size, not safety. is $135.4M, up 5% on the September report. Most of that growth is more wsrUSD Looping Deposit, borrow against it, buy more of the collateral, repeat. It multiplies the gap between the yield and the borrow rate, and the liquidation risk with it., after the council raised that market's caps from 30M to 40M on 2026-10-27.
Verdict: avoid, unchanged.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Yellow, unchanged. The Audit A security firm's review of a protocol's code. It lowers the odds of a bug but does not rule one out, so check what was in scope. folder in the curvance-contracts repository still holds the same six reports: Trail of Bits twice, Cantina, Sherlock and TrustSec twice. It was last changed on 2025-12-10. The repository itself was last pushed on 2026-10-22, so code keeps moving while the reviews do not. Three things now run in production with no review I could find: the OracleManager deployed in June 2026, the ProtocolManager delegation contracts and the CombinedAggregator pricing contracts. The September text search of the six PDFs found no mention of the last two. This run adds a new price adaptor for strUSD (0x4d48...51ae), and I did not find it in any audit. The core still has no proxy pattern, and that is the main reason this stays yellow and not red.
Admin control. Red. This dimension sets the verdict, and the evidence for it got stronger.
The structure, re-read on chain today, has not changed:
- The council is a 4-of-5 Safe with the same five owners as in September.
- The DAO is a 3-of-5 Safe, with the same five owners and the same nonce of 14. Three of its owners also sit on the council.
- The timelock delay is still 432,000 seconds (five days).
- The council and the timelock hold elevated permissions. The DAO does not.
- The mass-pause contract that cannot unpause is still owned by a 1-of-5 Safe whose owners are the council's five signers, and it still holds market permissions.
The council's activity since 2026-09-30, by date:
- 2026-10-07. It paused borrowing in the two matured October PT markets, which is routine. Two hours later it listed the PT-AUSD-17DEC2026/AUSD market in one batch:
addMarketManager, a new asset on the shared adaptor,addAssetPricingAdaptorand a price guard. - 2026-10-08. It linked the market's rate models and added Oracle The price feed a protocol trusts to value collateral. A wrong or manipulated price can cause unfair liquidations or let bad loans through. support for its two cTokens. It also approved the AUSD side for the hyAUSD Vault and curator A shared deposit pool run by code or by a curator. The curator chooses which markets get your money and sets the limits, for a fee. through
addApprovedAsset, which per the source needs elevated permission. Then it burned a Safe nonce with an empty self-transaction. Later that day it listed the strUSD/AUSD market with a new adaptor feed labelled "strUSD_FUNDAMENTAL". - 2026-10-09. It linked the strUSD market's rate models, added oracle support and added a position manager.
- 2026-10-12. It changed the hyAUSD vault allocation settings.
- 2026-10-16. It called
updateManagementConfig, which is elevated, on the delegation contract that manages savUSD rate models, adding the two new markets' rate models. - 2026-10-27. It paused borrowing of cstrUSD, then raised the wsrUSD/USDC market's wsrUSD collateral cap and USDC debt cap from 30M to 40M while keeping the 94.5% collateral ratio. The previous raise on this market, from 20M to 30M, was on 2026-09-04.
- 2026-10-30. It re-set the wsrUSD price guard.
- 2026-11-05 and 2026-11-06. It listed PT-USDat-14JAN2027/AUSD and added oracle support and a position manager for it. As of today the market holds only seed amounts.
So eight of the 14 decoded transactions used the no-delay path for planned listings and configuration. None was an emergency. The registry now reports 29 markets, up from 26 in September. The fifteenth nonce increment did not appear in Etherscan's list of direct calls, and no direct call landed between 2026-09-24 and 2026-10-07, so I cannot say what it did: not verified in this review.
The timelock check is the same as September. Its only operation ever, an earnAUSD price feed queued by the DAO on 2026-01-14, still returns state 2 (ready) and isOperationDone false. The DAO's nonce is still 14, so it has proposed nothing since. The five-day delay has still never governed a single change.
The per-market pause rights held by individual EOAs through the ProtocolManager contracts were not re-read this run and are carried forward as not verified in this review. No council transaction I decoded changed them.
Oracle. Red, re-tested live. getPricingAdaptors on the live OracleManager returns exactly one adaptor for:
- wsrUSD, USDC and AUSD
- the two new PTs
- strUSD
- eBTC, WBTC and savUSD
All of those use the shared adaptor 0x42b3...22e1 except strUSD, which sits alone on the new 0x4d48...51ae. With one adaptor per asset, OracleManager skips its divergence checks, so a bad price has nothing to disagree with.
The new listings add two more priced-by-assumption assets:
- strUSD is Tori Finance's staked trUSD, a synthetic dollar backed by Delta-neutral Holding an asset and shorting the same amount, so price moves cancel out. What is left is the funding the short collects plus the asset's own yield. trading positions, per third-party summaries I could not confirm against Tori's own docs. Curvance prices it through a feed labelled "fundamental", which suggests an exchange-rate or redemption-rate price and not a traded one. The exact methodology is not verified in this review.
- PT-USDat is a Pendle principal token on Saturn's USDat, which we rate caution separately. It is priced through the same shared adaptor.
The September findings on the routes behind those single adaptors were not re-read this run: savUSD priced off USDC/USD with no avUSD feed, and eBTC priced off BTC/USD. Nothing the council did since touches those feeds, but the exact current routes are not verified in this review.
Liquidity & exit. Red. DeFiLlama's breakdown at 22:51 UTC on 2026-11-06:
| Stablecoin | Borrowed | Idle |
|---|---|---|
| USDC | $44.90M | $4.95M |
| AUSD | $39.94M | $4.13M |
| Total | $84.84M | $9.08M |
That is about 90% utilized. Lenders as a group can reach about $9.1M today. Per-market Utilization The share of a lending market's deposits that is lent out. Near 100%, depositors may have to wait to withdraw and the borrow rate jumps. was not re-read on chain this run.
The collateral behind the largest loans still has no market on Monad outside Curvance. The two wsrUSD cTokens hold 53,998,820 wsrUSD of a 54,000,163 supply on Monad, or 99.998%. A liquidator who seizes wsrUSD has to bridge it back over LayerZero to sell or redeem it.
The eBTC market's WBTC lenders are still frozen (see track record). And one key on the 1-of-5 pause Safe can still freeze redemptions in every market, through a contract that cannot lift the pause again.
Yield: real vs emission. Yellow. DeFiLlama shows fees of $409,670 over 30 days and protocol revenue of $41,191, about a tenth. That is borrower interest, so it is real. Lenders in the main markets also get a flat incentive paid in cWMON, as in September. The borrower base is still concentrated in wsrUSD loops. wsrUSD collateral grew from $48.70M at the September report to $59.74M, most of it after the 2026-10-27 cap raise. Current per-market lender and borrow APY Yearly yield with the earnings reinvested (compound interest). Most tables here show APY; funding and the exchange vaults show APR. and srUSD's native yield are not verified in this review.
Holder concentration. Yellow. CVE still does not trade: CoinGecko shows zero tickers, no price, zero circulating supply and a 420,000,069 maximum. The registry's cve() and veCVE() still return the zero address, so no token holders check the council. My X scan found no TGE or airdrop announcement in the period.
On the deposit side, the top three collateral types make up $108.35M of $135.43M, or 80%:
- wsrUSD $59.74M (44%)
- VUSD $26.00M
- savUSD $22.61M
Wallet-level concentration behind the wsrUSD loops is not verified in this review.
Track record. Red, unchanged on chain. The eBTC market from the 2026-05-18 Echo key compromise is still registered and still paused. redeemPaused, liquidationPaused and transferPaused all return 2. Its WBTC cToken shows:
- 32.466 WBTC of total assets
- 0.00078 WBTC of actual cash
- 11.2966 WBTC still owed by the address defiprime named as the attacker, about 35% of the debt
None of those numbers has moved since September. That makes 173 days with no on-chain write-down and no way for WBTC lenders to redeem. Curvance's June statement pointed affected users to an off-chain Echo claims process, and I still cannot confirm that anyone was paid. I found no new incident since 2026-09-30:
- DeFiLlama's hacks list has no Curvance entry. Its only Monad entry is the May "Echo Bridge" event, at $821k.
- The 2026-10-29 Binance hack is listed on Ethereum, Bitcoin, TRON, Avalanche, Optimism, Arbitrum and Base, not Monad.
- My X scan found no exploit, pause, bad-debt, eBTC resolution or governance post about Curvance in the period.
DeFiLlama's daily TVL fell to about $101M from 2026-10-14 to 2026-10-19 and recovered on 2026-10-20. In that window savUSD read $0 and then reappeared at $26.4M, which looks like a DeFiLlama pricing gap, not an outflow. I did not confirm that on chain.
Worst case
The severe case is unchanged, with a longer precedent behind it. Four of the five council keys, or the three signers shared with the DAO plus one more, swap a price adaptor or the whole OracleManager in one transaction. The council has made exactly that kind of change without delay throughout 2026, most recently the three listings in October and November. With one adaptor per asset, nothing contradicts the new prices. An attacker borrows the roughly $9.1M of idle USDC and AUSD, then marks collateral down to liquidate borrowers. The timelock is not in the path.
A cheaper bad day needs one key. A compromised signer on the 1-of-5 pause Safe freezes every market. Lenders cannot redeem and Liquidation When a loan passes its LLTV or a perp position runs out of margin, it is closed by force and the collateral is sold, usually with a penalty. stop until four council signers agree to unpause.
The likely case is the eBTC pattern at a larger size. wsrUSD is now $59.7M of collateral, essentially the entire Monad supply, looped at up to a 94.5% collateral ratio against lender USDC and AUSD. The council just raised the room for that position from 30M to 40M. If srUSD loses value fast, the price guard is built to freeze pricing before loops reach liquidation. If the bridge route or the issuer were compromised, the oracle would price unbacked wsrUSD the way it priced eBTC in May. strUSD adds a third synthetic dollar whose backing sits off-chain at a trading desk.
The case already underway is the frozen eBTC market. Writing off the attacker's 11.30 WBTC would cost WBTC suppliers about 35% of their claims, unless Echo's off-chain process has made them whole. I found no documented insurance fund. Position sizing and staying out are the only mitigations.
Bottom line
Avoid, unchanged.
The September report named three things that would bring this back to caution:
- The eBTC market resolved.
- Listings and oracle changes routed through the timelock.
- A second pricing source on the large collateral.
Five weeks on, none of the three has happened. The council listed three more markets and raised the largest market's caps through the no-delay path. The timelock and the DAO did nothing. Every asset still has one price source. The engineering strengths still stand: an immutable core, isolated markets, price guards and rate-limited delegation. They do not answer who can change the rules, what stops bad collateral, or how a lender gets out. This is still not a place for showcase money.
Data appendix
TVL (DeFiLlama /protocol/curvance)
- Current: $135.43M, all on Monad. Borrowed $87.67M.
- History: daily points of $129.38M on 2026-09-30, $130.72M on 2026-10-29 and $135.78M on 2026-11-06. All-time high is still $141.26M on 2026-09-12.
- October dip: daily TVL was $100.6M to $102.1M from 2026-10-14 to 2026-10-19, while savUSD read $0. On 2026-10-20 savUSD reappeared at $26.43M and TVL was $132.58M.
- Deposit mix:
| Token | Amount |
|---|---|
| wsrUSD | $59.74M |
| VUSD | $26.00M |
| savUSD | $22.61M |
| aguaUSDCgc | $9.12M |
| USDC | $4.95M |
| PT-AUSD-17DEC2026 | $4.30M |
| AUSD | $4.13M |
| strUSD | $1.55M |
| earnAUSD | $1.34M |
- Borrowed: USDC $44.90M, AUSD $39.94M, WBTC $2.46M, WMON $0.35M.
Fees (DeFiLlama)
| Window | Fees | Revenue |
|---|---|---|
| 24h | $11,327 | $1,139 |
| 7d | $109,976 | $11,043 |
| 30d | $409,670 | $41,191 |
| All time | $2,839,729 | $356,220 |
Audits
- The six PDFs in
contracts/auditsare unchanged: Trail of Bits Invariant Development 1 (2024.3.13), Cantina 1 (2025.4.16), Trail of Bits 1 (2025.5.23), Sherlock (2025.9.29), TrustSec 1 (2025.10.17) and TrustSec 2 (2025.11.22). - The folder's last commit was 2025-12-10. The repository was last pushed 2026-10-22.
- Audit coverage of the strUSD adaptor
0x4d48676f7b407a7715e84862dba42b276b8851ae: not verified in this review.
Admin, verified on chain today
- CentralRegistry
0x1310f352f1389969Ece6741671c4B919523912fF.emergencyCouncil()is0x379d4a8fbc23a8fd8c2b3738dbf1febe9a64399c.daoAddress()is0x0acb7ef4d8733c719d60e0992b489b629bc55c02.timelock()is0x2677738657f27e1a3591e00ad7e5a78807688c08.oracleManager()is0x65adf8ae8420a58278de066593e6ff1713a137c5, unchanged.cve()andveCVE()return zero.hasElevatedPermissions: council true, timelock true, DAO false.marketManagers()returns 29 entries (26 on 2026-09-30). The three new ones are0x0247...2fbd,0x3b08...51e9and0x7c6b...5878.
- Council: threshold 4, nonce 77 (62 on 2026-09-30). Owners
0x342d...5a,0xb41f...ef,0x1ffc...bc,0xda54...6eand0x6987...70, unchanged. - DAO: threshold 3, nonce 14 (unchanged). Owners
0x8268...cf,0xb41f...ef,0x0f92...51,0x1ffc...bcand0x6987...70, unchanged. Three of them (0xb41f,0x1ffc,0x6987) are council owners. - Mass pause: ProtocolManagerMassPause
0x89d2253b13c718d06b78fcce3d973a520bd07803returnscanUnpausefalse and holds market permissions. Its owner0x25d4134861b30ba7215d2a280dd84c57c5780902is a Safe with threshold 1 and the council's five owners. - Timelock:
getMinDelay()returns 432,000. Operation0x11123def...2b50returnsgetOperationState2 andisOperationDonefalse, the same as September. - Permission checks in the develop-branch source:
- Elevated:
updateManagementConfig(ProtocolManager) andaddApprovedAsset(LendingOptimizer). - DAO permission:
setLinkedToken(DynamicIRM). - Market permission:
addPositionManager,setBorrowPausedandupdateTokenConfig(MarketManagerIsolated), plusupdateCap(LendingOptimizer).
- Elevated:
Council transactions after 2026-09-30, from Etherscan, UTC, decoded from calldata
Calls marked [E] need elevated permission.
- 2026-10-07 02:47.
setBorrowPausedon the cAUSD of PT-AUSD-8OCT2026 (0xddd5...2e) and PT-earnAUSD-8OCT2026 (0xfade...10). - 2026-10-07 04:29.
- Registry
addMarketManager(0x0247eabb0fd8953c4869a81857fd55289bb32fbd)[E] - adaptor
addAsset(PT-AUSD-17DEC2026 0x8b56...6a57)[E] - OracleManager
addAssetPricingAdaptor[E] - a guard
- Registry
- 2026-10-08 00:43.
setLinkedTokenon two rate models, thenaddCTokenSupportfor cPT-AUSD-17DEC20260xbf49...c500and cAUSD0xddf7...35c0[E]. - 2026-10-08 04:06. hyAUSD LendingOptimizer
0xad66...00bf:addApprovedAsset(0xddf7...35c0)[E] andupdateCap. - 2026-10-08 05:00. An empty Safe self-call sent by
0xb41f...ef, which burns a nonce. - 2026-10-08 16:28.
- Registry
addMarketManager(0x3b085337249722f192061ca371eb50c6e56f51e9)[E] - the strUSD adaptor configured with feed label "strUSD_FUNDAMENTAL" (selector
0x801d02da; the exact function is not verified in this review) addAssetPricingAdaptor(strUSD 0x683f...5d20)[E]- a guard on
0x5104...2ef5
- Registry
- 2026-10-09 00:40.
setLinkedTokenon two rate models,addCTokenSupportfor cstrUSD0xbde1...6ae8and cAUSD0x8717...5efa[E], plusaddPositionManager. - 2026-10-12 03:15. hyAUSD LendingOptimizer allocation change (selector
0xd1b1eeba, not decoded). - 2026-10-16 15:05.
updateManagementConfigon ProtocolManager0xc3a2...21a1for rate models0x1f5c...112dand0x2fd2...710a[E]. - 2026-10-27 20:21.
setBorrowPaused(cstrUSD, true)on the strUSD market. - 2026-10-27 20:41.
updateTokenConfigon wsrUSD/USDC0x27a4...b4c4: collateral ratio 9450 Basis point (bp) One hundredth of a percent: 1 bp = 0.01%, so 25 bp is 0.25%. The exit costs on the funding page are in bp. kept, the cwsrUSD collateral cap set to 40M, and the cUSDC debt cap set to 40M (both were 30M).collateralCapsanddebtCapsreturn 40M today. - 2026-10-30 06:13.
setGuardedPriceConfigfor wsrUSD on the shared adaptor. - 2026-11-05 03:44. Registry
addMarketManager(0x7c6b999b99bedd49cd666d24d56d673bac8c5878)[E],addAsset(PT-USDat-14JAN2027 0xa08a...c147)[E],addAssetPricingAdaptor[E] and a guard. - 2026-11-06 01:43.
setLinkedTokenon two rate models,addCTokenSupportfor cPT-USDat0x06ed...2c7aand cAUSD0xea01...8724[E], plusaddPositionManager. Both cTokens hold 77,777 base units, which is seed only. - Not located: the fifteenth nonce increment, not verified in this review. The last direct call before 2026-10-07 was on 2026-09-24, already in the September report.
Oracle, verified on chain today
getPricingAdaptorsreturns one adaptor for each asset checked:- shared adaptor
0x42b318abfde82a43b3685eb65a5863b9367b22e1: wsrUSD, USDC, AUSD, PT-AUSD-17DEC2026, PT-USDat-14JAN2027, eBTC, WBTC and savUSD 0x4d48...51ae: strUSD
- shared adaptor
- The other assets were not re-queried this run: not verified in this review. September found one adaptor on all 24.
- Scribe feed methodology for wsrUSD and aguaUSDCgc, and the strUSD fundamental feed: not verified in this review.
Liquidity
- Utilization comes from DeFiLlama's borrowed and idle figures, about 90% combined. Per-market on-chain utilization: not verified in this review.
- wsrUSD
totalSupplyon Monad is 54,000,163. The wsrUSD/USDC market's cwsrUSD holds 35,194,307 and the wsrUSD/AUSD market's cwsrUSD holds 18,804,513, together 99.998%.
eBTC market, verified on chain today
- Market
0xbc4cd7bbd8d38027A88838B88BA04561FA778C35:redeemPaused,liquidationPausedandtransferPausedall return 2. - ceBTC
0x2840772e14ffbe337ab966727b7d1dd09bdc76e4: 551.33 eBTC of total assets, 545.23 eBTC held. - cWBTC
0xdb3e888c3b50771821226d30ab6ec14eb5ba85ba:totalAssets32.4659 WBTC,totalSupply32.4226. The WBTC balance held by the cToken is 0.00078. debtBalance(0x6a0109d3c5ab56277096c75e8f5d1d1d45243415)is 11.2966 WBTC.- Status of Echo's off-chain claims payouts: not verified in this review.
Holder concentration
- CoinGecko
curvance(CVE): 0 tickers, no price, circulating supply 0, max 420,000,069. - Wallet-level concentration of the wsrUSD loops: not verified in this review.
Recent-news scan (2026-09-30 to 2026-11-07)
- X search found no exploit, pause, bad-debt, eBTC resolution, TGE, audit or governance announcement from or about Curvance. It found routine posts, including a 2026-11-02 heads-up that PT-USDat will be added to the hyAUSD vault.
- DeFiLlama's hacks list has no Curvance entry. Binance CEX, 2026-10-29, $6.36B, is listed on non-Monad chains only.
Third-party context
- trUSD and strUSD are attributed to Tori Finance by iq.wiki and DeFiLlama's stablecoin page. That attribution was not confirmed against Tori's own docs: not verified in this review.
Data as of 2026-11-07. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.