TL;DR
Tydro is the licensed Aave v3 market on Ink, Kraken's L2. Its structure has not changed since our September 30 report. The market is a kBTC-to-USDC credit line: one wallet supplies 69.7% of the USDC, and another owes 93.7% of the USDC debt at a flat 6.30% rate that does not rise with Частка позичених коштів Яку частину депозитів кредитного ринку позичено (утилізація). Коли вона близька до 100%, виведення може затриматися, а ставка позики різко зростає.. The new event is a freeze. At 22:53 UTC on October 29, about two and a half hours after the Binance hot-wallet drain, Tydro's own emergency Safe froze all thirteen live reserves and set kBTC's LTV і LLTV LTV: частка позики від вартості застави. LLTV: LTV, за якого позицію ліквідують. Різниця між ними і є вашим запасом до ліквідації. to zero. Tydro announced it ten minutes later, citing "recent reported exploits", and said repayments, withdrawals and Ліквідація Коли позика перевищує LLTV або позиції на біржі бракує маржі, її примусово закривають і продають заставу, зазвичай зі штрафом. would continue. It lifted the freeze 14.5 hours later. A freeze blocks new deposits and loans, not withdrawals or repayments, and nothing was lost. Tydro was not part of the hack. The freeze came from Tydro's own Safe, not from Aave governance. The other new number is less comfortable. BTC fell about 9% over the window. The large borrower added no collateral and repaid nothing, so its health factor slid from 1.50 to 1.33, and the liquidation point is now near $57,200 BTC. TVL Загальна заблокована вартість: сума всіх депозитів у протоколі чи пулі в доларах. Показує розмір, а не безпеку. fell from $134.3M to $117.6M. About $10.7M of that drop was price and about $5.2M was money leaving. The Таймлок Обов'язкова затримка між рішенням адміністратора змінити протокол і самою зміною. За цей час користувачі можуть вивести кошти, якщо не згодні. held, and no new payload has been queued since September 25. Verdict unchanged: caution.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Nothing new. Tydro's Аудит Перевірка коду протоколу незалежною компанією з безпеки. Її мета: виявити критичні проблеми, через які користувачі можуть втратити кошти. page still lists two Zellic reviews from August 2026. One covers Multiply, a separate set of Кредитне плече Позика, щоб тримати позицію, більшу за ваш капітал. Із плечем 3x на кожен ваш $1 припадає $3 позиції, і прибуток, збиток та ризик ліквідації ростуть разом. contracts. The other is a half-day check that one governance payload matches its description. A LlamaRisk parameter review sits beside them. The base audits Tydro lists are Aave V3.0 and 3.0.1 reports from 2021 and 2022. The page says they cover core Aave logic, not Tydro's own contracts or configuration. The live Pool is unchanged at revision 11, and its source compiles from a path named aave-v3-origin-private, so we still cannot match it to a public Aave release with a named audit. The page mentions a bug bounty without naming a platform or a size. DeFiLlama lists zero audits.
Admin control. The timelock part checks out again. The payloads controller enforces a 172,800-second delay, and the payload count is still 33. The last payload executed on September 25, so nothing has gone through the queue since our last report. The ACLManager has logged no role changes since June 5. The Safes have the same members as in September. The proposing Safe is 4-of-8 and the emergency Safe 4-of-9, sharing seven signers across ten distinct addresses. The risk council is 2-of-2 with the same two owners, none shared with the other Safes. None of these signers is publicly identified. This month, everything that touched the market went around the queue, as the design allows. On October 29 the emergency Safe froze WETH, kBTC, USD₮0, USDG, GHO, USDC, weETH, ezETH, sUSDe, USDe, SolvBTC, syrupUSDT and kHYPE in one batch. It also set kBTC's LTV to zero and marked ten E-mode Режим ефективності в Aave: вищий LTV, коли застава й позика рухаються разом, як ETH і wstETH чи два стейблкоїни. Дозволяє більше плече в лупінгу. collateral entries as zero-LTV. It unfroze them at 13:28 UTC on October 30 and restored the kBTC LTV and seven eMode entries at 14:13; the other three had already been zero-LTV since the August restructure, so the market is back to its pre-freeze settings. In between, at 13:22, the risk council cut the USDC borrow cap from $75M to $51.6M, just above the $48.5M already borrowed. Tydro's post that day said the cut would stay "until Binance confirms full isolation of the impact." The council restored the $75M cap on October 31. The response was fast and reversible, and it matched Tydro's public posts. It also shows that four keys can halt all new lending on this market in minutes with no notice. A second, narrower path is still in place: the Zodiac Roles module on the emergency Safe, which lets one EOA freeze the thirteen original reserves, is still enabled. It was not used in October; the freeze went through the Safe's own four-signature transaction. The proposing Safe also ran three transactions through a separate OpenZeppelin TimelockController, 0xfa527152, whose minimum delay is also 48 hours. They set up a weETH-to-WETH route for Multiply. The October 24 schedule executed twelve days later. They did not touch the pool's configuration.
Oracle. The wiring is the same as on September 30. Every asset resolves to a Chainlink feed. getFallbackOracle() returns the zero address, and so does the PriceOracleSentinel slot. The Оракул Джерело цін, за яким протокол оцінює заставу. Хибна чи маніпульована ціна може спричинити несправедливі ліквідації або пропустити погані позики. logged no source change after the kHYPE listing on September 25. kBTC is still priced straight off the Chainlink BTC/USD feed, 0xcd4d9b45, with no exchange-rate or proof-of-reserve adapter, and the oracle read $75,983 this run. That gap now covers about $78M of kBTC at an 87% liquidation threshold. If Kraken's wrapper broke from bitcoin, the oracle would keep reading bitcoin and nothing would liquidate. RedStone's announced failsafe layer is still not in the wiring.
Liquidity & exit. This is still the weakest surface. The USDC market holds $65.02M, with $48.52M borrowed, a 74.6% utilization rate, which leaves about $16.5M in cash. The rate model is unchanged: 95% kink, 6.30% base, both slopes zero. The borrow rate stays at 6.30% even at 100% utilization, so lenders who want out put no rate pressure on the borrower. One wallet supplies $45.31M. It could take all the free cash in one withdrawal and still have about $29M inside, and everyone else would then wait on repayments. During the freeze, exits stayed open: DeFiLlama's idle USDC fell from about $20.5M to $13.2M across October 29 and 30, while new loans were blocked. On the collateral side, kBTC Ліквідність Скільки можна продати чи вивести просто зараз, не зсуваючи ціну й не чекаючи. Мала ліквідність означає повільний або дорогий вихід. on Ink grew but is still small. GeckoTerminal now lists kBTC pools against USD₮0, USDC and WETH with about $2.6M of reserves in total, both sides counted, up from at most $0.74M on the side a liquidator sells into in September. Against roughly $69M of the borrower's kBTC, that does not change the picture. USD₮0 is tighter than in September at about 92% utilization, on a curve that does rise, and now charges borrowers about 6%.
Yield (real vs emission). USDC suppliers earn 4.23% APR Річний показник без складних відсотків. Фандинг на сайті показано як APR: погодинний показник × 8 760, бо стільки годин у році (24 × 365). of real interest: 6.30% times utilization, less a 10% reserve factor. It is down from 4.43% because utilization fell. In practice it is still one borrower's interest payment, at a rate the risk council can move by up to a point a day. If that borrower repaid, the USDC rate would collapse. USD₮0 pays about 5% and USDG 1.74%. Seven reserves pay zero. We found no confirmed INK token launch date, so points remain points.
Holder concentration. This got worse. aUSDC has 2,387 holders. EOA 0x0EF3A0dE supplies 69.7%, and the top five supply 86.5%. The Veda "Balanced Yield USDC" Vault і куратор Спільний пул депозитів, яким керує код або куратор. Куратор вирішує, у які ринки підуть ваші кошти, і встановлює ліміти, а за це бере комісію. came back from $0.98M to $5.03M, now second at 7.7%. USDC debt has about 730 holders. EOA 0xacc55735 owes 93.7% of it, up from 90.1%, and the top three owe 97.2%. The same wallet supplies 913.02 kBTC, which is 88.9% of the pool's kBTC and worth about $69.4M, about 59% of TVL. Neither matched position has moved since September 30. The borrower's debt rose from $45.18M to about $45.47M, which matches 38 days of interest at 6.30%. The lender's balance rose by about the interest it earned. The 56 kBTC that left the pool came from other suppliers. We still cannot say who controls either wallet.
Track record. About twelve and a half months live with no exploit. Realized bad debt is unchanged at 0.027592 USD₮0 plus 0.046337 GHO, about seven cents. The October freeze is the first halt since May. It was a freeze, not a pause, lasted 14.5 hours, was precautionary, and lost nothing. DeFiLlama's hacks list has no Tydro entry, and its Binance entry of 2026-10-29 ($6.36B) does not list Ink among the affected chains. The older record still stands. The April rsETH shortfall was closed by an ecosystem bailout, and the market was paused for six days in May. The corridor has now absorbed a BTC move from about $83,400 to about $76,000. It has not met a crash.
What changed since 2026-09-30
- One all-market freeze, October 29 22:53 UTC to October 30 13:28 UTC, by Tydro's emergency Safe, announced on X at 23:03 UTC. kBTC LTV was restored at 14:13 UTC. It was not an Aave DAO action.
- USDC borrow cap cut from $75M to $51.6M on October 30 and restored on October 31, by the risk council with no delay.
- Big borrower's health factor fell from 1.50 to 1.33 and its liquidation point rose from about $56,800 to about $57,200 BTC, because BTC fell and interest accrued.
- Borrower's share of USDC debt rose from 90.1% to 93.7%, because other borrowers left. Its kBTC share rose from 84.2% to 88.9%.
- TVL fell from $134.3M to $117.6M: about $10.7M from price and about $5.2M from net outflows.
- No new payloads, no oracle changes, no role changes, no new audits.
Worst case
The likeliest bad day still involves no exploit. The 70% lender withdraws first, takes the $16.5M of cash, and USDC sits at 100% utilization. The flat 6.30% rate gives the wallet owing 94% of the debt no reason to hurry. Your exit then waits on that borrower or on a rate change by the council or the queue.
The solvency case is a fast bitcoin crash. At a health factor of 1.33, the position becomes liquidatable if BTC falls about 25%, to roughly $57,200. That is closer than the one-third cushion in September. About $52M of kBTC would then need liquidators. At the $2M every ten minutes that Tydro's liquidator agreements are said to cover, clearing it takes over four hours. Ink pools hold a few million dollars. LlamaRisk sized this threshold for a much smaller book and a one-hour window. Any shortfall lands on USDC lenders, and no insurance fund or Aave safety module stands behind this market.
The tail is custody. If kBTC broke from bitcoin, the oracle would not see it, nothing would liquidate, and USDC lenders would be holding the overvalued collateral. On the admin side, four of eight keys can queue any change with 48 hours of notice. Four of nine can freeze everything immediately, as October showed, and one EOA can freeze the original reserves through the Roles module. That freeze power is defensive, but it is unilateral.
Bottom line
Caution, the same verdict as in September. The October freeze is not a strike against Tydro. The response was quick, communicated in public, undone within a day, and withdrawals stayed open throughout. What keeps this at caution is that nothing in the structure improved while the cushion thinned. USDC deposits here are effectively a loan to one borrower, mostly funded by one lender, at a rate that does not push the borrower to repay. The collateral is a custodial wrapper the oracle cannot see through. That borrower's health factor is now 1.33 with BTC near $76,000. For a lender: supply USDC here only in an amount you could leave stuck for weeks. Watch for: the borrower's health factor below 1.2, which means BTC near $68,700; USDC utilization above 90%; any move by the two big wallets; and any new emergency action.
Data appendix
- TVL: $117.58M (DeFiLlama
tydro, read 2026-11-07 09:25 UTC; a later read of the latest point was $117.93M). Our 2026-09-30 read was $134.34M, so -12.5%; DeFiLlama's stored daily point for that date now reads $133.77M, as its history is revised between reads. DeFiLlama token breakdown 09-30 to 11-07, about -$15.8M in total: price about -$10.7M (kBTC $83,405 to $76,086, -$7.92M; WETH $2,668 to $2,246, -$2.22M; SolvBTC -$0.56M) and flows about -$5.2M (kBTC 1,081.88 to 1,025.99, -$4.25M; WETH 5,269 to 4,477, -$1.78M; USD₮0, USDG, GHO, sUSDe together about -$1.7M; idle USDC +$2.43M). Daily points: $133.47M on 10-29, $120.40M on 10-30 (that point is missing a USD₮0 entry, so it partly reflects missing data), $118.90M on 11-06. Idle USDC in the breakdown: $20.50M on 10-29, $13.18M on 10-30, $16.46M on 11-07. ATH $506.13M (2026-01-15), down about 77%. Borrowed $59.51M. - Model: Pool 0x2816cf15F6d2A220E789aA011D5EE4eB6c47FEbA,
POOL_REVISION11, unchanged. Fourteen reserves, none frozen or paused on 2026-11-07 except wrsETH. kBTC LTV 85%, LT 87%, bonus 5%, borrowing off, supply cap 1,575 (1,026.52 used). USDC is the only asset with borrowing on outside eMode; borrow cap 75M, supply cap 100M, reserve factor 10%. USDC rate strategy 0xcfdada7dgetInterestRateDataBps= [9500, 630, 0, 0]. USD₮0 [9000, 0, 400, 1000]. PriceOracleSentinel: zero address. - Admin/governance: PermissionedPayloadsController 0x1dE9CB9420Dd1f2cCeFFf9393E126b800D413b7A, access level 1 delay 172,800s,
getPayloadsCount33, last executed payload 32 (kHYPE) on 2026-09-25 15:20 UTC after the 48h delay. ACLManager 0x86E2938d: last role event 2026-06-05. Addresses provider 0x4172e6aa: ACL admin and owner are the Executor 0x1dF462e2. Safes: 0x2e809071 4-of-8; 0x00C2B13e (EMERGENCY_ADMIN) 4-of-9, with Zodiac Roles module 0xD2547504 still enabled (its single-EOA freeze role, member 0xCdde5491, unused; that EOA's last transaction was 2026-08-10); risk council 0xEcD37F85 2-of-2 (0xb291232f, 0x2f52f9d5). Seven shared signers between the first two Safes, ten distinct, none shared with the council; identities not verified in this review. Configurator transactions since 2026-09-30, all five of them: 2026-10-29 22:53:41 UTC freeze of 13 reserves + kBTC LTV 0 (pending LTV 85% stored) + ten eMode ltvzero flags (emergency Safe, tx 0xf1f05ef2764ec9b5); 2026-10-30 13:22:43 USDC borrow cap 75M to 51.6M (council via RiskSteward 0xC1d38a1c, tx 0x326e41812ab69928); 13:28:06 unfreeze of all 13 (emergency Safe, tx 0xf8812ff259d271d0); 14:13:29 kBTC LTV back to 85% and seven eMode ltvzero flags cleared, for weETH, ezETH, sUSDe and USDe (category 5), SolvBTC, syrupUSDT, kHYPE (emergency Safe, tx 0xe4b3f3f0299bf767); the three left set (sUSDe in category 2, USDe in categories 2 and 3) were already zero-LTV since block 54,190,499 in August; 2026-10-31 16:45:35 USDC borrow cap 51.6M to 75M (council, tx 0x8ce24738da46bb62). The council also executed a Safe transaction at 2026-10-30 12:42 (tx 0x52ac6b22c859deed) that touched no market setting; purpose not verified in this review. Proposing-Safe transactions through OpenZeppelin TimelockController 0xfa527152A2d491449a7ED551f3D5404Fd997088b (getMinDelay172,800s): Multiply route calls scheduled 2026-09-25 and executed 2026-10-02, then a call scheduled 10-24 with a 172,800s delay and executed 11-05. The Zodiac Roles freeze path was not used; the freeze went through the Safe's own execTransaction. Not governed by Aave DAO. - Oracle: AaveOracle 0x4758213271BFdC72224A7a8742dC865fC97756e1,
getFallbackOracle()= 0x0. LastAssetSourceUpdated2026-09-25. kBTC and SolvBTC: Chainlink BTC/USD 0xcd4d9b45bee25e429ed010dfa8397e221f2d7fce, $75,983.48 on read. USDC: 0x89991637. kHYPE: HYPE/USD 0xb42ba1d3. Heartbeats and deviation thresholds: not verified in this review. RedStone failsafe: not in wiring. - Rates and utilization: USDC $65.02M supplied, $48.52M borrowed, 74.6%, supply 4.23% and borrow 6.30% APR. USD₮0 about 92% utilized, about 5.0% supply and 6.0% to 6.1% borrow across reads. USDG 29.1%, 1.74% and 6.65%. GHO 25.9%, 0.37%. USDe 93.3% of a $5.9k reserve. WETH 2.8%, 0.05%.
- Holder concentration: aUSDC 2,387 holders, top1 69.69% (EOA 0x0EF3A0dE1d46c9DEB887fF1e7120f68F4BBB4907, $45.31M), top5 86.52%, Veda BoringVault 0xcaae49fb $5.03M (7.73%). USDC debt 731 to 732 holders across reads, top1 93.69% (EOA 0xacc557354AFDb5132a11Aa8F1972524DA570c044), top3 97.22%. akBTC 5,679 holders, top1 88.94% (0xacc55735, 913.02 kBTC), second 0x76E112E0 75.58 kBTC (7.36%), top3 96.99%. aUSDT0 6,931 holders, top1 14.82%. USD₮0 debt top1 27.95% (0x76E112E0).
- The matched positions: borrower 0xacc55735: collateral $69.37M, debt $45.46M, health factor 1.3275, no eMode, liquidation near $57,200 BTC (health factor 1.2 near $68,700); 60 kBTC held outside the pool. Lender 0x0EF3A0dE: $45.32M aUSDC, no debt. Both unchanged in principal since 2026-09-30. Control of either: not verified in this review.
- kBTC on Ink: total supply 1,931.66 (2,133.89 on 2026-09-30). Tydro's aToken holds 1,025.99 to 1,026.52 across reads (53.1%). 0x6201A5Ed holds 529.47 (27.4%). GeckoTerminal lists kBTC/USD₮0 0x2c73736a ($1.03M reserves), kBTC/USDC 0x92775802 ($0.62M), kBTC/WETH 0x5697efeb ($0.60M), kBTC/USD₮0 0.167% ($0.23M), and others under $40k each, plus kBTC/SolvBTC 0xca1b5790 ($1.54M, no 24h volume). Per-side balances: not verified in this review.
- Audits: docs.tydro.com/vi.-security/audit-reports, re-read 2026-11-07: Zellic Multiply (Aug 2026), Zellic Payload/Economic Review (Aug 2026), LlamaRisk kBTC parameter review (Aug 2026), and Aave V3 base audits (OpenZeppelin, Trail of Bits, ABDK, PeckShield, SigmaPrime, Certora; 2021 to 2022). Nothing dated after 2026-09-30. Audit of the live Pool revision: not verified in this review. Bug bounty: the page says one exists and to reach out via official channels; platform and size not verified in this review. DeFiLlama audits: 0.
- Bad debt:
getReserveDeficit: USD₮0 0.027592, GHO 0.046337, all others 0. Identical to September. - Incentives: INK token: no confirmed launch date found this run, not verified in this review.
- Recent-news scan: Binance hot-wallet drain began at 20:24 UTC on 2026-10-29 (The Coin Republic). DeFiLlama hacks entry "Binance CEX", $6.36B, chains Ethereum, Bitcoin, TRON, Avalanche, Optimism, Arbitrum, Base; no Ink. Aave DAO froze 175 V3 reserves across 16 networks and 117 V4 reserves; the coverage we read does not mention Ink or Tydro. Tydro's freeze was signed by its own emergency Safe. Tydro on X, 2026-10-29 23:03 UTC: markets frozen "out of an abundance of caution surrounding recent reported exploits", with repayments, withdrawals and liquidations continuing; 2026-10-30 13:32 UTC: markets unfrozen with LTV left at 0 until reset; 2026-10-30 14:25 UTC: parameters "restored ... to their pre-freeze state, including LTVs," with the USDC borrow cap "lowered until Binance confirms full isolation of the impact"; 2026-10-31 16:49 UTC: cap "set to $75m." DeFiLlama hacks list: no Tydro entry (latest entry 2026-11-05). Whether the Binance attacker interacted with Tydro on Ink: none found, not verified in this review.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.