TL;DR
Two of the September questions now have on-chain answers. One answer is good news and the other is not.
The good news is the cold side. In September we could not tell who controls the cold Vault і куратор Спільний пул депозитів, яким керує код або куратор. Куратор вирішує, у які ринки підуть ваші кошти, і встановлює ліміти, а за це бере комісію.. Now we can. The USDC cold vault 5kwCMKjE... derives exactly as the Squads v4 vault (index 0) of the Мультипідпис (multisig) Гаманець, де транзакцію мають підписати кілька власників ключів, наприклад 5 із 9. Безпечніший за один ключ, але залежить від того, хто ці ключі тримає. J3UwXvVe.... The SOL cold vault 8nFeyzTF... derives exactly as the vault of the sibling multisig J3qeuKSS.... Both multisigs need 4 of the same 6 members, and neither has a config authority. Each cold-to-hot refill we checked went through a Squads VaultTransactionExecute: 1,000,000 USDC on 8 September and 2,000,000 USDC on 14 October. This setup is not new; the September refill already used it. We had simply not verified it. About 94% of deposits sit behind a quorum, not one key.
The quorum has an exception. The USDC multisig carries a Squads spending limit of 1,000,000 USDC per day. Its only member is B2ufqHxB..., an ordinary key, and its only allowed destination is the hot bridge. That one key can move up to 1M USDC a day out of cold storage without a vote. It cannot send the money anywhere except the hot bridge.
The bad news is that the parts that handle money every minute did not change:
- The upgrade authority of the program that holds the hot balance is still the ordinary on-curve key
BzZgjpBFHb19vWjBRoM5eVy6qnUjbGH5tMJrnN7cA47a. - The ordinary key
FHFvAvN1F6wzBGVwnAFM4kJ26BmM8rq1f7zhpTewnQ8rsigned 1,000 transactions between 22 October and today. The one we decoded, at 17:49 UTC, was aBatchWithdrawit signed alone, moving 765.25 USDC. - The Squads time lock is 0 seconds on both multisigs, although the Fund Security page promises a time-locked execution period.
- The docs still say Closed Beta.
We found no incident, ADL, bad debt or token in the period.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Nothing new. The Аудит Перевірка коду протоколу незалежною компанією з безпеки. Її мета: виявити критичні проблеми, через які користувачі можуть втратити кошти. page on docs.pacifica.fi still links one report: the BlockSec Безстроковий ф'ючерс (perp) Ф'ючерс без дати експірації. Його ціну тримає біля спотової фандинг, який лонги й шорти регулярно платять одне одному. Contracts audit of 24 April 2025. It covers perp-contracts/programs/pacifica-mainnet/src/lib.rs and found 2 Low issues, 4 recommendations and 2 notes. Items 1 to 6 are marked Confirmed. In BlockSec's terms that means the client acknowledged them, not that they were fixed. BlockSec's repository also holds a separate Bridge Contract report dated 1 April 2026. The main program PCFA5iYg... has never been upgraded. Its program data still records deploy slot 343778047 (31 May 2025), and only two signatures exist in its history. The source repositories are private, so no build ties the audited commit to the deployed bytecode. We found no audit of the matching engine, the Оракул Джерело цін, за яким протокол оцінює заставу. Хибна чи маніпульована ціна може спричинити несправедливі ліквідації або пропустити погані позики., Ліквідація Коли позика перевищує LLTV або позиції на біржі бракує маржі, її примусово закривають і продають заставу, зазвичай зі штрафом., the money market or the vaults.
Admin control. This dimension changed the most, and only in part.
On the cold side, both vaults are Squads v4 (SQDS4ep6...) vault PDAs. We derived them from the multisig addresses ourselves. The USDC multisig has made 21 transactions and the SOL multisig 5. Both are 4-of-6, with the same six members holding full permissions on each. The config authority is unset, so changing members takes a vote. Two of the members, B2ufqHxB... and GPoL2XDs..., executed the refills.
The USDC multisig also holds one SpendingLimit account (1X2xSvWW...):
- 1,000,000 USDC per day from vault 0
- one member,
B2ufqHxB..., which is on curve - one destination, the hot bridge
72R843Xw...
The account still shows the full 1,000,000 available and a last reset of 7 November 2025, which reads as unused since then. The two refills above used full votes. The limit matches the docs' description of cold refilling hot "through programmatic spending limits". It contradicts another line on the same page, which says no single party can move funds out of cold storage on its own.
On 23 October a second Pacifica program, pCfAcxHSHgntL64c8DTE4uGKWgKDbJdighG1cFNsH4C, moved behind the SOL cold-vault multisig. That program was last deployed on 28 May 2026 and has 13 transactions. Its previous upgrade authority, the ordinary key 3X1NDhAv..., handed the authority to 8nFeyzTF.... Two minutes later the multisig executed the program's own AcceptOwnership instruction, so its in-program owner moved as well. What this program does is not verified in this review. It is the first time we have seen Pacifica put an upgrade key behind a multisig, and it was not the main program.
PCFA5iYg... is still upgraded by BzZgjpBF.... That key is on curve, is also stored as admin in central_state, and last signed on 8 April 2026. The withdrawal key FHFvAvN1... is on curve, sits in central_state, and acts on the hot bridge through a Pacifica PDA. The Squads spending limit does not bound it, because that limit governs only refills from cold. BlockSec note 2.3.1 still applies: an account with withdraw_authority can withdraw user assets from the vault without limit.
A correction to our September appendix. The central_state field at offset 72 is not an address. Its first 16 bytes are two counters, which went from 74,662 and 149,156 on 19 September to 77,968 and 153,450 today. The last 16 bytes have not changed. Read as base58, the field looks like a different "key" at every reading. Nothing in it changed hands.
Four doc claims fail on chain:
- The upgrade authority is "distributed across multi-sig participants". For the main program it is not.
- Changes to withdrawal authorities or spending limits require "a time-locked execution period". The time lock is 0.
- The cold vault "cannot send funds to arbitrary addresses". The spending-limit path can reach only the hot bridge, but a 4-of-6 vote can send anywhere.
- The hot signer is bounded by the Squads spending limit. It is not; the hot account belongs to a Pacifica PDA.
Who the six members are, and whether they are independent of the team, is not verified in this review.
Oracle. Re-read in the docs this run, and unchanged. Pacifica updates its oracle every 3 seconds as a weighted average of USDT prices from Binance (weight 2) and OKX, Bybit and Hyperliquid (1 each). The mark price is the median of three inputs: that oracle, the median of the venue's own best bid, best ask and last trade, and perp prices on major exchanges. There is no third-party feed and no on-chain attestation. The API returns a separate oracle price for each market. SOL read oracle 89.874 against a mark of 89.84.
Liquidity & exit. Trading Ліквідність Скільки можна продати чи вивести просто зараз, не зсуваючи ціну й не чекаючи. Мала ліквідність означає повільний або дорогий вихід. grew. The API lists 79 markets (77 in September), with about $1.03B of 24h volume and about $112.7M of open interest. By market, 24h volume was:
| Market | 24h volume |
|---|---|
| BTC | $592M |
| ETH | $313M |
| SOL | $81.6M |
| HYPE | $16.8M |
Getting money out still depends entirely on the engine. The Deposits & Withdrawals page caps withdrawals at $500,000 per account per 24 hours "during Closed Beta". It adds a $500,000 per-asset daily cap on spot and an exchange-wide cap whose value is not published. It documents no permissionless exit.
The hot buffer is larger than in September. Hot USDC is 1,205,538 against 456,758 then, after the 2M refill on 14 October, so about 5.2% of USDC is hot. SOL still has no cold reserve. The hot bridge holds 1,670.29 SOL (down from 4,577.40). The cold vault holds 0.501 SOL, which is a 0.5 SOL top-up, not a reserve.
The Liquidations page, re-read this run, still describes three tiers: market liquidation, then a backstop liquidator, then auto-deleveraging. It still does not mention an insurance fund.
Yield: real vs emission. Nothing changed. On both of our legs, HYPE and SOL, funding and the next funding print are both +0.0000125 per hour. Longs pay our shorts about +10.95% a year, simple. Both markets sit on exactly the same figure, which reads as a baseline rate rather than a premium, so treat it as today's print, not a forecast. The points program has paid 10M points a week since 4 September 2025. A third-party review dated 13 October reports no snapshot and no TGE date.
Holder concentration. Still no token. DefiLlama shows gecko_id None, cmcId None and symbol "-". The X scan found no official TGE announcement. Anything trading under a PACIFICA ticker is not this venue's token.
Track record. Clean through 6 November. api.llama.fi/hacks has 1,339 rows and no Pacifica entry. An X scan from 19 September to 6 November found no outage, withdrawal halt, ADL, bad debt, exploit, TGE or exit from beta. On chain, the withdrawal key signs about 65 times a day over the last two weeks, so withdrawals are moving.
Against that, Pacifica has been on mainnet since June 2025 and is still in Closed Beta by its own docs. The only disclosed incident on record is still the 21 January 2026 leak at Mithril, a third-party bot builder. Pacifica says it did not affect its users. Watch for the name when you search: a California city, Pacific Life and others are also called Pacifica.
Worst case
The worst case is narrower than in September. Then we could not rule out that one compromised key reached the whole cold balance. Now we can: the cold USDC sits in a Squads vault, and the main program's upgrade key does not control it. Three scenarios remain.
- One key.
FHFvAvN1...reaches the hot side: 1,205,538 USDC plus 1,670 SOL, about $1.36M, or 5.8% of TVL Загальна заблокована вартість: сума всіх депозитів у протоколі чи пулі в доларах. Показує розмір, а не безпеку.. It needs no upgrade. It can run the sameBatchWithdrawit runs all day. - Two keys. If
B2ufqHxB...is also compromised, it can refill the hot bridge with up to 1M USDC a day from cold, andFHFvAvN1...can drain it. That reaches hot plus 1M per day, until four members revoke the limit. - Four of six members. With a zero time lock there would be no window to exit, and we do not know whether the six members are independent people or team devices.
The more likely scenario needs no attacker. The engine stops or slows in the hour SOL or HYPE moves hard. Both showcase shorts are on this one venue and both hedges are elsewhere. While the long legs reprice, you cannot close, add Маржа Застава, яка тримає позицію на біржі відкритою. Коли збитки зменшують її до мінімуму, який вимагає біржа, позицію ліквідують. or withdraw. The third liquidation tier, ADL, closes profitable opposing positions, and in a sharp drop those are our shorts. No insurance fund is described.
Marks at 18:00 UTC: HYPE $77.91, SOL $89.84. Current position sizes and margin are not verified in this review.
Bottom line
By the gate alone, this is avoid. The published verdict is caution, under the curator policy of 2026-10-03: a decentralised perp venue is published no lower than caution unless it has an unrepaid loss, and we found none.
Two reds remain:
- Admin control: the ordinary keys on the hot side (upgrade, unlimited withdrawal), plus one key that can pull 1M USDC a day from cold into hot.
- Liquidity & exit: money leaves only through the engine.
What moved is verifiability. The cold vaults are a real 4-of-6 multisig. On 23 October the team showed it knows how to put an upgrade key behind a multisig, but it did so for a side program.
Four steps would lift Admin control to yellow:
- move
PCFA5iYg...under the same Squads vault - set a non-zero time lock, as the docs promise
- put the spending limit behind more than one key, or publish who holds it
- publish who the six members are
The practical advice is unchanged. Keep the position small, and split the shorts across two venues so one failure does not unhedge both pairs at once.
Data appendix
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TVL: $23,352,043 (
api.llama.fi/protocol/pacifica, last point;/tvl/pacificareturned 23,355,573 minutes later). All of it is in thepacifica-bridgechild; perps and spot show $0.- On-chain check: 22,000,000.00 USDC cold in
FvGqozih...(authority5kwCMKjE...), 1,205,538.01 USDC hot in72R843Xw...(authority9Gdmhq4G..., the Pacificacentral_state), and 1,670.288 SOL in9sSr35zw...at $89.58. Total $23,355,162, within 0.02% of DefiLlama. - On 2026-09-19 TVL was about $25.0M (24M cold, 456.8k hot, 4,577.4 SOL).
- DefiLlama restructured the protocol into a parent with children. The new series has 26 points starting 2026-10-13, its peak at $27,195,440, so TVL is down 14.1% since then. Against the old series' ATH of $46.77M (January 2026), it is about 50% lower. 90d change on the new series: not verified in this review.
- On-chain check: 22,000,000.00 USDC cold in
-
Hot / cold: USDC is about 5.2% hot.
- Cold-to-hot refills went through Squads
VaultTransactionExecute: 1,000,000 USDC on 2026-09-08 (executorGPoL2XDs...) and 2,000,000 USDC on 2026-10-14 (executorB2ufqHxB...). - Squads
SpendingLimit1X2xSvWWuNgNPdkTU2QHFjjKKWbcjNsgzEjjqE6iRKMon the USDC multisig: mint USDC, vault 0, 1,000,000 per day (period 1), remaining 1,000,000, last reset 2025-11-07. Sole memberB2ufqHxBQXE27ja5kvv7GKJJP4nqdSHHnLtatRSdHUtU(on curve). Sole destination72R843Xw.... - SOL cold vault
8nFeyzTF...holds 0.501 SOL. Hot SOL fell from 4,577.40 to 1,670.29; the reason is not verified in this review.
- Cold-to-hot refills went through Squads
-
Audits: Two BlockSec reports, both in BlockSec's GitHub repository and no other firms:
- Perp Contracts, 2025-04-24:
raw.githubusercontent.com/blocksecteam/audit-reports/main/rust/blocksec_pacifica_fi_perp_contracts_signed_20250424.pdf, the only link ondocs.pacifica.fi/other/audits.md. - Bridge Contract, 2026-04-01.
No new audits found. Whether the Low findings were fixed, and whether the deployed code matches the audited commit: not verified in this review.
- Perp Contracts, 2025-04-24:
-
Admin / governance:
- Main program
PCFA5iYgmqK6MqPhWNKg7Yv7auX7VZ4Cx7T1eJyrAMH: program dataFC5zcmPm..., deploy slot 343778047 (2025-05-31), two signatures in its history. Upgrade authorityBzZgjpBFHb19vWjBRoM5eVy6qnUjbGH5tMJrnN7cA47a: on curve, unchanged, last signature 2026-04-08. central_state9Gdmhq4G...(185 bytes, discriminatorc93123e704a4cd5b): offset 8 holdsBzZgjpBF...; offset 40 holdsFHFvAvN1...(on curve). Offset 72 is not a pubkey: two u64 counters (74,662 and 149,156 on 2026-09-19; 77,968 and 153,450 now) plus 16 constant bytes. Offsets 104 and 136 are unchanged; their roles are not verified in this review.FHFvAvN1...: 1,000 signatures from 2026-10-22 08:22 to 2026-11-06 18:00 UTC, none failed. Decoded sample: tx5F7ugqby..., sole signer,BatchWithdraw, 765.25 USDC out of72R843Xw....- Squads v4 multisigs:
J3UwXvVeGZwGePrCx8daSgqy5j3jnqrkq1M8rt5fvEZN(USDC cold; vault 0 =5kwCMKjE...; tx_index 21) andJ3qeuKSSFywqHvXaXskbN4Gi3h4uJBikugwxY3ymc2Tb(SOL cold; vault 0 =8nFeyzTF...; tx_index 5). Both: threshold 4, time_lock 0, config_authority unset, six members with permissions 7:9XsKcGWJ...,B2ufqHxB...,BB5sAGqW...,DqsSok56...,F65mMxzS...,GPoL2XDs.... Member identities: not verified in this review. - Side program
pCfAcxHSHgntL64c8DTE4uGKWgKDbJdighG1cFNsH4C: last deploy 2026-05-28, 13 signatures. On 2026-10-23 its loader authority went from3X1NDhAv...(on curve) to8nFeyzTF...(tx4eQtWhnW...). Then Squads, with executorF65mMxzS..., ran itsAcceptOwnership(tx3TJLEWJc...). Its function: not verified in this review.
- Main program
-
Oracle: Re-read 2026-11-06. Pacifica-computed, 3-second updates, CEX weights Binance 2 and OKX, Bybit, Hyperliquid 1 each. Mark is the median of oracle, own book and external perps. No third-party feed.
-
Liquidations: Re-read 2026-11-06. Three tiers: market liquidation, then a backstop liquidator below two-thirds of maintenance margin, then auto-deleveraging of profitable opposing positions. No insurance fund described.
-
Market and funding:
api.pacifica.fi/api/v1/info/prices: 79 markets, 24h volume about $1,031M, OI about $112.7M (open_interest × mark). HYPE mark 77.906, SOL mark 89.84. Funding and next_funding are 0.0000125 on both. Max Кредитне плече Позика, щоб тримати позицію, більшу за ваш капітал. Із плечем 3x на кожен ваш $1 припадає $3 позиції, і прибуток, збиток та ризик ліквідації ростуть разом. is 20x on both. -
Withdrawals: $500k per account per 24h for USDC "during Closed Beta", $500k per asset per day for spot, an exchange-wide cap whose value is not published, and a $1 fee. Permissionless exit: none documented.
-
Holder concentration: No token (DefiLlama
gecko_idNone,cmcIdNone, symbol "-"). No TGE date per the X scan and a third-party review of 13 October. not verified in this review at launch. -
Recent news / incidents:
api.llama.fi/hackshas 1,339 rows, 0 of them Pacifica. X Search from 2026-09-19 to 2026-11-06 found no outage, withdrawal halt, ADL, bad debt, exploit, TGE or beta exit. The only disclosed incident remains the Mithril leak of 2026-01-21 (third party). -
Owned position: Two shorts, HYPE and SOL, which make up 100% of the portfolio's short side on this venue. Current sizes, equity, margin and liquidation prices: not verified in this review.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.