TL;DR
Kelp issues rsETH, a LST і LRT LST: токен ліквідного стейкінгу, застейканий актив, який можна продати чи внести в лендинг (jitoSOL, stHYPE). LRT ще й у рестейкінгу: дохідність і ризик вищі.. You deposit ETH or a liquid staking token, Kelp restakes it through EigenLayer, and you hold a tradeable claim. On April 18, 2026 an attacker forged a cross-chain message on rsETH's LayerZero bridge and released about 116,500 rsETH with nothing behind it, roughly $292M. The bridge trusted a single verifier.
This run we re-read everything on-chain, and a few things changed. The LayerZero adapter on Ethereum now has one live peer, Arbitrum, down from four. Mantle, Base and Ink no longer have peers set. The adapter's locked balance fell from 28,971 to 16,987 rsETH. Arbitrum still requires four verifiers on both send and receive. That is real progress toward retiring the bridge that failed.
Some things did not change. The adapter is still owned by a 3-of-6 Safe with no Таймлок Обов'язкова затримка між рішенням адміністратора змінити протокол і самою зміною. За цей час користувачі можуть вивести кошти, якщо не згодні.. The same Safe now visibly runs a newer power on the token itself: on 2026-10-30 it froze rsETH transfers for one address for 24 hours. Aave keeps rsETH frozen at 0% LTV і LLTV LTV: частка позики від вартості застави. LLTV: LTV, за якого позицію ліквідують. Різниця між ними і є вашим запасом до ліквідації. on every market we read, and Aave's Ethereum Core reserve holds 84% of all rsETH. Deposits fell another 10% in ETH terms. So the rating stays avoid.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. No change since the last report. There are five Sigma Prime reports, from June 2024 to June 2025, and a Code4rena contest from November 2023. The core contracts were not what failed. This run found no Аудит Перевірка коду протоколу незалежною компанією з безпеки. Її мета: виявити критичні проблеми, через які користувачі можуть втратити кошти. published after the exploit and no independent review of the CCIP path (not verified in this review). One thing is new to us. The live rsETH implementation (0x7159...7783) carries three newer controls: per-address transfer blocks (blockUserTransfers), a recoverFrozenFunds function that moves a blocked address's balance to a custody address, and a daily mint cap. The custody address is the 6-of-11 Safe, and the cap reads 5,000 rsETH per day. When these shipped, and whether an audit covers them, is not verified in this review. Yellow.
Admin control. The core still holds up. The rsETH admin slot points to ProxyAdmin 0xb61e...dc78. Its owner is TimelockController 0x49bd...35b1, and the minimum delay is still 864,000 seconds, or 10 days. The proposer Safe is still 6-of-11.
The bridge still does not sit behind any of that. The rsETH OFT adapter's owner() and its LayerZero endpoint delegate are both Safe 0xcbcd...29a1. That Safe is still 3-of-6, with no guard and no modules. Four of its six signers also sign on the 6-of-11 core Safe, so the two keys are less independent than they look. This Safe is also Kelp's day-to-day operator. Its recent transactions call the withdrawal manager's unlockQueue every few days. At 03:57 UTC on 2026-10-30 it called blockUserTransfers on rsETH, blocking address 0xa97b...8d10 until the next day. That address holds no rsETH today. We do not know why it was blocked, so the reason is not verified in this review. The fact is that three signers, with no delay, can freeze any holder's rsETH. We could not confirm which role may call recoverFrozenFunds (not verified in this review).
The last report said this dimension leaves red only when the adapter's ownership moves behind the timelock or an audited CCIP cutover retires the adapter. Neither has happened. The adapter still holds 16,987 rsETH, about $41M. Red.
Oracle. The NAV Оракул Джерело цін, за яким протокол оцінює заставу. Хибна чи маніпульована ціна може спричинити несправедливі ліквідації або пропустити погані позики., LRTOracle.rsETHPrice(), reads 1.083939 ETH, up from 1.081227. Multiplied by 346,970 rsETH, that implies 376,094 ETH, or about $843.6M at $2,243. DeFiLlama counts $844.7M, a 0.13% gap. Both numbers start from Kelp's own on-chain holdings, so this is a consistency check, not an outside attestation.
On the bridge, we scanned LayerZero endpoint IDs 30100 to 30439 and found a peer only for Arbitrum (30110). On Arbitrum both the receive and send configs require four DVNs with 64 confirmations and no optional verifiers, the same four DVNs as in October. Mantle (30181), Base (30184) and Ink (30339) now read zero. When those peers were removed, and what carries rsETH to those chains now, are not verified in this review. Base still has wrsETH, since Aave Base holds 11,347 of it. The likely answer is Chainlink CCIP, but we did not confirm it on-chain. Three signers can still change the Arbitrum verifier setup. Yellow.
Liquidity & exit. We read all five Aave V3 markets live today. Ethereum Core: LTV 0, Ліквідація Коли позика перевищує LLTV або позиції на біржі бракує маржі, її примусово закривають і продають заставу, зазвичай зі штрафом. threshold 75%, borrowing disabled, frozen, not paused. Prime: LTV 0, frozen, reserve liquidation threshold 0.10%. Arbitrum (wrsETH): LTV 0, frozen, threshold 0.10%. Base (wrsETH): LTV 0, frozen, threshold 0.10%. Linea: LTV 0, frozen, threshold 73%. The Ethereum Core state matches what we read on August 11 and October 2, and it still holds six and a half months after the exploit. This is the first run that read the other four markets. E-mode Режим ефективності в Aave: вищий LTV, коли застава й позика рухаються разом, як ETH і wstETH чи два стейблкоїни. Дозволяє більше плече в лупінгу. parameters were not read, so we make no claim about liquidation risk for existing E-mode positions (not verified in this review).
Kelp's own exit path works. The deposit pool, token and withdrawal manager all report paused() false. Requests not yet unlocked are small: 13 ETH requests, 46 stETH and 1 ETHx. About 8,146 ETH-equivalent is committed in the withdrawal manager, and the operator Safe processed batches on November 4 and 5. The full timing, including EigenLayer's escrow, is still 7 to 10 days per the earlier report (not verified in this review on current docs). You can get NAV, slowly. You still cannot use rsETH as fresh collateral at the largest lender. Red.
Yield: real vs emission. The yield comes from ETH consensus staking plus EigenLayer restaking rewards, with no Емісія і поінти Емісія: нові токени, якими протокол платить винагороди; вони входять у дохідність. Поінти в дохідність не включаємо. mirage. A third-party tracker listed about 3.49% APY Річна дохідність зі складними відсотками, тобто з реінвестуванням доходу. Більшість таблиць на сайті показує APY, а фандинг і vaults бірж показано як APR. on November 6 (not verified in this review against DeFiLlama yields). rsETH carries layered slashing risk: Ethereum consensus slashing plus slashing on each AVS its operators secure. The current AVS set is not verified in this review. Green.
Holder concentration. This finding is new and it is the largest one this run. The Aave V3 Ethereum Core aToken for rsETH (0x2d62...d7b1) holds 290,730 rsETH. That is 83.8% of the 346,970 supply, sitting in a frozen reserve. The adapter holds another 4.9%. That leaves about 39,250 rsETH, about 11% of supply, outside those two contracts. How many wallets own those aTokens is not verified in this review, because Etherscan's holder endpoint needs a paid tier. If a handful of Looping Депозит, позика під нього, купівля ще застави, і так кілька разів. Множить різницю між дохідністю та ставкою позики, а з нею й ризик ліквідації. positions own most of it, their unwind decides the token's Ліквідність Скільки можна продати чи вивести просто зараз, не зсуваючи ціну й не чекаючи. Мала ліквідність означає повільний або дорогий вихід.. Supply fell 9.8% since October 2. Red.
Track record. One catastrophic event, now six and a half months old. About $292M of unbacked rsETH was released on 2026-04-18 and attributed to North Korea's Lazarus Group. Kelp said on May 25 that recovery was complete and backing was back to 100%. Our backing check agrees at the mainnet level. DeFiLlama's hacks list has no new Kelp entry since April. The September 15 incident, about 2,900 rsETH taken from a user's Safe through that Safe's own module, did not involve Kelp's contracts.
Binance lost about $6.36B on 2026-10-29. We found no report linking rsETH to it. Kelp's single address block came the next morning, and we could not establish whether the two are connected. Kelp's developer, Evercrest Technologies, sued LayerZero Labs in the BC Supreme Court on September 24. We did not check where that suit stands (not verified in this review). Red.
Worst case
Unbacked rsETH appears again, and the token loses its ETH Пег і депег Пег, або прив'язка: цільова ціна стейблкоїна, зазвичай $1. Депег: відхилення від неї, найчастіше вниз. Сторінка стейблів перевіряє ціни кожні 5 хв.. The direct route is unchanged. Three of the six signers on the operator Safe, or someone who compromises them, weaken the Arbitrum verifier setup or re-add a peer with a weak setup. A forged message then releases the 16,987 rsETH the adapter holds. No 10-day window gives anyone time to react.
A second route goes through the new freeze power. That same 3-of-6 Safe can block any holder's transfers without delay, and a recovery function can move frozen balances to the custody Safe. Used well, it stops a thief. Used by a compromised signer set, it can trap honest holders.
The quieter risk is a concentration unwind. 84% of rsETH sits in a frozen Aave reserve. If those positions are pushed to exit, through governance tightening parameters or through their own choice, the queue lengthens and the secondary price can gap below NAV for days.
Bottom line
Avoid, unchanged. No red cleared. The bridge is visibly shrinking: one live LayerZero peer instead of four, 41% less rsETH locked in the adapter, and four required verifiers on the path that remains. Backing reconciles within 0.13% and the market price is 0.26% under NAV.
The gate still fails on fund-loss surfaces. The bridge owner and the new freeze power both sit with a 3-of-6 Safe and no timelock. Aave has frozen rsETH at 0% LTV on all five markets we read, and that frozen Ethereum reserve holds 84% of the token. In ETH terms, assets fell from about 416,000 to 376,000 ETH in five weeks. USD TVL Загальна заблокована вартість: сума всіх депозитів у протоколі чи пулі в доларах. Показує розмір, а не безпеку. fell about 26% because ETH also fell about 18%.
These would move this to caution, each checkable on-chain: adapter ownership and delegate move behind the timelock, or the adapter is retired with an audited CCIP path. Aave restores a non-zero LTV on native rsETH. Holder distribution of the Aave position is shown not to be a few wallets, and the incident-free record runs through Q1 2027.
Data appendix
- TVL: Parent
parent#kelp-daois about $868.5M, read 2026-11-07 09:30 UTC: kelp $844.10M (Ethereum), gain $23.21M and kernel $1.23M (BSC). This runapi.llama.fi/protocol/kelpread $844.7M. The prior report read $1,142.9M on 2026-10-02, so USD TVL is down 26.1%. ETH went from about $2,744 at the prior read to $2,243 (CoinGecko), down about 18%. In ETH terms, implied assets went from 416,048 to 376,094 ETH, down 9.6%. ATH $2,094.2M on 2025-09-18. - Deposits in token terms (DeFiLlama): 2026-10-02 to today. stETH 219,353 to 186,256 (down 15.1%). ETHx 50,225 to 41,932 (down 16.5%). ETH 143,686 to 143,666 (flat). Total 413,264 to 371,854 (down 10.0%).
- Peg and backing:
LRTOracle.rsETHPrice()(0x349A...020d) = 1.083939 ETH. CoinGecko: about 1.0811 ETH, $2,425, a 0.26% discount. Implied 346,969.9 x 1.083939 = 376,094 ETH, about $843.6M, against DeFiLlama's $844.7M. L2-side wrsETH supply against the adapter lock and any CCIP pools: not verified in this review. - Supply:
totalSupply()346,969.9 rsETH, down 9.8% from 384,792 on 2026-10-02. Daily mint capmaxMintAmountPerDay()= 5,000 rsETH.custodyAddress()= 6-of-11 Safe 0xb369...a46d. - Admin, core (on-chain): rsETH 0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7, implementation 0x7159107483e623707c18c6e06cbc095bd0717783. ProxyAdmin 0xb61e0e39b6d4030c36a176f576aabe44bf59dc78, owned by TimelockController 0x49bd9989e31ad35b0a62c20be86335196a3135b1,
getMinDelay()= 864,000s. Proposer Safe 0xb3696a817d01c8623e66d156b6798291fa10a46d: threshold 6, 11 owners, nonce 169. Upgrades or role changes since 2026-10-02: none seen in what we read, full event history not verified in this review. - Admin, bridge (on-chain): OFT adapter 0x85d456B2DfF1fd8245387C0BfB64Dfb700e98Ef3.
owner()and endpointdelegates()= Safe 0xcbcdd778aa25476f203814214dd3e9b9c46829a1: threshold 3, 6 owners, no guard, no modules, nonce 2080. Owners 0xfcc1...9dfd, 0x51c5...c9f3, 0x6017...2a7c, 0xb859...d306, 0x7aad...af47, 0xa85b...9fc1. Four of these (fcc1, 51c5, b859, a85b) are also owners of the 6-of-11 Safe. The adapter holds 16,987.2 rsETH (4.9% of supply), down from 28,970.6. - Bridge verifier config (on-chain): Endpoint IDs 30100 to 30439 scanned, and only Arbitrum (30110, peer = wrsETH 0x4186...b41f) is set. Mantle, Base, Ink, Optimism and Unichain read zero. Arbitrum receive (lib 0xc02a...24c2) and send (lib 0xbb2e...dce1): 64 confirmations, 4 required DVNs, 0 optional. DVNs 0x3802...f20d, 0x589d...236b, 0xa4fe...c2cd and 0xd56e...c7cc. Date of peer removal, DVN operator identities and remote-side config: not verified in this review.
- Freeze power (on-chain): Tx 0x660aef0b...1f2b, 2026-10-30 03:57:35 UTC, submitted by signer 0x7aad...af47 through Safe 0xcbcd:
blockUserTransfers([0xa97bf7836f8a08f9ed91d41453d371493fae8d10]).transfersBlockedUntil= 2026-10-31 03:57 UTC. That address now holds 0 rsETH. The reason, and the role required forrecoverFrozenFunds: not verified in this review. - Withdrawal queue (on-chain): Manager 0x62de...ec16,
paused()false. ETH: nonces 7,182 locked and 7,195 used (13 pending), 1,159.9 committed. stETH: 7,849 and 7,895 (46 pending), 6,975.6 committed. ETHx: 1,370 and 1,371 (1 pending), 10.7 committed. The Safe calledunlockQueueon 2026-11-04 and 2026-11-05. - Aave status (on-chain, all via the PoolAddressesProvider data provider): Ethereum Core: LTV 0, LT 7500, bonus 10750, borrowing off, frozen, not paused, supply cap 530,000, aToken supply 290,730 rsETH. Prime: LTV 0, LT 10, frozen, 5.04 rsETH supplied. Arbitrum: LTV 0, LT 10, frozen, 16,466 wrsETH. Base: LTV 0, LT 10, frozen, 11,347 wrsETH. Linea: LTV 0, LT 7300, frozen, 564 wrsETH. The EtherFi market does not list rsETH. E-mode parameters: not verified in this review. No governance post unfreezing rsETH was found this run.
- Bailout and recovery: Kelp said on 2026-05-25 that the restoration was complete, and the Aave-led "DeFi United" relief effort funded it (Cointelegraph, The Defiant). An earlier report cited a remaining shortfall of about 76,127 rsETH pending an Arbitrum DAO release of frozen ETH. We consider that superseded by the May 25 statement and our backing check, but final accounting is not verified in this review.
- Audits: Sigma Prime (five reports, June 2024 to June 2025) and Code4rena (November 2023). No post-exploit audit, no audit of the transfer-block code and no CCIP audit were found this run: not verified in this review.
- Holder concentration: The Aave Core aToken holds 83.8% of supply and the adapter 4.9% (on-chain), leaving about 39,250 rsETH outside both. Holders of the aToken: not verified in this review (Etherscan top-holders needs a Pro key).
- Recent news: No new Kelp entry on DeFiLlama's hacks list (read 2026-11-07). The Binance hot-wallet hack on 2026-10-29, about $6.36B, appears on that list with no rsETH link found. Evercrest Technologies' suit against LayerZero Labs (BC Supreme Court, filed 2026-09-24): current status not verified in this review. The CCIP migration was announced 2026-05-05, and we did not confirm completion. Spark had begun phasing out rsETH earlier in 2026.
- Incident (April): See the 2026-08-11 report. 2026-04-18, about $292M, 1-of-1 LayerZero DVN, Lazarus attribution.
- Slashing exposure / AVS set: not verified in this review. Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.