TL;DR
Kamino Lend holds $1.185B and is still the largest lending venue on Solana. Its lead over Jupiter Lend, at $927M, widened to 27.8% from 21%, even though Kamino's own TVL Загальна заблокована вартість: сума всіх депозитів у протоколі чи пулі в доларах. Показує розмір, а не безпеку. fell 14.2% since the September report. Our rough estimate puts around 60% of that fall on SOL's price, which dropped 19.0% over the same span. The rest looks like net outflow; we did not measure flows directly.
The admin picture held up under re-measurement. The upgrade authority is the same program-derived address under the same 5-of-10 Squads Мультипідпис (multisig) Гаманець, де транзакцію мають підписати кілька власників ключів, наприклад 5 із 9. Безпечніший за один ключ, але залежить від того, хто ці ключі тримає. with a 24 hour Таймлок Обов'язкова затримка між рішенням адміністратора змінити протокол і самою зміною. За цей час користувачі можуть вивести кошти, якщо не згодні.. Every one of the 14 proposals executed since September respected that delay, including the 2026-10-26 upgrades that redeployed both the lending and Vault і куратор Спільний пул депозитів, яким керує код або куратор. Куратор вирішує, у які ринки підуть ваші кошти, і встановлює ліміти, а за це бере комісію. programs.
The problem from September is still there. We re-read Kamino's source at release 1.28.0, tagged today, and Ліквідація Коли позика перевищує LLTV або позиції на біржі бракує маржі, її примусово закривають і продають заставу, зазвичай зі штрафом. still requires only three of the six price checks. The TWAP divergence guard that stops you borrowing on a bad wick does not stop you being liquidated on one. Two things got slightly worse. The Аудит Перевірка коду протоколу незалежною компанією з безпеки. Її мета: виявити критичні проблеми, через які користувачі можуть втратити кошти. gap grew to eleven releases past the last audited lending version. The bug bounty also moved to a new platform with a lower cap.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. The official audits repository holds 43 reports across six firms: Certora, OtterSec, Offside Labs, Sec3, Ackee Blockchain and RX Security. Certora and OtterSec both contribute formal verification. This is still deeper coverage than most lenders anywhere. The one report added since September, pushed 2026-10-27, is an OtterSec audit of the separate Ліквідність Скільки можна продати чи вивести просто зараз, не зсуваючи ціну й не чекаючи. Мала ліквідність означає повільний або дорогий вихід. product, not the lending program. The newest lending reports still cover version 1.17.0, a commit from 2026-03-31. Lending master now reads 1.28.0, with 1.26.0, 1.27.0 and 1.28.0 all tagged since our last report, so eleven releases sit between the audited code and the head of the repo. The lending program was redeployed on chain 2026-10-26. We think that deploy is probably 1.27.0 (committed 2026-10-19), but the bytecode carries no version string and we could not prove it.
The bug bounty changed too. The Immunefi page we checked in September now returns 404. Kamino's docs point to a Sherlock program, live since 2026-10-16. It caps smart-contract theft at 10% of funds at risk up to $1M, down from $1.5M, and it states there are no minimum payouts, where the old program had a $150k critical floor. The audits repo's own SECURITY.md still sends researchers to the dead Immunefi link.
Admin control. We re-measured this on chain rather than carrying it over. Both programs are still upgradeable. Both still name GzFgdRJXmawPhGeBsyRCDLx4jAKPsvbUqoqitzppkzkW as upgrade authority. Recomputing the Squads v4 vault derivation reproduces that address at index 0, bump 250, of multisig 6hhBGCtmg7tPWUSgp3LG6X2rsmYWAc4tNsA6G4CnfQbM. That multisig reads threshold 5, 10 members each holding all permissions, config authority unset and time lock 86400 seconds. Nothing changed except the transaction index, which moved from 96 to 110.
Proposals 97 to 110 all read Executed, with 5 approvals and no rejections or cancellations. Measured from the last approval signature to execution, the shortest wait was 24.2 hours (proposals 101 and 102). The lending redeploy, proposal 109, waited 78 hours. Proposal 107 executed to the second when the vaults program was last deployed (2026-10-26 12:14:12Z), and proposal 109 when the lending program was (17:11:59Z). The vaults program-data account also shows transactions on 10-01, 10-06, 10-08 and 10-13, each on the day proposals 97, 99, 101 and 103 executed.
The September caveats stand. Five keys can replace the code holding every deposit, and a 24 hour window only protects someone who is watching. The parameters that decide liquidations on Kamino's own primary market run through a different multisig, 7idEEVRidWrahZJhxXMqniDbV6ESj7ZjyLrigcMcEt6H. It is still 4 of 10 with a 43200 second lock, its transaction index has moved from 296 to 366, and nine of its ten signers also sit on the upgrade multisig.
Oracle. Still red, and re-read rather than assumed. Kamino-run markets price through Scope, its own aggregator over Pyth and Switchboard, which has its own audits. In programs/klend/src/state/last_update.rs on master (1.28.0), ALL_CHECKS is all six price-status flags. LIQUIDATION_CHECKS is still only PRICE_LOADED, PRICE_AGE_CHECKED and PRICE_USAGE_ALLOWED. In lending_operations.rs, assert_obligation_liquidatable checks the repay reserve, the withdraw reserve and the obligation against LIQUIDATION_CHECKS, while the borrow and withdraw-with-debt paths require ALL_CHECKS. In practice, a price the protocol considers too far from TWAP to lend against can still be used to liquidate you.
Feed choice and TWAP settings are per reserve and belong to whoever owns the market. Today that is mostly not Kamino. Of 668 reserves, 409 sit on markets owned by other keys, 231 on Kamino's two authorities, and 28 point at markets we did not decode. The new Sherlock bounty does not treat a trusted Оракул Джерело цін, за яким протокол оцінює заставу. Хибна чи маніпульована ціна може спричинити несправедливі ліквідації або пропустити погані позики. publishing a bad price as a qualifying bug. It does count Kamino mishandling price data, and it pays wrongful liquidations under the normal smart-contract categories. That is useful, but it is not a code change.
Liquidity & exit. TVL is $1,185,266,288, which is 35.1% of the $3.37B peak of 2025-10-07, down from 41.0% in September. The changes are -15.3% over 30 days, +15.5% over 90 and -50.0% over the year.
The main market was tested in late October. After the Binance hot-wallet theft on 2026-10-29, Kamino paused new borrowing in its SOL/BTC market (the renamed main market) at 22:03Z "out of an abundance of caution". It said it had no exposure, and its posts covered borrowing only, describing no limit on deposits or withdrawals. A news report on 2026-10-30 citing SolanaFloor says borrowing resumed that day; another report found no resumption announced as of 09:22Z, so the pause lasted somewhere between about 11 and 26 hours. On chain the primary market 7u3HeHxYDLhnCoErrtycNokbQYbWGzLs6JSDqGAv5PfF now reads borrow_disabled 0 and emergency mode 0. The same night Jupiter Lend queued withdrawals in a liquidity crunch. We found no comparable report for Kamino, but we did not sample Kamino's withdrawable liquidity at the time.
The curator's September report put the main market at 40% Частка позичених коштів Яку частину депозитів кредитного ринку позичено (утилізація). Коли вона близька до 100%, виведення може затриматися, а ставка позики різко зростає. and the Ethena market at 44%. USDC inside the main market touched 95.1% in the last days of September. Four markets now read emergency mode engaged, all owned by third parties: the three from September plus 6epKradsryNLSpYse3bgPzRf9pYJPxCesySB9iWMU9Bx. Two of the four also have borrowing disabled.
Yield: real vs emission. Real. Borrowers pay the interest, $4.72M of it in September per the curator report, plus vault and liquidity fees. Kamino Fixed Rates also launched in September, on the AUTO market from 2026-09-21 and then OnRe. KMNO rewards and points sit on top as a separate layer and should not be read into the base rate.
Holder concentration. KMNO circulating supply is 5,931,507,224 of the 10B cap (59.3% out). That is 361.6M more than in September. Unlock trackers report 229.17M KMNO unlocking on 2026-09-30 and again on 2026-10-30, which would add 458.3M. CoinGecko's supply figure does not reconcile with that, and we have not resolved the gap. Price is $0.03438, up 24% from $0.02773 on 2026-09-20, for a $203.9M market cap and $343.8M fully diluted. Insiders still hold 55% of supply (35% Key Stakeholders and Advisors, 20% Core Contributors) under a vesting schedule that trackers say runs to March 2027. Both multisigs have no config authority, so neither answers to a token vote. Top-holder distribution: not verified in this review.
Track record. Live since 2023-10-12. DefiLlama's hacks list now runs to 1340 rows with zero Kamino entries. The one row that names Kamino is the July 2026 Allbridge Core exploit, where Kamino was the flash-loan source and took no loss. Two recent rows belong to other protocols: Loopscale Lending paused on 2026-11-05 under an API attack campaign, and DefiTuna Lending was hit in July. Neither is Kamino. Kamino reported no exposure to the Binance theft, and its co-founder said the team blocked the attacker's SOL wallet within five minutes; that is their statement, not something we verified. The curator's September report shows 725 liquidations and $436.3K of collateral seized, with stress tests putting potential bad debt near zero down to a 30% price drop. No October risk report has been published yet.
Worst case
The cheap failure has not changed. A volatile hour prints a wick past a reserve's TWAP tolerance. Kamino correctly refuses new borrowing at that price but still liquidates at it, because the liquidation path skips the TWAP bit. Fast, permissionless liquidators take collateral from borrowers who were solvent at the reference price the protocol itself trusts. October 2025 showed the shape: SOL fell 14.2% and recovered inside one hour. Third-party analysis put about $1.08M of that night's Kamino liquidations as premature on a TWAP basis; we did not reproduce that figure. Depositors who only supply are mostly outside this. Borrowers and anyone running Kamino's Кредитне плече Позика, щоб тримати позицію, більшу за ваш капітал. Із плечем 3x на кожен ваш $1 припадає $3 позиції, і прибуток, збиток та ризик ліквідації ростуть разом. Looping Депозит, позика під нього, купівля ще застави, і так кілька разів. Множить різницю між дохідністю та ставкою позики, а з нею й ризик ліквідації. are inside it.
The expensive failure needs five of ten upgrade signers to collude or be compromised, queue a malicious upgrade and wait 24 hours. The delay has now been honoured on every observable proposal through 110, but nothing pushes a queued proposal to depositors.
Under both, curator markets are the product and they set their own feeds, LTV і LLTV LTV: частка позики від вартості застави. LLTV: LTV, за якого позицію ліквідують. Різниця між ними і є вашим запасом до ліквідації. and kill switches. Bad debt inside a K-Lend market is socialized across that market's lenders. There is no meaningful insurance fund. The new bounty pays nothing guaranteed below its caps.
Bottom line
Caution, for the same reason as September. The scale and the admin controls are good: the venue is bigger than its nearest rival by a wider Маржа Застава, яка тримає позицію на біржі відкритою. Коли збитки зменшують її до мінімуму, який вимагає біржа, позицію ліквідують., the timelock worked on 14 more proposals, and the October scare ended with borrowing on the main market restored the next day. Against that, the oracle asymmetry is still in the code as of today's release, the audited lending version is now eleven releases behind master, and the bug bounty cap dropped by a third with its minimum removed.
For the showcase, supplying into Kamino-administered markets at a sized allocation is reasonable. Leveraged borrowing should be sized as if a wick can liquidate you at a price the protocol would refuse to lend against. Any curator market needs its own diligence on that curator, and this verdict does not cover it.
Data appendix
- TVL: $1,185,266,288 (DefiLlama
kamino-lend, child ofparent#kamino-finance; the liquidity sibling is excluded). On 2026-09-20 it was $1,381,646,779, so -14.2% since the last report. Peak $3,372,533,427 on 2025-10-07, so 35.1% of peak. 7d -0.6%, 30d -15.3%, 90d +15.5%, 180d -20.7%, 365d -50.0%. - Price vs flows: SOL was $111.02 on 2026-09-20 and is $89.92 now, -19.0% (DefiLlama coins). The curator's September month-end mix had SOL and LST і LRT LST: токен ліквідного стейкінгу, застейканий актив, який можна продати чи внести в лендинг (jitoSOL, stHYPE). LRT ще й у рестейкінгу: дохідність і ризик вищі. at $914.6M of supply (34.6%) against $290.7M of SOL and LST debt, so net SOL-linked exposure of about $624M. A 19% fall on that is roughly $118M, around 60% of the $196.4M TVL drop. That is our rough estimate from month-end composition, not a measured flow figure: not verified in this review.
- Rank: Kamino Lend $1,185.3M vs Jupiter Lend $927.1M on DefiLlama's
/protocolslisting, a 27.8% lead. Then Loopscale $82.6M, Save $71.6M, Project 0 $54.1M, marginfi $31.6M. A third-party review claiming Jupiter Lend overtook Kamino does not match DefiLlama today. - Programs: lending
KLend2g3cP87fffoy8q1mQqGKjrxjC8boSyAYavgmjD, last deployed slot 461744249 (2026-10-26 17:11:59Z; it was 2026-08-20 in September). VaultsKvauGMspG5k6rtzrqqn7WNn3oZdyKqLKwK2XWQ8FLjd, last deployed slot 461660004 (2026-10-26 12:14:12Z). The vaults program-data account also shows transactions on 2026-10-01, 10-06, 10-08 and 10-13. Both programs still name the upgrade authorityGzFgdRJX.... Earlier lending deploys inside the window were not enumerated: not verified in this review. - Upgrade multisig
6hhBGCtmg7tPWUSgp3LG6X2rsmYWAc4tNsA6G4CnfQbM: owned by Squads v4SQDS4ep65T869zMMBKyuUq6aD6EgTu8psMjkvj52pCf. Threshold 5, 10 members with full permissions, config authority unset, time lock 86400s, transaction index 110 (96 in September), stale index 85. The vault-0 PDA derivation reproduces the upgrade authority at bump 250. - Timelock observed: proposals 97 to 110 all read Executed, with 5 approvals and no rejections or cancellations. Gaps from the last approval signature to execution: 97 34.7h, 98 25.2h, 99 38.2h, 101 24.2h, 103 25.6h, 105 117.4h, 107 117.7h, 109 78.1h (each even-numbered proposal executed seconds after its pair). The Approved timestamp is overwritten on execution, so the last approval comes from the proposal account's signature history. Proposal 76 (SetTimeLock to 259200s) is still Active with 4 approvals, unchanged. What the executed proposals contain was not decoded: not verified in this review.
- Market-configuration multisig
7idEEVRidWrahZJhxXMqniDbV6ESj7ZjyLrigcMcEt6H: threshold 4, 10 members, time lock 43200s, config authority unset, transaction index 366 (296 in September). Its vault 024LjDBuk...owns the primary market. Nine of its ten members are also members of the upgrade multisig. - Market layer, recounted: 245 LendingMarket accounts, of which 243 are full 4664-byte markets, with 67 distinct owner keys (58 in September). Kamino's two authorities own 27 markets; 216 belong to other keys. 668 reserves: 231 on Kamino markets, 409 on third-party markets, 28 pointing at markets we did not decode. The largest third-party owners are unchanged:
Cv4MFCq...44 markets,radixktq...23,FU76ac2H...15. - Market flags (offsets taken from the current
LendingMarketstruct in source): the primary market7u3HeH...reads quote USD, emergency mode 0, borrow_disabled 0, autodeleverage 1. Emergency mode is engaged on3FgMPrMm...,5UQZbR5g...,7kaNagzb...and the new6epKradsryNLSpYse3bgPzRf9pYJPxCesySB9iWMU9Bx(ownerCPpw5U5i...). Borrowing is also disabled on5UQZbR5g...and7kaNagzb.... None of the four is Kamino-owned. - Oracle masks: klend master,
programs/klend/Cargo.tomlversion 1.28.0 (tag commit 2026-11-06 14:28Z).LIQUIDATION_CHECKS = PRICE_LOADED | PRICE_AGE_CHECKED | PRICE_USAGE_ALLOWED.assert_obligation_liquidatableuses it three times. Borrow and withdraw-with-debt paths useALL_CHECKS. This is unchanged since September. How many live reserves have TWAP disabled: not verified in this review. - Audits: 43 PDFs in
github.com/Kamino-Finance/audits, last pushed 2026-10-27, which addedkamino_liquidity_audit_ottersec_2026_10.pdf. The newest lending reports arekamino_lend_certora_1.17.0andkamino_lend_ottersec_1.16.0_and_1.17.0. klend tags since September: 1.26.0 (commit 2026-10-12), 1.27.0 (2026-10-19), 1.28.0 (2026-11-06). Which version is running: not verified in this review. - Bug bounty: Sherlock program 433, live since 2026-10-16 17:26Z. Smart-contract theft pays 10% of funds at risk, capped at $1,000,000. Irreversible loss or freezing pays 5%, capped at $100,000. Web/app critical is capped at $100,000. No minimum payouts. Scope includes the lending, vaults and farms programs plus the closed-source liquidity program. The Immunefi page
immunefi.com/bug-bounty/kamino/information/returns 404, yetdocs/SECURITY.mdin the audits repo still points to it. - KMNO: $0.03438, market cap $203.9M, FDV $343.8M, circulating 5,931,507,224 of 10B (CoinGecko, 2026-11-06). On 2026-09-20 the price was $0.02773 (DefiLlama coins). Trackers report unlocks of 229.17M on 2026-09-30 and 2026-10-30, with vesting ending 2027-03-30. That does not reconcile with CoinGecko's +361.6M circulating change, and the next unlock date is unconfirmed: not verified in this review. Top holders: not verified in this review.
- Governance: the latest forum post is "Kamino Lend Monthly Risk Insights, September 2026" (posted 2026-10-06). It reports supply $2.64B, debt $1.04B, main market (now named SOL/BTC) utilization 40%, Ethena 44%, OnRe 33%, and USDC in the main market touching 95.1% at month end. Kamino Fixed Rates launched on AUTO 2026-09-21 and on OnRe 2026-09-25. No October report yet. No binding on-chain vote found: not verified in this review.
- Incidents and news since 2026-09-20:
- DefiLlama hacks list: 1340 rows, no Kamino entry.
- 2026-10-29: Binance hot-wallet theft (Binance estimated about $6.3B; DefiLlama lists $6.36B). Kamino paused borrowing on its SOL/BTC market at 22:03Z and reported no exposure. No resumption had been announced as of 09:22Z on 2026-10-30; resumption was reported later that day citing SolanaFloor, and the market reads borrow-enabled on chain today. Jupiter Lend queued withdrawals in the same window.
- 2026-11-05: Loopscale Lending paused under an attack campaign. That is a separate protocol, not Kamino.
- We found no Kamino bad debt or oracle-driven liquidation event reported in the window.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.