TL;DR
LlamaLend is Curve's lending product. Borrowers post collateral into LLAMMA, which sells it gradually across price bands instead of liquidating at one line. Lenders supply the borrowed asset, almost always crvUSD. There are two books. V1, the older one, is what DeFiLlama's curve-llamalend slug measures: $95.56M TVL Загальна заблокована вартість: сума всіх депозитів у протоколі чи пулі в доларах. Показує розмір, а не безпеку., $84.88M of lender deposits across 95 markets. V2, live since June on Optimism and July on Ethereum, is tracked separately as curve-llamalend-v2 ($37.30M TVL, $34.37M of deposits). This report covers both. V1 still carries the verdict because it holds about 71% of the deposits and all of the losses.
What changed since our 30 September report:
- The jump in V1 TVL is not organic. V1 rose from $76.05M to $95.56M. The cause is DAO vote 1509, executed 29 October at 15:54 UTC, which raised the crvUSD the DAO mints into Resupply's sreUSD market from $30M to $60M. DeFiLlama shows a single step of about $28M between 29 and 30 October ($69.27M to $97.54M), while borrowing stayed flat ($43.85M to $43.70M in total, $43.09M to $42.94M on Ethereum). CRV's price did not drive it: CRV fell from about $0.38 to $0.27. Real deposits did not drive it either. Take the DAO out and V1 deposits fell from about $31.2M to $24.9M. Most of the new money sits idle: the sreUSD Vault і куратор Спільний пул депозитів, яким керує код або куратор. Куратор вирішує, у які ринки підуть ваші кошти, і встановлює ліміти, а за це бере комісію. holds $62.0M against $24.6M of loans.
- The admin structure changed. Vote 1510, executed the same day, moved the V1 lending factory, the crvUSD mint factory, and the V2 factory and Configurator under a new Lending Owner Proxy. Its emergency role is the same 5-of-9 Safe. On V1 the emergency role lost a few powers: it can no longer set AMM or admin fees, and it can now only raise loan discounts, not lower them. On V2 it gained real ones: swapping a market's rate model, setting callbacks, zeroing borrow caps and deposit limits, pausing, and replacing an Оракул Джерело цін, за яким протокол оцінює заставу. Хибна чи маніпульована ціна може спричинити несправедливі ліквідації або пропустити погані позики. that has already failed. In September we credited V2 with having no emergency key over it. That is no longer true. The vote text calls the migration "yRisk's recommended" design. yRisk is the DAO's risk provider, and when we read its proposal in September it named its contributors as Resupply's primary developers.
- CRV-long is unchanged, and the exit got cheaper. The market is still 100% utilized at an effectively zero rate and still $0.70M short on $2.93M. The recovery pool now quotes 60.3% of face for $10k, down from 63.6%.
- V2 grew more Resupply-shaped. A new market takes reUSD/sfrxUSD Curve LP (постачальник ліквідності) Депозит двох токенів у торговий пул, щоб отримувати комісії з обмінів. Якщо ціни токенів розходяться, у вас стає більше того, що подешевшав. as collateral (vote 1501, 3M cap). It is the first LlamaLend vote this year where we saw Stake DAO's locker vote against. The sDOLA cap went to 25M (vote 1505, executed 21 October).
Scope notes. DeFiLlama's llamalend slug is an unrelated NFT-lending protocol. crvUSD itself, including how much the DAO has minted, belongs to /risk/curve-dex. Resupply's June 2025 exploit was Resupply's loss, not LlamaLend's.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. V1's core is Аудит Перевірка коду протоколу незалежною компанією з безпеки. Її мета: виявити критичні проблеми, через які користувачі можуть втратити кошти. and has held. MixBytes reviewed Curve Lending from February to July 2024. StateMind's Curve Lending report covers 15 January to 2 February 2024. ChainSecurity's Curve Stablecoin report, final version 21 February 2025, includes two lending-version reviews with OneWayLendingFactory and Vault in scope. These were read at source in September and not re-read this run. Nothing has broken LLAMMA or the Controller. The March 2026 loss came from a per-market oracle helper outside that core.
V2 is a separate Vyper 0.4.3 codebase that now holds $34.37M of deposits. Curve's live audit page (docs.curve.finance/user/security/audits, checked 7 November) still lists StateMind's lending report and ChainSecurity's crvUSD reports, and has no V2 entry. The new Lending Owner Proxy (0xeDA020b0, Vyper 0.4.3, source verified) now administers both books, and we found no audit for it. Neither gap is evidence of a bug. Both mean a lender cannot read the review that covers the code holding their money.
Admin control. Vote 1510 made the Lending Owner Proxy the admin of V1's OneWayLendingFactory (0xeA6876DD), the crvUSD ControllerFactory (0xC9332fdC) and V2's LendFactory (0x8f6B56EC), and the default admin of V2's Configurator (0x6065858d). We confirmed all four on-chain. The same vote moved the Arbitrum, Optimism, Sonic and Taiko factories by cross-chain message. The proxy has two roles. The DAO's Ownership Agent (0x40907540) can do anything through execute and can replace or remove the emergency role. The emergency role is the 5-of-9 Safe 0x467947EE, the same Emergency DAO as before, whose nine signers we did not identify.
The contract source shows what the emergency role can do with no vote and no delay:
- V1 and crvUSD mint markets: swap the rate model, set the AMM callback, raise the loan discount (it can no longer lower it or set fees), cut a debt ceiling, toggle a Chainlink feed, kill gauges or change their manager, and pause any contract with a
pause()function. - V2 markets: swap the rate model, set the callback, raise the loan discount, zero the borrow cap, zero the vault's max supply, remove a custom admin, and replace an oracle, but only one whose
price()already reverts or returns zero.
That last limit is a real safeguard. For lenders, the rate-model power matters most. It is exactly how CRV-long's rate was pinned at zero on 17 April 2026, without a DAO vote, and it now reaches V2 too. V1 market creation is still permissionless. V2 markets still start with a zero borrow cap that only a DAO vote can raise.
Two lockers still carry the votes. On vote 1509 (sreUSD to $60M), Convex's voter proxy cast 76.8% of the yes weight and Stake DAO's locker 23.1%, across 9 voters. On vote 1510 (the proxy migration), the split was 77.7% and 22.3%. Votes 1499, 1505 and 1512 show the same pattern, with Convex at 75% to 78%. Vote 1501, the new reUSD/sfrxUSD LP market, was the exception: 377.5M veCRV for, all from Convex, against 158.6M, of which Stake DAO cast 117.6M and Convex 40.9M. It passed on Convex's weight alone. By Curve's own description, Resupply was developed by contributors from Convex and Yearn. So the protocol on the other side of most of this book also co-authored the votes that size it.
Oracle. No change to V1. The sDOLA-long2 market exploited on 2 March 2026 still runs the oracle that was manipulated. It is deprecated, holds $0.31M and pays nothing. The sreUSD market's oracle still values reUSD at whichever is higher, its pool EMA or Resupply's 0.99 redemption floor. reUSD trades at about 0.992 today (coins.llama.fi), right on that floor. Now that the DAO has $60M in this market, that floor is the part to watch. If reUSD truly broke, the oracle would keep pricing collateral at 0.99 and Ліквідація Коли позика перевищує LLTV або позиції на біржі бракує маржі, її примусово закривають і продають заставу, зазвичай зі штрафом. would start late. V2's four original Ethereum markets keep the EMA-wrapped share-price oracle that blocks the March attack path. The new reUSD/sfrxUSD LP market (0x4922995d) uses a ChainOracle (0xf9f3beac) that multiplies several feeds together. We did not read those feeds, so whether it has the same EMA protection is not verified in this review.
Liquidity & exit. CRV-long lenders have not been able to withdraw in full since 10 October 2025, 393 days as of today. We read the controller (0xEdA215b7) on-chain this run. It holds 66 loans with 2,932,654 crvUSD of debt, equal to the vault's assets, so Частка позичених коштів Яку частину депозитів кредитного ринку позичено (утилізація). Коли вона близька до 100%, виведення може затриматися, а ставка позики різко зростає. is 100%. The rate model is still the effectively-zero policy the Emergency DAO installed in April. Thirty-six positions are underwater and fully converted to crvUSD: $781,729 against $1,482,774 of debt. That leaves lender claims about 76.1% covered, a shortfall of $701,045, the same hole as a year ago. Bad debt is not socialized, so the vault still marks shares at face. The 30 healthy loans hold 13.24M CRV against $1.45M of debt. At today's CRV oracle price of about $0.267, that is about 2.4 times coverage. A further CRV drop could push more of them under.
The "CRV LlamaLend Recovery" pool (0x516C3eCf) is the only exit. It now holds 24.5% of the vault's shares, up from 21%. An on-chain quote today returns 6,029 crvUSD for $10,000 of face (60.3%) and 57,086 for $100,000 (57.1%). Curve's own spring model needed CRV near $0.96 for partial recovery and $1.24 for full. CRV is at $0.27.
The other dead V1 markets we re-checked are still dead. WFRAX ($0.16M), SQUID ($0.14M) and IBTC ($0.08M) are all at 100% utilization in Curve's API. The rest of the September list (UwU, FXN, OP, plus the ARB and sDOLA-long2 holes) was not re-read on-chain: not verified in this review.
In healthy markets, exit works today, but it is getting tighter. V1 shows 51.3% utilization only because the DAO's idle $37M inflates the denominator. V2 is 85.5% utilized, up from 78.3%. Its syrupUSDC vault is at 91%, and sfrxUSD has $1.84M idle against $15.76M supplied.
Yield: real vs emission. Lender income is borrower interest. It is real, and in V1 it is thin. Deposit-weighted, V1 pays 1.16%. The sreUSD vault pays 0.18% base plus 1.69% in CRV (yields.llama.fi), because the DAO's minted crvUSD there is mostly unborrowed. CRV-long pays zero. Among the larger V1 vaults, WBTC (6.28%) and wstETH (7.14%) pay more, and almost all of those deposits are staked through Convex. V2 pays 3.87% deposit-weighted, with CRV adding about 0.8% to 1.0% on its two biggest vaults. The CRV leg is worth less than in September because CRV fell from about $0.38 to $0.27.
Holder concentration. Concentration got worse again; we read these numbers on-chain this run. The DAO's sreUSD operator (0x21862cA8) holds vault shares worth $60.0M of the vault's $62.03M (96.7%). Its mint limit and minted amount are both 60M. That single DAO position is 71% of all V1 lender deposits.
We also measured how much of each vault's shares are staked through Convex's voter proxy. That is the route Resupply's pairs use, and in September we traced it to those pairs directly. This run we did not split it pair by pair. The Convex-staked shares are 100% of V1 sfrxUSD, 98.3% of WBTC, 96.9% of sUSDe, 92.8% of WETH and 76.4% of wstETH, about $19.4M in all across Ethereum V1. Add the DAO and about 93% of V1 deposits are either the DAO's or Convex-staked, up from about 89%. V2 shows the same pattern. About 85% of its deposits are Convex-staked: 86.8% of sDOLA, 84.2% of sfrxUSD, 92.5% of syrupUSDC. In September 99.9% of all sreUSD sat in this one market; we did not re-read that share: not verified in this review.
The loop Curve itself has described still holds. Users lend crvUSD into V2, borrow reUSD against it through Resupply, stake the reUSD as sreUSD, and post that sreUSD back on V1 to borrow crvUSD, most of which the DAO printed. The new reUSD/sfrxUSD LP market adds one more Resupply-linked collateral.
Track record. These incidents belong to this product. On 13 June 2024 the founder's CRV liquidation left about $10M of bad debt, since repaid. The CRV-long hole opened on 10 October 2025 and is still open. On 2 March 2026 the sDOLA oracle was exploited: DeFiLlama records $240K taken, and the post-mortem puts borrower losses at about 822K crvUSD. How much the 5M CRV veFunder compensation has paid out is not verified in this review. The curve.fi domain was hijacked in August 2022 (about $575K, DeFiLlama) and again in May 2025 (loss figure not verified in this review).
DeFiLlama's hacks list has no Curve or LlamaLend entry since 30 September. Around 29 October, V2 TVL fell from $44.85M on 28 October to $38.02M on 31 October, and V2 borrowing on Ethereum fell from $32.24M to $29.91M. We did not establish the cause this run. V1 had drifted from $75.2M to $69.3M over 21 to 29 October, before the mint landed. We found no exploit, Пег і депег Пег, або прив'язка: цільова ціна стейблкоїна, зазвичай $1. Депег: відхилення від неї, найчастіше вниз. Сторінка стейблів перевіряє ціни кожні 5 хв. or new bad-debt event.
Worst case
The loop unwinds, and now with twice the DAO money in it. Resupply sits on both sides of this book. Trouble there would reach LlamaLend from both ends, whether it is an exploit, reUSD breaking through its 0.99 floor, or a run on redemptions. Convex-staked pairs, most of them Resupply's, are most of the lenders in the other big vaults. An unwind would drain the idle cash first and leave everyone else at 100% utilization. On the borrow side, the sreUSD oracle keeps reUSD at 0.99 while the market price falls, so liquidations start late and lenders take the shortfall. 97% of that vault is crvUSD the DAO printed. Most of that loss would therefore fall on crvUSD's own backing, and crvUSD is the asset nearly every V1 and V2 vault lends out.
CRV-long is the smaller version, and it has already happened. Collateral fell through its bands faster than liquidations could follow, the hole landed on lenders, utilization pinned at 100%, the rate went to zero, and the way out pays about 57 to 60 cents. It has been that way for 393 days.
The third path is a change of terms after you deposit. The Emergency DAO can now swap the rate model on any V1 or V2 market with no delay, as it did on CRV-long in April. It can also zero a V2 market's borrow cap or deposit limit. A DAO vote can do more. Soft liquidation gives borrowers time; it does not protect lenders' principal.
Bottom line
Avoid, unchanged. The engine is good, and V2's oracle design is better than V1's. But this month moved the book further toward one counterparty. The DAO doubled the credit it prints into Resupply's market, and most of it sits idle. That one step is behind the whole TVL jump this slug shows. A proxy designed by the same Resupply-linked risk provider now gives the Emergency DAO a no-delay rate key over V2. In September V2 was the part of LlamaLend we singled out for not having one. Trapped CRV-long lenders are still trapped, and their exit got cheaper. V2's audit is still not public.
What would change the verdict:
- the V2 audit and an audit of the new proxy are published;
- the CRV-long hole is closed;
- the DAO's sreUSD mint is reduced, or reviewed by a risk provider with no Resupply link;
- organic deposits grow instead of shrinking.
Until then, a $10k lender here would sit next to a protocol whose co-developer casts most of the votes that size the market.
Data appendix
- TVL: V1 $95.56M (DeFiLlama
curve-llamalend, last point 2026-11-06): Ethereum $94.61M, Arbitrum $0.87M, Fraxtal $0.08M; borrowed $43.52M. On 2026-09-30 it was $75.70M (our September report used $76.05M from an intraday read). Step change from $69.27M (29 Oct) to $97.54M (30 Oct), with borrowing flat ($43.85M to $43.70M in total; $43.09M to $42.94M on Ethereum), matches vote 1509. V2 $37.30M (DeFiLlamacurve-llamalend-v2): Ethereum $37.07M, Optimism $0.22M, borrowed $29.39M; peak $44.85M on 28 Oct. Never add the two figures to each other or tocurve-dex. Sources: api.llama.fi/protocol/curve-llamalend, /curve-llamalend-v2. - Markets: Curve API getLendingVaults/all, 2026-11-07. V1: 95 markets, $84.88M supplied, $43.53M borrowed, 51.3% utilized. Per market: sreUSD $61.91M supplied and $24.58M borrowed (0.18% lend APY Річна дохідність зі складними відсотками, тобто з реінвестуванням доходу. Більшість таблиць на сайті показує APY, а фандинг і vaults бірж показано як APR.); sfrxUSD $5.50M; sUSDe $5.15M; WBTC $3.29M; wstETH $3.05M; CRV $2.93M (100%); WETH $1.22M. V2: 8 markets (5 Ethereum, 3 Optimism), $34.37M supplied, $29.40M borrowed, 85.5% utilized. Ethereum caps read on-chain: sfrxUSD $15.76M supplied / $13.92M borrowed, cap 28.4M; sDOLA $13.44M / $10.93M, cap 25M (vote 1505); syrupUSDC $4.45M / $4.05M, cap 51.8M; svZCHF $0.37M / $0.29M, cap 0.5M; reUSD/sfrxUSD LP $0.20M / $0.06M, cap 3M (vote 1501). Loan discounts: 1.3% on sDOLA and sfrxUSD, 3.5% syrupUSDC, 4.8% svZCHF, 3.0% reUSD/sfrxUSD LP.
- Audits: MixBytes Curve Lending (Feb to Jul 2024), StateMind Curve Lending (Jan to Feb 2024), ChainSecurity Curve Stablecoin (final 21 Feb 2025, lending versions in scope); read in September, not re-read. Curve's audit page (docs.curve.finance/user/security/audits, fetched 2026-11-07) has no V2 entry. V2 audit: not verified in this review. Lending Owner Proxy
0xeDA020b0audit: not verified in this review. - Admin / governance:
- Lending Owner Proxy
0xeDA020b067872717901916a3B8C724C21f6080d1(LendingOwnerProxy, Vyper 0.4.3, source verified).dao= Ownership Agent0x40907540.emergency_dao= Safe0x467947EE(threshold 5, 9 owners, read on-chain; signer identities not verified in this review). Both roles can call the emergency functions. Only the DAO can callexecuteorset_emergency_dao. Either role can callremove_emergency. - The proxy is admin of V1 OneWayLendingFactory
0xeA6876DD, crvUSD ControllerFactory0xC9332fdCand V2 LendFactory0x8f6B56EC, anddefault_adminof the Configurator0x6065858d(all read on-chain). - Installed by vote 1510: creator
0xf7Bd34Dd, executed 2026-10-29 18:20 UTC, tx0x52b52f63, 529.2M for, 0 against, 10 voters; Convex 77.7%, Stake DAO 22.3%. The vote also moved the Arbitrum, Optimism, Sonic and Taiko factories. - Other LlamaLend votes since 30 Sep:
- 1499: kill Емісія і поінти Емісія: нові токени, якими протокол платить винагороди; вони входять у дохідність. Поінти в дохідність не включаємо. to the old V1 sfrxUSD market (executed 2026-10-06).
- 1501: reUSD/sfrxUSD LP V2 market, 3M cap, 10% fee (executed 2026-10-15; 377.5M for / 158.6M against; Stake DAO 117.6M against).
- 1505: sDOLA V2 cap to 25M (executed 2026-10-21).
- 1506: gauge for the reusdsfrx supply side (not executed).
- 1509: sreUSD mint and debt ceiling to 60M. Creator
0x7c5EFe88, executed 2026-10-29 15:54 UTC, tx0x567e9b72, 510.9M for, 0 against, 9 voters; Convex voter proxy0x989AEb4d76.8%, Stake DAO0x52f5417623.1%. - 1512: callback and gauge on the reUSD/sfrxUSD LP market (executed 2026-11-03).
- 1517: pause two LMCallbackFactory contracts (open).
- Convex cast 75% to 78% of yes weight on 1499, 1505 and 1512, and Stake DAO the rest.
- Source: prices.curve.finance/v1/dao/proposals. The gov.curve.finance threads returned 403 to this run, so we did not read the proposal rationale: not verified in this review. Emergency DAO actions since 30 Sep: not verified in this review.
- Lending Owner Proxy
- Oracle: V1 sreUSD oracle design unchanged (OracleProxy; reUSD priced at the higher of pool EMA and 0.99). reUSD $0.9916 (coins.llama.fi, 2026-11-07). V2 oracles for sDOLA
0x0117ba42, sfrxUSD0xEa1b9812, syrupUSDC0xb799322Cand svZCHF0xa44b313Aunchanged (read from each AMM'sprice_oracle_contract). The reUSD/sfrxUSD LP market's oracle0xf9f3beacis a ChainOracle (Blockscout-verified); its component feeds: not verified in this review. The exploited V1 oracle is still attached to sDOLA-long2 ($0.31M, 0% rate). - Bad debt / exit:
- CRV-long controller
0xEdA215b7: 66 loans, debt 2,932,654 crvUSD, equal to the assets of vault0xCeA18a87(2,932,654). - 36 underwater loans hold $781,729 against $1,482,774 of debt; covered 76.1%, shortfall $701,045. 30 healthy loans hold 13.24M CRV against $1.45M of debt.
- AMM oracle CRV $0.2668; monetary policy still
0x8B1C4D27; loan discount 30%, liquidation discount 12%. - Recovery pool
0x516C3eCfe45F0820653E08DD7c93633d71B93Cb5: 334,609 crvUSD and 574.6M vault shares (24.5% of 2,345.1M). get_dy: 60.3% of face for $10k, 57.1% for $100k. - Days stuck since 10 Oct 2025: 393. CRV $0.266 (coins.llama.fi); $0.381 on 2026-09-30 (coins.llama.fi historical).
- Dead markets re-checked via Curve API: WFRAX, SQUID, IBTC at 100% utilization; others not verified in this review.
- CRV-long controller
- Holder concentration:
- sreUSD vault
0xC32B0Cf3: totalAssets 62,034,161 crvUSD. Operator0x21862cA8shares convert to 60,000,606 (96.7%); itsmintLimitandmintedAmountare both 60M. - Shares staked through Convex's voter proxy, as a share of vault supply (gauge balanceOf / vault totalSupply). V1: sfrxUSD 100%, WBTC 98.3%, sUSDe 96.9%, WETH 92.8%, wstETH 76.4%, sreUSD 2.7%; Ethereum V1 total about $19.4M. V2: sDOLA 86.8%, sfrxUSD 84.2%, syrupUSDC 92.5%, svZCHF 60.7%; about $29.28M of $34.37M.
- Attribution of the Convex-staked shares to Resupply pairs is carried over from the September pair-by-pair read, not repeated: not verified in this review. sreUSD supply share inside the market: not verified in this review.
- sreUSD vault
- Yield: Curve API lend APYs, deposit-weighted: V1 1.16%, V2 3.87%. CRV rewards (yields.llama.fi): sreUSD 1.69%, V2 sfrxUSD 0.81%, V2 sDOLA 0.99%, most other V1 vaults about 0%.
- Recent news scan (30 Sep to 7 Nov 2026):
- 15 Oct: reUSD/sfrxUSD LP market activated on V2 (vote 1501).
- 15 Oct: Diario Bitcoin reports Curve loans up 68% in Q3 to $70.9M, about 84% of the net increase from V2.
- 21 Oct: sDOLA V2 cap raised to 25M (vote 1505).
- 29 Oct: sreUSD mint raised to $60M (vote 1509) and eDAO proxy migration (vote 1510). Both were covered on X (@ilivinskiy and @cryptoissimple on 29 Oct, @SolMikasa1903 on 5 Nov).
- 5 Nov: vote 1517 opened to retire two LMCallbackFactory contracts.
- DeFiLlama hacks list: no Curve entry after 2026-03-02. The 29 to 31 Oct V2 TVL dip has no established cause. No LlamaLend exploit, depeg or new bad-debt event found.
- External cross-reference: no second-opinion LlamaLend report located this run; verdict derived independently.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.