TL;DR
Cap issues cUSD, a dollar backed by USDC. Whitelisted operators borrow most of that USDC and run their own strategies, and restakers on EigenLayer and Symbiotic post collateral that can be slashed if an operator defaults. stcUSD is the yield-bearing wrapper. Five weeks after the October run, the Vault і куратор Спільний пул депозитів, яким керує код або куратор. Куратор вирішує, у які ринки підуть ваші кошти, і встановлює ліміти, а за це бере комісію. reads 83.3% utilized instead of 93.4%: $11.02M is available against $66.04M supplied. That is better, but it is still well above the 70% line we set for a re-rate. The $11.02M is also not all cash. About $6.0M is USDC deposited in Aave, and $5.0M is Ondo's rUSDY, a tokenized Treasury note. Supply proved twitchy again. It climbed back to $82.8M by 21 October and then lost about $12.9M at the end of the month. The loan book is as concentrated as it was. One operator owes 50.9% of all debt and already sits above its own maximum LTV і LLTV LTV: частка позики від вартості застави. LLTV: LTV, за якого позицію ліквідують. Різниця між ними і є вашим запасом до ліквідації.. The control problem is also unchanged. The 3-of-5 developer Safe still adds borrowers, changes their LTV and moves the reserve with no delay, and it did all three this month. Avoid holds.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. The public repo cap-labs-dev/cap-audits holds the same eleven PDFs as in October: Zellic, Trail of Bits, Electisec, Spearbit (two), Recon, Sherlock, Certora on the EigenLayer AVS, Octane 2026-03-24, octane_audit_jan_8.pdf and 2026-9-26-Octane (Upgrade).pdf. The newest commit is still 2026-09-25. One open question from October is now answered. The cUSD proxy points at implementation 0xbdaa...1b97, which Cap's deployer created on 2026-09-25 at 16:07 UTC. The Таймлок Обов'язкова затримка між рішенням адміністратора змінити протокол і самою зміною. За цей час користувачі можуть вивести кошти, якщо не згодні. is the only holder of the upgrade role on cUSD, so the swap went through the 24h delay. That fits the reviewed Octane upgrade, but we have not compared the code to the Аудит Перевірка коду протоколу незалежною компанією з безпеки. Її мета: виявити критичні проблеми, через які користувачі можуть втратити кошти.. No upgrade call reached the timelock after 2 October, so the upgrade most likely executed between 26 September and 2 October. The exact block was not pinned. not verified in this review The Delegation implementation dates from February 2026 and the Lender's from September 2025, so neither has changed recently.
Admin control. Re-enumerated on-chain today on the access registry 0x7731...c683. The TimelockController is still the only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE holder and the only holder of the upgrade role on cUSD and on Delegation. Its getMinDelay() still returns 86400. The developer Safe is still 3 of 5, and it is still the only holder of modifyAgent and setLtvBuffer on Delegation. Delegation's own addAgent is held by the Symbiotic and EigenLayer agent managers, and the Safe can call the Symbiotic manager's addAgent, as it showed this month. The manager-level role lists were not re-read. not verified in this review The Safe's transactions since 2 October show what it does with no delay:
- On 3 October and 28 October it re-allocated the reserve sub-vault. It dropped two Morpho strategies and on 28 October put $5M into an Ondo rUSDY strategy.
- On 8 October it called the Symbiotic agent manager to add a new borrower (
0x3403...673a) at 50% LTV and an unlimited coverage cap. - On 15 October it set that agent's LTV to zero through
modifyAgent. The agent had already borrowed about $304k. - On 4 November it set LTV to zero on seven more agents in one batch.
- Between 19 and 22 October it paused, divested and removed the wWTGXX treasury-fund asset from cUSD. It also whitelisted four addresses on the vault across 15 to 22 October, itself among them.
Cutting LTVs and dropping an asset reduce risk, and they look like housekeeping. But the same instant path can just as easily raise an LTV, onboard a borrower or move the reserve into a less liquid asset. Through the timelock went a setFeeData on USDC, two Оракул Джерело цін, за яким протокол оцінює заставу. Хибна чи маніпульована ціна може спричинити несправедливі ліквідації або пропустити погані позики. batches, and a recoverERC20 that moved 588,148.85 cUSD from contract 0xfe2e...98a4 to 0xa388...69fd (scheduled 22 October, executed 27 October). Its purpose was not found. not verified in this review
Oracle. Two oracle configuration changes were scheduled through the 24h timelock. On 8 October a batch set up OETH pricing using the Chainlink ETH/USD feed. On 5 November the Safe scheduled a BGBTC price source with a 10,800 second staleness limit. As of block 26,363,121 no execute call for it had reached the timelock. BGBTC shows up in DeFiLlama's token list at about zero value, so it looks like a collateral type being prepared. The rest of the feed set (RedStone for reserves and stables, Chainlink for wstETH and wBTC, Aave adapter for rates) is carried from the July doc read. not verified in this review
Liquidity & exit. Read on the vault at block 26,363,121: USDC totalSupplies $66.04M, totalBorrows $55.02M, availableBalance $11.02M, and Частка позичених коштів Яку частину депозитів кредитного ринку позичено (утилізація). Коли вона близька до 100%, виведення може затриматися, а ставка позики різко зростає. 83.3%. That is up from $4.07M available in October, but most of the improvement is deposits coming back, not loans being repaid. Debt only fell from $57.29M to $55.02M. The available $11.02M is not idle in the vault either. reserve(USDC) is zero, and the vault contract itself holds $2,623 of USDC. loaned(USDC) is $11.02M in the fractional-reserve vault 0x3ed6...0072, a Yearn v3 vault named "cap USDC". It holds no idle cash. $6.02M sits in an Aave V3 USDC lender strategy, and $5.00M sits in an "OndoHolder USDC" strategy that holds 5.0M rUSDY. So a redemption first pulls USDC out of Aave. Past about $6M, it depends on turning rUSDY back into USDC, and we did not check how fast that works at size. not verified in this review Redemptions worked at par in October, and no failed redemption was found this time. The 29 to 31 October outflow was not traced transaction by transaction. not verified in this review The vault is not paused. DeFiLlama prices cUSD at $0.9998. A DEX Ліквідність Скільки можна продати чи вивести просто зараз, не зсуваючи ціну й не чекаючи. Мала ліквідність означає повільний або дорогий вихід. check was not repeated, and in October it was about $2k across four pools. not verified in this review
Yield: real vs emission. Unchanged. The return is the credit spread operators pay plus an Aave floor. CAP is a governance token and is not the yield source.
Holder concentration. 44 agents are registered, and summing Lender.debt(agent, USDC) gives $55.09M. The largest operator (0x0d35...e21a) owes $28.02M, which is 50.9% of all debt. The next two owe $8.51M and $5.37M, so the top three hold 76.1%, about the same as October's 75.9%. The new detail is the largest operator's own numbers in Lender.agent():
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Delegated coverage | $44.42M |
| Current LTV | 63.1% |
| Configured max LTV | 60% |
| Ліквідація Коли позика перевищує LLTV або позиції на біржі бракує маржі, її примусово закривають і продають заставу, зазвичай зі штрафом. threshold | 80% |
| Health | 1.27 |
So this operator can't borrow more, and a fall of about 21% in its collateral value would make it liquidatable. Which assets back this one operator was not checked. not verified in this review
On the collateral side, $171.2M is delegated. BTC wrappers make up 71.9% of it (uniBTC $69.4M, LBTC $44.3M, SolvBTC $8.7M, cbBTC $0.7M), with wstETH at $29.2M and weETH at $18.9M. uniBTC is now 40.5%, down from 53.0%, because units fell again, from 1,676 to 920. Why they left is unknown. not verified in this review A cUSD holder table was not pulled. not verified in this review
Track record. DeFiLlama's hacks list has no Cap entry. A web search and an X search covering 2 October to 7 November found no exploit, default, slashing or failed redemption. One post from @StableTableDeFi, a small monitoring account, on 31 October counted three large redemptions in a week and described them as paid. It is a weak third-party signal, not a receipt. An on-chain scan for slash events failed with a 403. not verified in this review Supply has had three sharp drops in about six weeks: about $25.5M from 1 to 3 October, $25.5M, then $12.9M between the 29 and 31 October readings. Smaller dips came around 10 October and 25 October. Each time, holders were paid at or near par as far as we can tell. The July record still stands. The stabledrop was cut from $12M to $4.2M, and the founder self-dealing allegations were denied and are still unresolved. Nothing new turned up on either. not verified in this review The status of the September PYUSDx migration report is also unconfirmed. On Ethereum, assets() now lists USDC only. not verified in this review
Worst case
The largest operator is the obvious failure point. It owes half the book and is already above its own LTV cap. If BTC wrappers fall about a fifth while it is slow to repay, its restaked collateral gets slashed and auctioned into a falling market. Cap's docs do not say what lenders get if that auction comes up short. The insurance fund address holds about $0.50M of cUSD and $16.6k of USDC, against a $28.0M loan. Meanwhile holders queue against an $11M buffer, of which only about $6M is USDC in Aave. The rest is rUSDY, which must be turned back into USDC first. The faster path needs no market move at all. Three of five Safe keys can whitelist a borrower, raise an LTV or move the reserve in one instant transaction, and they used those powers several times this month. Position size is the only real mitigation.
Bottom line
Avoid. The gate does not average, and the worst flaws are still there. Admin control is still red, because the parameters that decide credit losses, and where the reserve sits, still change with no delay. Exit has improved from 93.4% to 83.3% utilization, but it is not back under the 70% line, and part of the buffer is now a tokenized Treasury note, not cash. And one borrower holds half the book while running over its own LTV limit. To the protocol's credit, nothing has broken. Redemptions keep paying, and the cUSD upgrade went through the timelock after an audit. The Safe has also been cutting credit risk, not adding it. We would re-rate to caution if utilization holds under about 70% or the agent-management roles move behind the timelock. We would treat a paused or queued redemption, a first operator default, or any LTV increase on the largest borrower as reasons to stay at avoid with more conviction.
Data appendix
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TVL: $182.2M (
api.llama.fi/protocol/cap), down from $275.6M on 2026-10-02. The all-time high in the series is $483.8M on 2026-01-28. Composition: $171.2M of delegated restaking collateral (uniBTC $69.4M, LBTC $44.3M, wstETH $29.2M, weETH $18.9M, SolvBTC $8.7M, cbBTC $0.7M) plus $11.02M of USDC. The TVL Загальна заблокована вартість: сума всіх депозитів у протоколі чи пулі в доларах. Показує розмір, а не безпеку. figure is almost entirely insurance collateral. cUSD backing is that $11.02M plus $55.02M lent to operators. DeFiLlama counts the loans separately asborrowed($55.08M). The agents' on-chaincoveragesums to $174.6M. -
cUSD supply:
totalSupply66,040,639 on-chain (0xcCcc...cccC). DeFiLlama stablecoins (id 296) reads $66.08M, against $64.70M a week ago and $78.28M a month ago. The daily series bottomed at $61.59M on 10-03 and peaked at $82.83M on 10-21. It then read $77.57M (10-29), $72.87M (10-30) and $64.72M (10-31). stcUSDtotalSupplyis 59,242,580 (0x8888...8888), against 55,045,891 on 10-02. -
Vault accounting (on-chain): USDC totalSupplies $66,040,303, totalBorrows $55,017,108, availableBalance $11,023,195, utilization 83.31%.
reserve(USDC)is 0, and the vault contract holds $2,623 of USDC.loaned(USDC)is $11,020,572, held in fractional-reserve vault0x3ed6aa32c930253fc990de58ff882b9186cd0072(Yearn v3 "cap USDC", totalIdle 0). Its strategies hold $6,015,783 in "Aave V3 USDC Lender"0x7d7f...84ffand $5,004,789 in "OndoHolder USDC"0x9939...931e, which holds 5,004,814 rUSDY.assets()returns USDC only, since wWTGXX was removed between 10-19 and 10-22. Not paused. -
Borrowed: $55.09M summed across 44 agents. Largest: $28.02M (50.9%, current LTV 63.1%, max 60%, LT 80%, health 1.27), then $8.51M (15.4%), $5.37M (9.8%), $4.68M (8.5%), $3.00M, $2.44M and $1.22M. Nine agents now have LTV set to 0, eight of them this month, with about $1.15M of debt between them.
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Audits:
github.com/cap-labs-dev/cap-audits, eleven PDFs, latest commit 2026-09-25. cUSD implementation0xbdaa34082f1a1a3c32190a672bc9dd1b69791b97, created 2026-09-25 (block 26,055,554). The Delegation implementation0x7e2d...38b5dates from February 2026, and the Lender implementation0x68c4...aaa7from September 2025. -
Admin and governance (on-chain 2026-11-07): The registry is
0x7731129a10d51e18cDE607C5C115F26503D2c683. Its onlyDEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLEholder is the timelock, which is also the only upgrader of cUSD and Delegation. Timelock0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab,getMinDelay()= 86400. Safe0xb8FC49402dF3ee4f8587268FB89fda4d621a8793has threshold 3 of 5 owners and is the only holder ofmodifyAgentandsetLtvBufferon Delegation. DelegationaddAgentis held by the Symbiotic manager0x08a7...53eaand the EigenLayer manager0xa82f...5ba9. No-delay Safe transactions since 10-02:- reserve sub-vault
update_debtandrevoke_strategyon 10-03 15:40 UTC; update_debton 10-28 16:57 UTC, which put $5M into the Ondo strategy;- Symbiotic manager
addAgenton 10-08 23:50 UTC; - Delegation
modifyAgenton 10-15 12:06 UTC (one agent) and 11-04 17:07 UTC (seven agents); - cUSD
setWhiteliston 10-15, 10-21 (two addresses) and 10-22 (the Safe itself); - the wWTGXX wind-down:
pauseAsset,divestAllandsetReserveon 10-19, thenunpauseAsset, mint, burn andremoveAsseton 10-22.
Timelocked:
setFeeData(USDC), scheduled 10-22 and executed 10-23;recoverERC20of 588,148.85 cUSD from0xfe2e...98a4to0xa388...69fd, scheduled 10-22 and executed 10-27;- an OETH oracle batch executed 10-08;
- a BGBTC oracle batch scheduled 11-05 and not yet executed.
Role lists on the two agent managers: not verified in this review.
- reserve sub-vault
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Oracle: OETH source wired to Chainlink ETH/USD
0x5f4e...8419via the timelock on 10-08. A BGBTC source with 10,800s staleness was scheduled 11-05, and no execution was found by block 26,363,121. Other feeds: not verified in this review (last doc read 2026-07-04). -
Insurance fund:
insuranceFund()=0x5eaf...b825, holding 503,828 cUSD and 16,602 USDC. Whether it holds any other assets, and what its payout rules are: not verified in this review. -
Holder concentration: borrower side as above. On the collateral side, BTC wrappers are 71.9% of delegated collateral and uniBTC alone is 40.5%, with units down from 1,676 to 920 since 10-02. cUSD and CAP holder tables: not verified in this review.
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Recent news, 2026-10-02 to 2026-11-07: No exploit, default, slashing or redemption failure turned up in web search, X search or the DeFiLlama hacks list. @StableTableDeFi (X, 2026-10-31 19:39 UTC, a small monitoring account) reported three large redemptions in a week being paid. The on-chain slash-event log scan failed (RPC 403): not verified in this review. Airdrop reversal and founder allegations: no update found, still unresolved. The PYUSDx migration's scope is still unconfirmed: not verified in this review. Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.