TL;DR
Aave V3 is over-collateralized lending. You supply an asset, someone borrows it against collateral, and their interest is your yield. The core contracts have never been directly exploited, and its Аудит Перевірка коду протоколу незалежною компанією з безпеки. Її мета: виявити критичні проблеми, через які користувачі можуть втратити кошти. registry is the deepest of any lending protocol. In an emergency, two Guardian Мультипідпис (multisig) Гаманець, де транзакцію мають підписати кілька власників ключів, наприклад 5 із 9. Безпечніший за один ключ, але залежить від того, хто ці ключі тримає. can freeze markets.
The verdict stays at caution for a fourth month. The reason has not changed since September, and this month added a second, unrelated stress event.
The reason first. The April rsETH contagion left a deficit of 52,964.45 WETH on the Ethereum Core WETH reserve. We read getReserveDeficit(WETH) again today and it returns 52,964.453912595963038573 WETH. That figure is identical to the wei at four points: the block of our September read, two blocks in between and the latest block. In dollars it fell from about $139M to about $118M, but only because ETH fell 15.2%. Nothing was repaid. The deficit is now 2.52% of aWETH supply, up from 2.51%, because the reserve shrank a little while the hole stayed the same. We searched the governance forum since 19 September and found no proposal to repay it. Aave Labs' October update lists the AIPs it created and reviewed that month, and none of them deals with it.
The new event. On 29 October a Binance hot wallet on Ethereum was drained. Within about 40 minutes, one wallet in the exploiter's cluster had supplied 60M USDT on Aave V3 Ethereum Core and borrowed 19,762 WETH, about $44.6M. The Guardians then froze 175 Aave V3 reserves on 16 networks and 117 reserves on V4. The exploiter's position stayed over-collateralized. LlamaRisk, Aave's risk provider, says it does not put suppliers at risk. Markets have since reopened in waves. As of today, USDC and USDT on Ethereum Core still carry 0% LTV і LLTV LTV: частка позики від вартості застави. LLTV: LTV, за якого позицію ліквідують. Різниця між ними і є вашим запасом до ліквідації. on chain, so they cannot back new borrowing. This is the second time in six months that a loss elsewhere in crypto has landed on Aave's books or its users.
Checklist
Audits & contracts. Unchanged from September. The audits directory in aave-dao/aave-v3-origin holds 49 files. The GitHub commits API shows that the last change to that path was the addition of the v3.7 audits on 31 March 2026. The newest audits are therefore still the six v3.7 reports, dated 26 to 31 March 2026, from MixBytes, Sherlock, Pashov, Certora, Savant and Enigma. They are now about seven months old.
On 21 October Aave Labs published an ARFC for V3.8. It is a release focused on security, built around a reentrancy guard on Pool operations, and Certora and other firms will audit it before any AIP. Nothing from V3.8 is live. The core lending logic has still never been directly exploited.
Admin control. Yellow. We read both Guardian Safes on chain today:
- The Protocol Guardian Safe 0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30 returns a threshold of 4 with 7 owners.
- The Governance Guardian Safe 0xCe52ab41C40575B072A18C9700091Ccbe4A06710 returns 5 with 9 owners.
Both owner lists are byte-for-byte identical to an archive read at block 26,014,704, the block of our September read. The keys have not changed.
What changed is that we saw the Guardians act at protocol scale. Between 21:42 and 23:04 UTC on 29 October they froze the relevant reserves on Aave V3 across 16 networks and on V4 across four. No market was paused. The goal was to stop the exploiter from supplying stolen assets. Over the following days, the Risk Steward and Guardian paths made these changes without a vote:
- Slope2 was cut so that the borrow rate at full Частка позичених коштів Яку частину депозитів кредитного ринку позичено (утилізація). Коли вона близька до 100%, виведення може затриматися, а ставка позики різко зростає. stayed at or below 10% APR Річний показник без складних відсотків. Фандинг на сайті показано як APR: погодинний показник × 8 760, бо стільки годин у році (24 × 365).. The cut was reverted on 1 November.
- Borrow caps were cut to about 2% above pre-exploit borrowing. That removed about $3.7B of unused borrow capacity on V3.
- LTV was set to 0 on nine assets.
LTV came back for the non-stablecoin assets on 2 November. USDC, USDT and USDT0 remain at 0 on V3, E-mode Режим ефективності в Aave: вищий LTV, коли застава й позика рухаються разом, як ETH і wstETH чи два стейблкоїни. Дозволяє більше плече в лупінгу. included. LlamaRisk calls restoring them "the next step we will consider" and gives no date. Users posting in that thread are angry, and one says he cannot unwind a position. None of this was misuse. It does show how much a 4-of-7 Safe can change across the whole protocol in one evening.
Two governance items would widen that path further. A delegate's vote rationale from early October records an ARFC that does two things:
- It cuts the Risk Steward minimum delay from 72 to 36 hours on seven cap and IRM parameters.
- It moves Umbrella's stkToken pause and unpause power from the Governance Executor to the Protocol Guardian.
We did not confirm that it executed. We also did not re-read the Risk Steward bounds or the executor Таймлок Обов'язкова затримка між рішенням адміністратора змінити протокол і самою зміною. За цей час користувачі можуть вивести кошти, якщо не згодні. this run.
Oracle. Yellow. Aave uses Chainlink feeds wrapped in its CAPO rate caps. On 13 October LlamaRisk proposed a second protocol-wide snapshotRatio refresh, covering 27 reserves on 11 Aave V3 instances. It is explicitly part of the same monitoring process as the May round. It selects reserves where a widening gap between cap and rate could, in an inflation attack, let borrowers create bad debt. LlamaRisk's monthly update puts the widest gap at 16.76%, on wstETH on Optimism, with a snapshot 971 days old.
A refresh that repeats is better than the one-time fix we recorded in September. It also confirms that snapshots keep drifting between rounds, and we did not confirm that this round executed.
Separately, Aave Labs reports that the long-tail Оракул Джерело цін, за яким протокол оцінює заставу. Хибна чи маніпульована ціна може спричинити несправедливі ліквідації або пропустити погані позики. deprecation executed in October. On V2 and V3 it replaced Chainlink feeds classed as high or very high risk with adapters that return a fixed price, so that those positions wind down. That is sensible housekeeping, but it means some long-tail reserves no longer track a market price. During the 29 October event, LlamaRisk reported that oracle feeds worked normally.
Liquidity & exit. Yellow. The book is $15.778B, down 12.6% from $18.058B, while ETH fell 15.2%.
We also tracked units held, using DeFiLlama's per-chain token counts. These are supplied minus borrowed, summed by symbol, so they are directional only. Between 20 September and the 6 November 00:00 UTC snapshot:
- ETH-family units fell 2.8%. wstETH fell 11.3% and rsETH 12.6%, while weETH rose 3.0% and WETH 2.3%.
- The ETH-family numbers hold up in the later 18:59 UTC snapshot.
- Stablecoin units did not hold up. In the 00:00 UTC snapshot, USDC is down 57.2% and USDe down 17.5%. In the 18:59 UTC snapshot the same day, USDC is up 110.3% and USDe up 3.8%.
Because the counts are net of borrowing, utilization swings during the freeze move them a lot. We draw no conclusion about stablecoin flows this month.
The freeze tested exits. With new supply blocked, withdrawals pushed the largest stablecoin reserves to 92% to 100% utilization, according to LlamaRisk. Withdrawals stayed open throughout. At 100% utilization, though, the last withdrawers have to wait for repayments.
The WETH reserve is still 2.52% under-backed. That is a hole in the books, not a Період очікування і виведення коштів з протоколу Час між заявкою на виведення коштів з протоколу і їх отриманням: фіксований період (7 днів у стейкінгу HYPE) або черга, що рухається з поверненням коштів., but it falls on the last claims out.
Also new: on 31 October tBTC on Ethereum Core was frozen after Threshold paused minting and redemption. We confirmed it on chain: frozen, with LTV 0.
Yield (real vs emission). Green. Supplier yield is borrower interest. Umbrella staker rewards are paid from the treasury under explicit allowances. AIP 528 renewed them through 2 December 2026 for aEthUSDT, aEthUSDC and aEthWETH. Those rewards pay for a backstop. They are not a subsidy on supplier yield.
Holder concentration. Unreadable for a fourth month. The Etherscan top-holders endpoint has required API Pro for three runs. This run, Nansen's top-holders call also returned a Pro-subscription error.
What we could read: 15,440,276.58 AAVE circulating of a 16,000,000 maximum, at about $130.4 (CoinGecko, 6 November). That is a market cap of about $2.01B. Governance sets the parameters and listings that failed in April, so not knowing who holds the vote is a real gap.
Track record. Red, unchanged, for the reason that has not changed. The DeFiLlama hacks registry, current to 5 November, still lists only two Aave entries: August 2024 ($56k) and the March 2026 CAPO misconfiguration ($862k).
The April rsETH exploit is filed under Kelp ($293M), and the 29 October event under Binance CEX. Those filings correctly say who was hacked. They say nothing about who carries the loss.
On Aave's own books the loss is 52,964.45 WETH, recognized between 30 April and 13 May 2026 and unchanged since. Archive reads on eth.drpc.org at blocks 26,014,704, 26,214,400 and 26,279,936, plus the latest block on two nodes, all return the same 52,964,453,912,595,963,038,573 wei.
Of the older episodes, the 2022 CRV squeeze is closed. The March 2026 CAPO wrongful Ліквідація Коли позика перевищує LLTV або позиції на біржі бракує маржі, її примусово закривають і продають заставу, зазвичай зі штрафом. ($21.7M to $27M) were compensated.
The October Binance event adds no loss to Aave. It does add a pattern. After Kelp, Aave was again the deepest pool against which someone could turn stolen assets into ETH. Forum posters note that cap-limiting proposals have been raised before and not adopted, among them an automated supply-cap updater and an automated cap controller. The roughly $71M of ETH held under a New York restraining notice since May was not re-checked this run.
Worst case
The worst case is the same failure happening twice. An asset outside Aave fails or is stolen, someone posts it as collateral, and Aave's suppliers end up holding the result.
In April the collateral was worthless rsETH. The shortfall landed on the WETH reserve and has sat there for six months.
In October the collateral was real but stolen USDT. Here the damage was limited to three things: a frozen protocol, eight days of no new borrowing against stablecoins, and a WETH debt of 19,762 still owed by the exploiter's wallet. That position is over-collateralized, and liquidators can take it like any other. An independent forum post put its health factor at 1.054 on 31 October, liquidatable if ETH rises to about $2,365 on Aave's oracle. The same post notes that Tether has blacklisted the exploiter's address. The collateral, however, sits as aUSDT inside Aave's reserve, outside that blacklist.
A second independent post raised a question nobody has answered. Its fork test, which assumed stablecoin funding, shows that someone with enough eligible collateral could have pushed WETH to 100% utilization within minutes. Rate limits are meant for exactly that scenario, and today Aave has none at the protocol level.
The backstop has not changed. Umbrella's WETH module was paused in April so that it could not be slashed automatically, and covering the deficit was left to governance. Six months later, governance has not covered it.
A delegate's vote rationale from October records an Umbrella parameter update that sunsets the GHO Umbrella market and moves future GHO deficits onto the DAO treasury. We did not confirm that it executed. The backstop is getting narrower, not wider.
Bottom line
Caution, held. This report does not change what we know. It adds six weeks of evidence for it.
Aave V3 remains one of the most audited and most liquid venues in DeFi. The core code has never been exploited, and the yield is real. But the April loss is still on the WETH reserve to the wei, with no repayment plan we could find. The October freeze showed two things: the Guardian keys act fast and broadly, and Aave is still the first place stolen assets go to become ETH. The deficit's fall from $139M to $118M in dollars is ETH falling, not the DAO paying.
What to do with this:
- Stick to Core and Prime with blue-chip collateral.
- Expect that a freeze or a 0% LTV can arrive without notice and last more than a week.
- Do not plan on borrowing against USDC or USDT on V3 until LTV is restored.
- Size a WETH supply position as if 2.52% of it may never be repaid.
Next month, re-check:
- whether the deficit has been eliminated
- whether stablecoin LTV is back
- how the tBTC freeze resolved
- whether the V3.8 audits land
- whether the Guardian pauser change executed
- whether holder concentration can be read at all
Data appendix
- TVL: $15,778,102,619 (api.llama.fi/tvl/aave-v3, 2026-11-06, read twice the same day). Scope is the
aave-v3child only. Siblings: aave-v4 $768.2M (was $563.4M on 2026-09-20), aave-horizon-rwa $219.1M, aave-v2 $98.6M, aave-v1 $7.1M. Change against September's $18.058B: -12.6%. Recent prints: $16.044B (11-05), $15.109B (11-06 00:00 UTC), $15.778B (11-06 18:59 UTC, latest). Against the pre-exploit $25.668B (2026-04-17), today is 61.5%. Against the $45.444B ATH (2025-10-07), it is 34.7%. - Price context: ETH fell from $2,624.47 to about $2,225, or -15.2% (DeFiLlama coins; CoinGecko $2,229.90). TVL fell less than ETH.
- Unit composition, 2026-09-20 to the 2026-11-06 00:00 UTC snapshot: our own computation from DeFiLlama per-chain
tokens, net of borrows, summed by symbol. Directional only.- ETH family: 3,230,711 to 3,139,485 (-2.8%).
- weETH: 1,367,733 to 1,408,433 (+3.0%).
- wstETH: 956,136 to 847,732 (-11.3%).
- rsETH: 351,413 to 307,200 (-12.6%).
- WETH: 347,108 to 354,933 (+2.3%).
- WBTC: 37,378 to 37,247 (-0.4%).
- USDe: -17.5%. sUSDe: -30.5%. USDC: -57.2%. USDT: -9.9%. GHO: +49.8%.
- Against the 18:59 UTC snapshot the same day, the stablecoin figures swing: USDe +3.8%, USDC +110.3%, USDT -37.8%. ETH-family figures move by about two points at most (WETH +0.6%, wstETH -9.3%, rsETH -12.6%).
- The stablecoin flow signal is treated as unreadable this month: not verified in this review.
- WETH reserve deficit (central finding, re-verified):
getReserveDeficit(WETH)on Pool 0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2 returns 52,964,453,912,595,963,038,573 wei (52,964.45 WETH).- Identical at blocks 26,014,704, 26,214,400 and 26,279,936 (eth.drpc.org archive), and at the latest block (about 26,357,970) on both eth.drpc.org and ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com.
- aWETH totalSupply is about 2,098,985 (was 2,109,367.00), so the deficit is 2.52% of supply.
- About $117.9M at $2,225.41.
- Same-call deficits on other reserves: rsETH 0, wstETH 0.0069, USDC 1.60, USDT 0.88, tBTC negligible.
- Repayment search: forum searches for "deficit", "rsETH", "Kelp", "Umbrella" and "eliminateReserveDeficit" after 2026-09-19 found no repayment or coverage proposal for the V3 WETH deficit. Aave Labs' October update lists AIPs 524 to 531 and 533 to 538, and none is about it. One community post in the "Aave Will Win Framework" TEMP CHECK (topic 24055, 2026-09-20) says buybacks were halted "to cover the deficit". That is unverified, and the on-chain deficit is unchanged either way.
- Reserve configuration, Ethereum Core, read today via
getConfiguration:- USDT: LTV 0%, LT 78%, not frozen.
- USDC: LTV 0%, LT 78%, not frozen.
- WETH: LTV 81%, LT 84%.
- tBTC: LTV 0%, LT 78%, frozen.
- Aave Labs reports that the ETH and BTC collateral efficiency revision (AIP 536) was "set for execution" as of 2 November. Whether 81%/84% already reflects it: not verified in this review.
- Admin, on chain 2026-11-06: Protocol Guardian 0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30, threshold 4, 7 owners. Governance Guardian 0xCe52ab41C40575B072A18C9700091Ccbe4A06710, threshold 5, 9 owners. For both,
getOwners()output at block 26,014,704 and at the latest block is identical.- Executor timelocks (one day and seven days) and Risk Steward
getRiskConfig()bounds were not re-read this run: not verified in this review. - "[ARFC] Risk Stewards Cooldown Reduction & Umbrella Pauser Role Reassignment" (Risk Steward minDelay from 72 to 36 hours on seven cap and IRM parameters; Umbrella stkToken pause authority to the Protocol Guardian) is cited only in Areta's delegate rationale (topic 16780, 2026-10-06). Execution: not verified in this review.
- The 2026-09-11 forum post about a Governance Guardian signer who also sits on DeFi Saver's admin Safe was not re-checked: not verified in this review.
- Executor timelocks (one day and seven days) and Risk Steward
- Binance exploit response (governance.aave.com topic 25954; LlamaRisk posts 2026-10-30 00:59 and 13:51 UTC, and 2026-11-02 20:45 UTC):
- Between 20:58 and 21:01 UTC on 29 October, the exploiter supplied 60M USDT on V3 Ethereum Core and borrowed 19,762 WETH (about $44.6M).
- The position held $59.9M of collateral against $43.8M of debt.
- 175 V3 reserves on 16 networks and 117 V4 reserves on four networks were frozen between 21:42 and 23:04 UTC. No market was paused, and Horizon RWA was left open.
- GHO went from $0.998 to $0.997 as 4.6M GHO was redeemed through the GSM.
- Risk Steward batches: a temporary Slope2 cut capping the full-utilization rate at 10% APR (reverted 1 November), and borrow caps cut to about 2% above pre-exploit borrowing (about $3.7B of V3 capacity removed).
- LTV was set to 0 on USDT, USDC, USDT0, POL, WAVAX, sAVAX, XAUt, PAXG and OP. Non-stablecoin LTV was restored on 2 November. Stablecoins were still at 0 as of this pull.
- The exploiter health factor of 1.054 at block 26,311,998 and the fork test come from independent community posts (SrAugust, 0kage.eth), not from Aave service providers.
- The DeFiLlama hacks registry files the event as "Binance CEX", 2026-10-29, $6.36B.
- tBTC (topic 25965): a pre-emptive freeze on Ethereum Core executed at 10:01 UTC on 2026-10-31, after Threshold paused mints and redeems. Confirmed on chain. The conditions for restoring it are still open.
- Oracle: "[Direct-to-AIP] CAPO SnapshotRatio Update Across Aave V3: October 2026" (topic 25837, LlamaRisk, 2026-10-13), a follow-up to the May round. Per LlamaRisk's monthly update (topic 17935, 2026-11-06), it covers 27 reserves on 11 instances, with the widest spread 16.76% on Optimism wstETH and a snapshot 971 days old. Execution: not verified in this review. The long-tail oracle deprecation (AIP 526) executed in October, per Aave Labs' October update (topic 25979). Live CAPO config was not re-pulled: not verified in this review.
- Audits: 49 files in aave-dao/aave-v3-origin/audits, re-pulled via the GitHub API. The last commit to the path was 2026-03-31 ("docs: add v3.7 audits"). Newest audits: v3.7, 2026-03-26 to 03-31. "[ARFC] Aave V3.8" (topic 25891, 2026-10-21): Certora plus third-party audits are planned before the AIP.
- Umbrella:
- AIP 528 (topic 25700, 2026-09-25) renews reward allowances through 2026-12-02: 500,000 aEthUSDT, 475,000 aEthUSDC and 160 aEthWETH.
- Whether stkwaWETH is still paused (paused under topic 24595, April 2026): not verified in this review.
- The GHO Umbrella sunset, with GHO deficits moved to the treasury, is cited in Areta's delegate rationale (topic 16780, 2026-10-06). Execution: not verified in this review.
- AAVE token: 15,440,276.58 of 16,000,000 circulating, about $130.4, market cap $2.014B (CoinGecko, 2026-11-06). September: 15,428,077.06 at $140.65.
- GHO: $0.9986 (CoinGecko, 2026-11-06). The October GHO Stewards update raised the Core borrow rate from 4.25% to 4.50%.
- Holder concentration: not verified in this review. Nansen
token_current_top_holdersreturned 403 (Pro required) on 2026-11-06. Etherscan has been Pro-only for the three prior runs. This is the fourth consecutive month unverified. - Incident registry: DeFiLlama hacks API (latest entry 2026-11-05).
- Aave entries: 2024-08-28 Aave $56,000; 2026-03-12 Aave V3 $862,000, Oracle Misconfiguration.
- Related entries: Kelp 2026-04-18 $293M, Cross-Chain Message Spoofing; Binance CEX 2026-10-29 $6.36B.
- No new Aave entry since September.
- Legal tail: about $71M of ETH under the SDNY restraining notice since May 2026. Not re-checked this run: not verified in this review.
Maintained monthly. Methodology: DeFi Research Instruction v2.